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FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS*

By NORMAN J. PADELFORD

THE financial difficulties of the United Nations have become one of the pressing issues of contemporary international affairs. They have roots that extend to the heart of the politics of the Organization and its procedure. Beyond this they raise serious questions about the ability of the institution to function effectively in the future. To grasp the complex problems associated with the UN financial situation it is necessary to view the matter in some perspective.

I. Overall Expenses of the United Nations

The United Nations is no exception to the general rule that it costs money to run deliberative bodies and operating programs. As in the national scene, the UN has also found itself confronted with appeals and demands that have resulted in rising expenditures and the need for appealing for ever larger contributions. From an initial operating budget of $25 million, the expenditures of the United Nations and the affiliated Specialized Agencies have risen to $480 million in 1962.[1]

These comprise the assessments for the Regular Budget, the Specialized Agencies, and the peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo, together with voluntary contributions for the special voluntary programs such as the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund. The relationship of these component expenses is shown in Figure 1. This of course does not represent the entire

* The author is indebted to the Brookings Institution for permission to draw upon data developed for its recent project on the United Nations Financing System. He is also appreciative of assistance by Richard H. Solomon, Catherine McArdle, and Margaret Windus on the research and computations.

[1] The most generally useful sources on UN finances are the Annual Reports of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the General Assembly, the Financial Reports and Accounts for each calendar year combined with the Report of the Board of Auditors, and the Official Records of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Much useful information will also be found in the Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, on S. 2768, a Bill to Promote the Foreign Policy of the United States by authorizing the Purchase of United Nations Bonds and the Appropriation of Funds therefor, June 27 to July 26, 1962 (cited hereinafter as *Purchase of United Nations Bonds*). See also Norman J. Padelford, *The Rising Cost of United Nations Membership* (Cambridge, M.I.T. Center for International Studies, C/63-2, 1963), one of a series of papers prepared for the Brookings project.

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

Compiled from Information on the Operations and Financing of the United Nations, Feb. 6, 1962, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 69-70, 40-41.

FIG. 1. RISING COST OF THE UNITED NATIONS

"cost" to member states of participating in the United Nations, for there are also expenses for maintaining permanent missions in New York and Geneva, communications, travel, attendance at meetings, and the time and salaries of the numerous personnel involved in planning and executing national policies with respect to the United Nations.

Taken in comparison with the amounts spent on the League of Nations—$6,128,000 at its height in 1935—the annual expenses of the United Nations seem very large. But compared with government expenditures in many states, they are really very small.

In noting the rise in UN expenses since 1946, it should be borne in mind that the purchasing power of the dollar has declined about 20 per cent in this period of time. Thus, if the direct outlay for the UN in assessments and contributions were to be expressed in terms of a constant-value dollar, the current level would more nearly approximate $390 million.

In considering what has happened to UN expenses over seventeen years it must also be borne in mind that in 1945-1946 the United States and others countries were supporting the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to the extent of over $1 billion. This was administered separately from the United Nations as such, but the expenditures for it must not be overlooked. Furthermore, between 1947 and 1950 over $412 million was laid out for the International

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Refugee Organization. Taking these expenditures into account, the United Nations and its affiliated programs are in fact costing a good deal less today than international activities did in the immediate post-war period.

In the area of routine annual operating expenses the rise from $19 to $82 million over sixteen years has been fairly moderate, considering the many demands that have been thrust upon the Organization, the continual series of meetings held under UN auspices, the doubling of the membership, and the gravity of the world situation. These expenses would of course have become much higher had some of the more expensive special voluntary programs such as technical assistance or the emergency peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo been put on the Regular Budget instead of being covered by voluntary contributions or placed on special assessment accounts. Figure 1 shows what the cumulative total has amounted to.

By decision of the General Assembly, the operating expenses of the Organization are apportioned among the member states according to a scale of assessment that is based on relative national income and revised periodically. Apportionments currently range from a minimum of .04 per cent to a high of 32.02 per cent. Not counting the states admitted at the XVIth and XVIIth sessions, at the present time 32 states pay the minimum rate of .04 per cent. An additional 48 are assessed less than 1 per cent, 14 are assessed at rates ranging from 1 to 5 per cent. Only 4 countries pay over 5 per cent—France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States.[2] All of the states admitted since mid-1961 will pay less than 1 per cent. The four major powers contribute 60 per cent of the UN's operating expense revenue.

The cost pattern of the programs financed by government voluntary contributions shows a much steeper rise and now accounts for 43 per cent of the overall UN expenditures. The income for these programs—refugee work, relief, UNICEF, technical assistance, and the like—has indeed provided, on an average, twice as much income and outlay as the Regular Budget since 1956. This is, therefore, a substantial element in the UN financing picture. Without this form of support many undertakings could not have been carried forward as they have been. At the same time it must be noted that the number of states contributing to these programs has varied greatly, from as few as 18 for the Economic Fund for the Congo to 92 for the Children's Fund. EPTA and the Special Fund have enlisted pledges from 97 member states for

[2] General Assembly Resolution 1691 (XVI), December 18, 1961, set the apportionment rates for 1962, 1963, and 1964.

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1963. This is the high-water mark for the number of states contributing. Contributions have also varied enormously, as might be expected. One thing that stands out in this area is the large giving record of the United States. The percentages of U.S. contributions to the totals of these programs are summarized in Table I. In every instance the United States has given more than its apportionment share under the assessment system. No other state has as consistent a record of liberal giving.

TABLE I. PER CENT OF UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO TOTALS OF VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS, 1946-1961

Children's Fund	62.1	UNHCR Current Programs	38.3
UNRWA	68.4	Special Fund for Hungarian Refugees	51.3
UNKRA	65.1	United Nations Special Fund	41.0
EPTA	49.4	Economic Fund for the Congo	65.7
UN Refugee Fund	35.5	Fund for Algerian Refugees	49.6

Since 1946 the United States has contributed voluntarily over $1 billion to UN activities. The nation can take pride in the leadership it has shown in supporting the worthwhile causes represented by these programs. Much good has been done through them in alleviating want and despair and enabling some activities to go on that otherwise could not have gotten off the ground.

The expenditure curve for the nine Specialized Agencies most closely associated with the United Nations shows a close parallel to that of the UN Regular Budget, as seen in Figure 1, and requires little comment. Suffice it to say that the $70 million figure is a relatively modest one, considering the number of agencies involved and the global nature of the services they render.

The factor that has done more than anything else in recent years to catapult United Nations expenditures has been the maintenance of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East since 1957 and the military operations in the Congo since the summer of 1960. Table II shows what this has done to UN costs and assessments since 1956. Putting aside for the moment considerations of attitude on how the costs of these operations should be shared—and this has been at the heart of much of the dispute over what to do about UN finances—it is this jump in assessments from $48 million to approximately $221 million in six years that has alarmed Members of the UN and led to rising opposition to paying assessments. Many have alleged that payments were becoming "unbearable." Far from lightening the burden of the

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TABLE II. UN ASSESSMENTS, 1956-1962

			Members
1956—Regular	Budget	$ 48,330,000	76
1957—Regular	Budget	49,088,050	
UNEF		15,028,988	
	Total	64,117,038	76
1958—Regular	Budget	51,502,289	
UNEF		25,000,000	
	Total	76,502,289	83
1959—Regular	Budget	61,500,000	
UNEF		15,205,000	
	Total	76,705,000	82
1960—Regular	Budget	58,347,514	
UNEF		20,000,000	
UNOC		48,500,000	
	Total	126,847,514	82
1961—Regular	Budget	69,399,839	
UNEF		19,000,000	
UNOC		120,000,000	
	Total	208,399,839	99
1962—Regular	Budget	82,144,740	
UNEF		19,500,000	
UNOC		120,000,000	
	Total	221,644,740	99*

* Not including states admitted at XVIth Session.

assessments seriously, the increase in membership that has taken place during this same period has principally brought into the Organization a large number of low-income countries upon whom any assessment, however small, might seem onerous. Thus, the effect of the increase in membership has been rather to heighten the chorus of those calling for reductions and for the Great Powers to pay more of the bill. How real the burden is has concerned not a few observers as the costs have crept up and defaults in payments have multiplied. Obviously the burden varies greatly from country to country, depending upon such vari-

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ables as the capital structure, national income, the stage of development, and the competitions that exist for the allocation of scarce resources.

II. Current Cost of United Nations Membership

The amounts assessed each state for participation in the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, *plus* the voluntary contributions made by it to the various voluntary programs, express in one way what the United Nations is costing member states. Table III gives these figures for each state in 1961. These include the assessments for UNEF and the Congo operation, with allowance for the rebates that were authorized that year for states receiving technical assistance from the UN. For comparative purposes, the states have been listed in a rank order regression from the country with the largest total payments to that with the smallest.

The figures show that the cost of participating in the United Nations at this time ranges from $201,541,993 on the part of the United States to $45,193 for Dahomey. The median in the cost curve falls at $325,972. This is the amount paid by Uruguay, a state which was assessed to pay .12 per cent on the normal scale of apportionment of UN expenses. The figures given in Table III do not indicate what each state actually paid, for many defaulted on one or more of their assessments in 1961 and 1962. The "cost" represented in this table is therefore what membership would have cost *if* each state paid in full what was assigned to it in addition to the voluntary contributions which it actually made.

Expressing the national assessments and contributions as a percentage of the total received by and due to the UN, the high and low percentages will be seen in Column 4 to extend from 46.91 per cent for the United States—all of which was paid—to .011 per cent for the smallest contributor, with the median located at .076 per cent. The large voluntary contributions made by the United States explain the 14 per cent excess over the 32.51 per cent the country was assessed, as shown in Column 5. Aside from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, New Zealand, and the UAR, the record reveals that most UN members have been providing a smaller percentage of the total support than their assessment ratios, owing to the weighting introduced by the voluntary contributions. The Soviet Union and most of its satellites stand far below their apportionment levels in this respect.

The contributions made to the UN through assessments and voluntary payments express the external monetary cost of membership to the various states. They do not tell, however, what the cost amounts

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to in terms of the resources and productivity of each country. If the payments made *and* due to the United Nations are taken as a percentage of each state's gross national product, a fairly objective measure of the relative cost of UN membership can be obtained. GNP statistics do not tell the entire story about each country's means or its ability to pay, but GNP is a reasonably straightforward, stable index of national capacity that is almost universally accepted. It is a politically neutral concept. It does not bring into question controversial issues, such as a nation's economic effectiveness, the form of its government, or the extent of governmental control over the economy. It affords a fairly objective basis on which to compare relative means at any given time. Estimates of the gross national product of each Member of the United Nations, made with the assistance of the 7090 Computer at the M.I.T. Computation Center, are given in Column 2 of Table III. These show a spread from an estimated $525 billion for the United States in 1961 to $33 million for Congo Brazzaville.

By figuring each nation's payments to the United Nations as a percentage of its GNP, the percentages shown in Column 3 of Table III are reached. The principal fact which emerges from this calculation is the very small percentage of GNP which payments to the UN represent. No state contributes as much as one-half of 1 per cent of its GNP to the United Nations. Few even approach this figure. The contributions of 63 of the 97 states compared in 1961 fall between .015 and .035 per cent. Aside from the special situation of China, whose assessments are based on the resources of mainland China, and of Liberia, which has made large voluntary contributions for the Congo operation, there is a relatively small difference in the percentages of GNP being tapped. In a few instances—particularly in the cases of Congo Brazzaville, Libya, Gabon, Togo, Laos, and Somalia, which are among the states with the lowest incomes—UN payments do represent a somewhat higher burden, but only to a fractional degree.

What does stand out prominently in the comparison of UN payments as a percentage of GNP is that United Nations membership is costing the Soviet Union, Byelorussia, and the Ukrainian SSR, which have an estimated combined GNP of $169 billion, only a hair more than it is costing Peru, which has an estimated GNP of $1.8 billion, and less than it is costing India with an estimated GNP of $31 billion. In terms of individual means the discrepancy is no less striking. For with its large population the estimated per capita GNP of India in 1961 was only $73, and that of Peru $164, while that of the Soviet Union was figured at $746. The percentage of GNP being devoted to the United Nations

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TABLE III. THE COST OF UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP

UN Members by Rank Order of Payments to UN	*Assm'ts. & Contrbn's. 1961, US $**	*GNP, 1961 U.S. $ (millions)*	*Payments to UN as % of GNP, 1961*	*% Total UN Contrbn's. 1961*	*Normal Assm't. Scale*
United States	201,541,993	525,437	.038	46.910	32.51
United Kingdom	37,713,116	73,491	.051	8.778	7.78
USSR	35,438,809	169,621	.021	8.249	13.62
France	21,238,174	60,628	.035	4.943	6.40
Canada	16,515,883	37,293	.044	3.844	3.11
Sweden	8,642,794	12,706	.068	2.012	1.39
China	8,331,831	1,705	.489	1.939	5.01
Netherlands	8,232,175	11,701	.070	1.916	1.01
India	8,198,340	31,435	.026	1.908	2.46
Italy	7,999,045	33,412	.024	1.862	2.25
Australia	6,816,300	7,262	.039	1.587	1.79
Japan	6,333,369	41,179	.015	1.474	2.19
Ukraine SSR	4,669,773	incl. in USSR	—	1.087	1.80
Denmark	4,165,898	6,190	.067	.970	.60
Belgium	4,161,554	12,646	.033	.969	1.30
Brazil	3,231,989	18,082	.018	.752	1.02
Norway	3,220,606	4,642	.069	.750	.49
Poland	3,049,760	17,480	.017	.710	1.37
Czechoslovakia	2,293,115	8,902	.026	.534	.87
Argentina	2,226,681	9,852	.023	.518	1.11
New Zealand	2,049,603	3,812	.054	.477	.42
Mexico	1,962,302	11,236	.017	.457	.71
Turkey	1,826,324	6,326	.029	.425	.59
Spain	1,786,262	8,638	.021	.416	.93
UAR	1,580,791	4,149	.035	.368	.32
Austria	1,566,614	5,985	.026	.365	.43
Venezuela	1,500,050	7,437	.020	.349	.50
South Africa	1,489,326	7,752	.019	.347	.56
Byelorussia SSR	1,322,067	incl. in USSR	—	.308	.47
Pakistan	1,179,831	6,707	.018	.275	.40
Yugoslavia	1,149,535	5,274	.022	.268	.35
Finland	1,127,336	4,688	.024	.262	.36
Indonesia	974,464	9,165	.011	.227	.47
Philippines	966,524	6,209	.016	.225	.43
Rumania	887,327	8,021	.011	.207	.34
Iran	867,220	2,428	.036	.202	.21
Chile	863,113	4,555	.019	.201	.27
Colombia	834,277	5,082	.016	.194	.31
Hungary	773,204	6,598	.012	.180	.42
Cuba	620,432	2,633	.024	.144	.25
Thailand	607,978	2,461	.025	.142	.16
Greece	505,424	3,320	.015	.118	.23
Nigeria	451,744	2,921	.015	.105	.21
Israel	419,071	2,597	.016	.098	.14
Liberia	406,822	164	.248	.095	.04
Peru	386,081	1,853	.021	.090	.11
Portugal	379,561	2,402	.016	.088	.21
Ireland	373,025	1,896	.020	.087	.16
Morocco	353,109	2,070	.017	.082	.14
Uruguay	325,972	1,275	.026	.076	.12
Bulgaria	301,898	4,101	.007	.070	.16

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TABLE III (continued)

UN Members by Rank Order of Payments to UN	*Assm'ts. & Contrbn's. 1961, US $**	*GNP, 1961 U.S. $ (millions)*	*Payments to UN as % of GNP, 1961*	*% Total UN Contrbn's. 1961*	*Normal Assm't. Scale*
Iraq	284,650	1,435	.020	.066	.09
Burma	276,701	1,304	.021	.064	.08
Sudan	265,136	1,124	.024	.062	.06
Ghana	243,853	1,541	.016	.057	.07
Ceylon	227,254	1,363	.017	.053	.10
Jordan	223,175	265	.084	.052	.04
Ecuador	187,169	941	.020	.044	.06
Ethiopia	182,758	1,288	.014	.043	.06
Lebanon	181,439	575	.032	.042	.05
Malaya	167,358	2,927	.006	.039	.17
Tunisia	155,760	764	.020	.036	.05
Saudi Arabia	149,383	1,155	.013	.035	.06
Afghanistan	146,960	721	.020	.034	.06
El Salvador	141,232	549	.026	.033	.05
Guatemala	140,468	699	.020	.033	.05
Luxembourg	138,103	504	.027	.032	.06
Libya	135,739	89	.153	.032	.04
Costa Rica	131,726	488	.027	.031	.04
Honduras	123,722	396	.031	.029	.04
Dominican Rep.	118,595	721	.016	.028	.05
Haiti	118,484	403	.029	.028	.04
Bolivia	117,793	344	.034	.027	.04
Senegal	109,791	247	.044	.026	.06
Panama	107,301	436	.025	.025	.04
Laos	106,648	137	.078	.025	.04
Guinea	101,500	167	.020	.024	.04
Iceland	101,421	192	.053	.024	.04
Nicaragua	99,783	319	.031	.023	.04
Paraguay	94,484	205	.046	.022	.04
Cambodia	90,237	505	.017	.021	.04
Albania	80,573	370	.021	.019	.04
Cameroun	77,696	343	.023	.018	.04
Madagascar	74,661	559	.013	.017	.04
Ivory Coast	73,571	333	.022	.017	.04
Togo	65,182	63	.103	.015	.04
Nepal	65,026	491	.013	.015	.04
Congo (L)	60,382	1,257	.005	.014	.04
Yemen	60,226	367	.016	.014	.04
Central Afr. Rep.	59,783	131	.046	.014	.04
Mali	57,735	392	.015	.013	.04
Cyprus	57,653	227	.025	.013	.04
Congo (B)	56,515	33	.171	.013	.04
Upper Volta	55,796	397	.014	.013	.04
Somalia	55,286	78	.071	.013	.04
Chad	53,258	293	.018	.012	.04
Gabon	53,075	46	.115	.012	.04
Niger	48,973	271	.018	.011	.04
Dahomey	45,193	182	.025	.011	.04

* Figures given include total amounts assessed, after rebates where granted under Resolutions A/1732-1733 (XVI), whether paid in full or not, plus voluntary contributions.

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by the people of the United Kingdom is approximately twice that of the Soviet Union. In the case of the Netherlands, it is three times that of the USSR.

The bearing of these percentages must be viewed of course in the light of each state's unique circumstances. In countries where large sectors of the national economy are controlled by the government, payment may be somewhat easier to make than where most of the wealth is in private hands. Among most of the newer countries there are naturally great needs and pressures to devote the maximum possible resources to economic and social development. As UN costs and assessments rise, increased payments will tend to seem most onerous to those whose economic growth rate does not keep pace with the rising costs, for the "marginal value" of each extra dollar they are called upon to pay will seem greater to them than to those with a cushion of larger resources and income. Countries having difficulties in obtaining hard currencies find payments more difficult to make than those with ample foreign exchange. Thus, although the percentages of GNP represented in UN payments are in no wise large, there are variables that differentiate the load which any given percentage, however small, may constitute. And in all countries appropriations for the United Nations are to some extent in competition with demands for local interests and needs and with such basic concerns as national defense. The GNP computations throw much doubt, however, on assertions that UN costs are an unduly heavy burden on the economies of member states, especially where states are receiving substantial foreign aid from the United States or elsewhere.

Senator Hubert Humphrey in a recent Hearing inserted in the public record an estimate that the "total cost of the operations of the United Nations to the United States" since 1946, including the cost of all refugee programs, has been $1,864,218,000 for 17 years. This is slightly over $100 million a year, or, as he figured it, "approximately 75 cents per man, woman and child per year for the entire operations" of the United Nations for 17 years. To carry his estimate one point further, the $100 million a year "is one-fourth the cost of the *Enterprise* carrier; that is less than the cost of the maintenance of one division of troops in West Germany, troops without equipment or not having been delivered, just arrived."[3]

Dollar outlay figures for participation in the United Nations give

[3] Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *Review of United States Participation in the United Nations*, 88th Congress, 1st Session, March 13, 1963, 35-36.

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only one side of the picture. There are intangible elements, not readily reducible to dollar figures, which lie on the *asset* side of the ledger. These must not be overlooked when contemplating what the United Nations is costing member states. For instance, if the United Nations were not in existence, many states would have to spend something more than they now are for national security, for additional representation costs, for information-gathering, and the like. There are, furthermore, numerous benefits which states receive from the presence of the institution and its various programs.

Many of the developing countries receive tangible amounts of economic or technical assistance. There are the advantages of the ease of negotiating simultaneously with many governments at the UN headquarters. Dollar symbols cannot be attached to the political support that can be marshaled behind national positions at UN meetings, or against policies that run counter to vital interests. World-wide publicity can be gained for leading statements or positions taken at the United Nations. Information gathered by UN agencies on such matters as economic, demographic, political, and other conditions in various parts of the world is invaluable. UN instrumentalities have also made contributions to maintaining peace and security that cannot be reduced to dollar terms. These have often benefited the large powers as well as the smaller states. For the United States in particular, there is a prestige value in having the headquarters of the world organization in New York, attracting as it does leaders and visitors from all over the world. These things all offset, to varying degrees, outlays made to support the United Nations and its various operations and programs. To consider the dollar costs of membership in the United Nations without at the same time considering the advantages and benefits derived from the presence of the Organization gives an unbalanced and unreal picture of the cost of the United Nations.

III. Financing Peace and Security Operations

The special assessments needed to support the peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo have been the principal factor behind the sharp rise in UN costs since 1956 and the source of its financial woes. Because of the magnitude of the added payments and dispute over who should pay for these operations, many states have opposed proration of these expenditures at the normal scale of apportionment and withheld some or all of their assessments.

A statement supplied to the Congress by the Department of State in 1962 contained the nub of the opposition which these assessments raised:

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"This opposition was based primarily on three propositions. First, it was contended that the Charter contemplated that peace and security actions should be carried out primarily by the five permanent members of the Security Council who would furnish their troops without cost to other U.N. members. Accordingly it was argued that the five permanent members of the Security Council should pay considerably more than their ordinary assessment percentages for peace and security operations such as UNEF and ONUC, particularly since in neither case were they furnishing manpower. Second, it was maintained that in accordance with principles of equity the 'aggressors' who made U.N. peace and security actions a necessity, plus 'parties in interest' should pay all or most of the expenses. Finally, it was argued that regardless of other considerations, some member states had such limited financial resources that they simply could not contribute on the basis of the regular scale of assessments to the expenses of such costly operations as UNEF and ONUC."[4]

Mindful of the first and last of these arguments where they were sincerely advanced, and desirous of seeing the UN peace-keeping efforts succeed, Washington made a series of voluntary contributions to the UN expressly for these operations from 1957 to 1962. The amounts of these contributions are shown in Table IV. In the first years of UNEF, the contributions were used to reduce the total budget costs and the

TABLE IV. UNITED STATES VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, 1957-1962

Year	*UNEF*	*UNOC*	
1957	3,170,850		
1958	9,750,000		
	1,191,581	(waivered airlift)	
1959	3,500,000		
1960	3,200,00	3,900,000	
		10,317,622	(waivered airlift)
1961	1,800,000	15,305,596	
1962	1,320,000	11,400,800	
Total	23,932,431	40,924,018	

SOURCE: Compiled from Appendices 14 and 15, *Purchase of United Nations Bonds*, 374-75.

[4] *Purchase of United Nations Bonds*, 340. The United Nations military operation in the Congo is referred to in this statement as ONUC; the Anglicized initials UNOC will be employed elsewhere.

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balance was then assessed against all members. Later the procedure was modified so that the contributions were applied only to the assessments of states least able to pay. As a result of negotiations at the United Nations, the criterion chosen for determining who should be included in the list of those having reduced assessments was qualification for assistance under the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. With increasing numbers of states registering demands for relief from the assessments after the magnitude of the Congo operation became fully evident, the General Assembly declared that these were "extraordinary expenses," "essentially different in nature" from the normal operating expenses, and that a "procedure different from that applied in the case of the regular budget" should be employed. Accordingly, after further declaring that the Members of the Security Council have a special responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, the General Assembly decided in December 1961 to grant rebates extending from 50 to 80 per cent for states receiving or eligible to receive technical assistance from the UN. At the same time it appealed to all member states who were in a position to do so to make voluntary contributions to offset the deficit created by the rebates and to assist the general financing.[5]

This "mixed" arrangement, embodying both voluntary and assessment elements and exceptions from the normal scale of apportionment, was at most an expedient hammered out after laborious negotiation. Apportionment of some part of the cost to all member states by assessment emphasized the responsibility of each state, no matter how small or poor, for assuming some part of the costs of Organization peace-keeping functions. The singling out of the Permanent Members of the Security Council as having a "special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, therefore, for contributing to the financing of peace and security operations" laid it on the line that those Members who refused to pay their assessments for these activities —namely, France and the Soviet Union—were shirking on the job in the sight of the majority in the General Assembly. The rebate feature acknowledged that there are differences in the capacities of states to bear the added amounts needed to defray peace-keeping costs. The pro-

[5] See Resolutions 1732 (XVI) and 1733 (XVI), adopted December 20, 1961. The final vote on the first resolution, to provide for the Congo financing, was 66-13-15; on the resolution for UNEF, 61-11-24. The XVIIth General Assembly was unable to decide how to finance the UNOC costs after July 1, 1962, and passed the problem on to a Special Working Group that was asked to report not later than April 1, 1963. Meanwhile, standing obligations were to be met out of voluntary contributions and proceeds from the bond sale. See Resolutions 1854 (XVII), December 19, 1962, and 1864 (XVII) and 1865 (XVII), December 20, 1962.

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vision for voluntary contributions helped to make it feasible to lighten the burden on the developing countries. And the arrangement permitted United States assessments to remain at no more than one-third of the total, in keeping with United States law.[6]

Although this compromise package succeeded in obtaining a two-thirds vote in the XVIth General Assembly, it was essentially a stop-gap measure and had some serious limitations. Other than appeals for voluntary contributions, it contained no provision for making up the deficits resulting from the rebates granted to states eligible to receive them. No penalty or sanction was built into the system to induce those inclined to be wayward in payment to fulfill their assessments. Nor was any provision made for support of the Organization in the event there were non-payments. To be sure, Article 19 of the Charter does stand in the background as a mild sanction. It has not yet been tested. It provides that a state "shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years." But it then permits exceptions to be made if the Assembly finds that non-payment is due to "conditions beyond the control" of a state. What are the "conditions beyond the control" of a Member that would excuse failure to pay in the eyes of the Assembly? The Charter gives no guidance on this point. Hence, the General Assembly must decide the point when it may be raised. Without explicit guidance or precedents, it remains to be seen how the Assembly will interpret the Article and whether it will take firm action when the time of testing is reached, whoever the parties may be that are in arrears. Diplomacy may be able to find some carrot-and-stick formula that will induce sufficient payments to keep the Organization going. But it is by no means sure that the United Nations will not undergo a major constitutional crisis if large numbers of Members continue to hold back their payments and efforts are made to apply Article 19.

[6] The limitation placed by the United States Congress upon American contributions will be found in Public Law 495, July 10, 1952, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, as follows:

"No representative of the United States Government in any international organization after fiscal year 1953 shall make any commitment requiring the appropriation of funds for a contribution by the United States in excess of 33 1/3 per centum of the budget of any international organization for which the appropriation for the United States contribution is contained in this Act: *Provided*, however, that this section shall not apply to the United States representatives to the inter-American organizations.

"No representative of the United States Government to any international organization of which the United States is now a member shall, unless specifically authorized in an appropriation Act or other law, make any commitment requiring the appropriation of funds for a contribution by the United States in excess of 33 1/3 per centum of the budget of such international organization." (66 Stat. 549, 550-51.)

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IV. Financial Crisis

The crux of the financial crisis that has confronted the United Nations since 1961 lies in the failure of an increasing number of states to pay their assessments on time or in full, and the refusal of some—led by France and the Soviet Union—to pay one or another of their peacekeeping obligations. Table V summarizes the situation. The difficulty

Table V. Summary of Assessments Due and Received as at December 31, 1962

	Total Amount Assessed US $	*Amount Received (incl. credits)*	*Per Cent Received*	*Balance Due US $*
1959 Reg. Budget	61,500,000.00	61,497,944.00	99.99	2,056.00
1960 Reg. Budget	58,347,514.00	58,302,054.00	99.92	45,460.00
1961 Reg. Budget	69,347,807.00	64,924,123.10	93.55	4,475,715.90
1960 for New Member States	52,032.00			
1962 Reg. Budget	74,124,117.00	60,899,485.62	82.16	13,224,631.38
UNEF 1957	15,028,988.00	11,040,057.00	73.46	3,988,931.00
UNEF 1958	25,000,000.00	17,740,741.00	70.96	7,259,259.00
UNEF 1959	15,205,000.00	10,850,117.00	71.36	4,354,883.00
UNEF 1960	20,000,000.00	15,269,623.91	76.35	4,730,376.09
UNEF 1961	18,989,898.00	14,106,255.32	74.24	4,893,744.68
1960 for New Member States	10,102.00			
UNEF 1962	9,750,000.00	7,330,554.50	75.19	2,419,445.50
Congo 1960	48,500,000.00	31,185,891.38	64.30	17,314,108.62
Congo 1961	100,000,000.00	69,829,562.93	69.83	30,170,437.07
Congo 1962	80,000,000.00	51,274,933.54	64.09	28,725,066.46

Source: United Nations Secretariat, *Statement on the Collection of Contributions as at 31 December 1962*, ST/ADM/SER.B/168, January 2, 1963, Table IX.

Note: The assessments for both the UNEF and the Congo accounts for 1962 covered expenses only through June 30. The Congo account extended back to November 1, 1961. The XVIIth Session of the General Assembly did not decide upon the assessments for the remainder of the calendar year or for 1963 before adjourning in December 1962.

is clearly seen in the failure of the UNEF account to receive more than 76 per cent of the amount needed in any year, and of the Congo assessments to net more than 69 per cent of the amounts required from the membership. Furthermore, it will be seen that in 1962 the percentage received for the Regular Budget took a sharp drop. What this adds up to is that, as of the end of 1962, Members of the United Nations owed the Organization $122 million for expenses dating from 1957 through 1962. To this amount must be added the expenditures that have been accumulating since July 1, 1962, at the rate of $1 million a month for

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UNEF and $10 million a month for UNOC. The UN bonds, to which 58 countries had either subscribed or pledged a total of $139,003,937 up to March 1963,[7] will take care of a part of the current running expenses. But this will not enable the Organization to become fully solvent unless large numbers of member states resume paying their assessments.

TABLE VI. NUMBERS OF STATES HAVING BALANCES DUE ON ASSESSMENTS
(Figures as of December 31, 1962)

	1957		*1958*		*1959*	
	*R.B.**	*UNEF*	*R.B.*	*UNEF*	*R.B.*	*UNEF*
African[1]	0	1	0	1	0	1
Arab[2]	0	7	0	8	0	8
Asian[3]	0	2	0	2	0	2
Latin American	0	7	0	7	2	10
Soviet Bloc	0	9	0	9	0	9
Western European	0	2	0	2	0	2
Other[4]	0	1	0	1	0	1
	0	29	0	30	2	33

	1960			*1961*			*1962*		
	R.B.	*UNEF*	*UNOC*	*R.B.*	*UNEF*	*UNOC*	*R.B.*	*UNEF#*	*UNOC#*
African	0	1	6	3	7	10	8	12	14
Arab	0	9	6	2	9	7	4	9	7
Asian	0	2	5	1	4	5	6	6	6
Latin American	4	13	18	8	16	18	15	18	20
Soviet Bloc	0	9	10	1	9	10	9	9	10
Western European	0	2	6	1	3	6	3	3	8
Other	0	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	2
	4	37	53	17	49	58	47	58	67

* Regular Budget
# Through June 30, 1962, only
[1] Except Arab League members and South Africa
[2] Arab League members
[3] Except for China (Taiwan)
[4] China (Taiwan), Israel, South Africa
SOURCE: Compiled from *Statement on the Collection of Contributions as at 31 December 1962, op.cit.*

The mounting wave of defaulting is depicted in Table VI. As of the beginning of 1963, 25 states had paid nothing at all on their UNEF assessments, and 48 had paid nothing on their Congo levies. The procession of non-payers has been led by a nucleus of Arab, Latin American, and Soviet bloc states who withheld payments first on UNEF, then

[7] *United Nations Review*, x (March 1963), 2.

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on the Congo. Since 1960 some of these states have withheld or delayed their payments for the Regular Budget assessments. None of the principal groupings of states has stood by the Organization en masse. Not a few of those who have been most vocal on the matter of the UN's playing a major role in maintaining international peace and security, and who voted for its engaging in these activities, have been among the major defectors. Included among these also are some who have received the principal benefits from the UN in the form of economic and technical assistance. It is such a record that raises the question of how seriously some Members mean to take their obligations under the Charter. Practice appears to deny what has been accepted in principle—namely, that maintaining international peace and security and supporting the Organization are responsibilities of all.

Speakers at the XVIIth session of the General Assembly, as on other occasions, hailed the "concept of universality of the United Nations," declaimed on its ability to meet the outstanding problems of international relations with firmness and wisdom, and underscored a worldwide "determination for its survival and development." The actions of some Members indicate that there is a considerable gulf between professions and actions. So long as large numbers of states continue to withhold payments for activities voted in a bona fide manner by large majorities in the General Assembly, the situation cannot fail to raise serious doubts about the future of the Organization. Unless it can pay its bills, it cannot for long fulfill the functions assigned to it by the Charter and confidence in it is likely to wane. The comparison is not to be pressed too far, but it cannot escape note that the fall-off in UN support today bears a resemblance to what happened to the League of Nations in the 1930's after the Manchurian episode.

The records show that by the end of 1962 less than one-quarter of the Members had paid all of their assessments for the period from 1957 to 1962, or from the date of their admission to the United Nations. Indeed less than one-half of the Members had paid all of their dues for the normal running expenses. As Table VII shows, only 41 states paid their assessments for supporting UNEF in full, and only 32 for the Congo operation. In the small company of 25 states fulfilling all assessments, 7 were Western European countries, 7 Asian states, 7 African members, and 4 classed as "others," including the United States.

It is not possible to document precisely what relationship may exist between United States foreign aid programs and payments to the United Nations. Examination of the records shows that there is relatively little correlation between the amounts received and constancy in

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TABLE VII. STATES HAVING PAID THEIR OBLIGATIONS IN FULL AS OF DECEMBER 1962

	Reg. Bud.	*UNEF*	*UNOC*		*Reg. Bud.*	*UNEF*	*UNOC*
Afghanistan	*			Lebanon	*		
Australia	*	*	*	Liberia	*	*	*
Austria	*	*		Libya	*		*
Burma	*	*	*	Luxembourg	*	*	
Cambodia		*		Madagascar	*	*	
Cameroon	*	*	*	Mali	*		
Canada	*	*	*	Mexico	*		
Cent. Afr. Rep.	*	*	*	Morocco	*		
Ceylon	*	*	*	Netherlands	*	*	*
Chad	*			New Zealand	*	*	*
Cyprus	*	*	*	Nigeria	*	*	*
Denmark	*	*	*	Norway	*	*	*
Dominican Rep.	*			Pakistan		*	*
Ecuador		*		Peru	*		
El Salvador	*			Philippines	*		*
Ethiopia	*			Portugal	*	*	
Fed. Malaya	*	*	*	Somalia	*	*	
Finland	*	*	*	South Africa	*	*	
France	*	*		Spain	*		
Gabon	*	*	*	Sudan			*
Iceland	*	*	*	Sweden	*	*	*
India		*	*	Thailand	*		
Indonesia	*	*	*	Togo	*		
Iraq	*			Tunisia	*	*	*
Ireland	*	*	*	Turkey	*	*	*
Israel		*	*	United Kingdom	*	*	
Italy		*	*	United States	*	*	*
Ivory Coast	*	*	*	Venezuela	*	*	
Japan	*	*	*	Yugoslavia	*	*	
Jordan	*			59	52	41	32

SOURCE: Compiled from *Statement on the Collection of Contributions as at 31 December 1962, op.cit.*

meeting UN obligations. Some of the largest recipients of American aid have been among the chief withholders. A few of the larger beneficiaries of U.S. aid, such as Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey, have met all of their payments. On the other hand, some countries that have received no U.S. aid, such as Australia, Canada, Finland, and New Zealand, have fulfilled all of their contributions. It is noted that no Latin American country has paid all of its obligations, and that one of America's principal allies, France, has been a leading standout against paying for the Congo operation.

The United States is the only Permanent Member of the Security Council that has met all of its financial obligations to the Organization when due. The United Kingdom has done so, with the exception of a short fall over this last year when it held up its Congo payment pend-

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ing settlement with the UN of certain sums due to it. It is now fully current. China has been behind for some time, but it made a payment in April 1963. The Soviet Union paid its Regular Budget assessment in January 1963, but continued to withhold on the peace-keeping accounts the $60 million due from it. Likewise France continued to withhold the $14 million assessed to it for the Congo. Such policies are hardly in keeping with the responsibility given the Permanent Members of the Security Council when the Charter was drafted.

There is no simple explanation for the failure of so many states to meet their responsibilities to the United Nations. A few have found it difficult to locate ready funds to meet certain payments when due. A plotting of the overall assessment curve alongside the record of payments does show, as seen in Figure 2, that as the assessment gradient



FIG. 2. FULFILLMENT OF UN ASSESSMENTS COMPARED WITH RISING CHARGES

has risen since 1959, the percentage of states fulfilling their obligations has dropped, notwithstanding the increase in membership. The plot lines show that after the assessment level passed the $100 million mark, fulfillments fell off precipitously. The fact that this coincides with the admission of the large number of new countries with low incomes suggests that the rising cost of UN membership is responsible, in part at least, for the financial crisis. But there is obviously more to it than this. For the numbers of Members fulfilling their obligations were already falling sharply before the assessment curve reached $80 million, and the defaulting parties are by no means limited to the low-income states.

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Twelve of the 18 states having the highest apportionment rate—that is, above 1 per cent—failed to make their full payments in 1961 or 1962. Each of these 12 states had a GNP in excess of $8 billion in 1961. Moreover, among these 12 are 5 of the states with the highest national incomes in the UN membership. At the other end of the spectrum, 19 of the 25 states paying all of their assessments as of December 30, 1962, are in the minus 1 per cent apportionment category and 11 of their number had a GNP of less than $2 billion in 1961. If states with as small a national income as this can pay their assessments, those with a much larger GNP should be able to pay theirs.

In the majority of cases, payments to the United Nations appear to have been withheld for political rather than economic or financial reasons. Soviet and French refusals have been based upon outright opposition to measures taken by the Organization. Others have followed suit out of similar reasons or sheer opportunism. Delegates from African, Arab, and Soviet bloc states have argued that the peace-keeping costs should be borne by the states whose actions called forth UN intervention or who were in some way accessories to the causal circumstances. Lower-income countries have argued that the bulk of the costs should be borne by the Members of the Security Council, who have a primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security. Others have insisted that the situations in the Near East and in the Congo are of no direct concern to themselves and on this ground have rationalized non-payment. A few appear to have withheld payments as a part of a movement to bring about a testing of the question whether there is a legal liability to pay for this type of activity.

The Soviet Union has argued that expenses for peace-keeping cannot be imposed as binding upon member states save by a decision of the Security Council; that the latter must define all conditions relating to such financing and that the General Assembly has no right to assume such a function. In the case of UNEF it is argued that, since this force was called into being by an emergency session of the Assembly, there was a violation of the Charter and assessments for it are of no validity. In the case of the Congo force, although this was in response to a Congolese request and authorized by the Security Council, it is argued that the operations in the Congo were carried out in circumvention of the Council; hence the financing is said to impose no obligation.[8] This

[8] This argument is summarized in the report of the Working Group of 21, *Financing of United Nations Peace-keeping Operations*, UN Document A/5407, March 29, 1963, 4-5.

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ex parte argument running in two different directions disregards the language of the Charter.

Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter clearly lays down the proposition that "the expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly." It makes no qualifications with respect to any kind of expenses. The withholdings of so many states served to bring into question, nevertheless, the scope of the Assembly's power and of the Members' commitments. It was to obtain "legal guidance" on these points that the XVIth Assembly, acting under proddings from the United States and others who have paid their assessments, decided to ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on whether the expenditures authorized by a series of Assembly resolutions, and pro-rated among the Members by separate assessments, constituted "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter.[9] It was the hope of those who supported this move, taken on the recommendation of a special subcommittee known as the Working Group of 15,[10] that a favorable opinion would not only clarify the power of the General Assembly with respect to UN finances but also settle the question of obligation by the member states to pay levies.

The advisory opinion of the Court, handed down on July 20, 1962, by a highly divided bench, has not settled the issue.[11] Space does not permit a full review here of the ten opinions that emerged from the deliberations of the fourteen judges who considered the questions. These have been carefully reviewed elsewhere.[12] It must suffice to say that the majority opinion, rendered by nine judges, held that the expenditures authorized by the various General Assembly resolutions for UNEF and the Congo operation constituted "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter, and as such were to be "borne by the Members as apportioned by the

[9] Resolution 1731 (XVI) on Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations on the report of the Fifth Committee (A/5062), passed on December 20, 1961, by a vote of 52-11-32. The text will be found in *Purchase of United Nations Bonds*, 390; and the list of countries voting on the resolution in *ibid.*, 458-59.

[10] The text of the Report of the Working Group of 15 is contained in UN Document A/4971 (XVI), November 15, 1961.

[11] The opinion, entitled "Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, par. 2 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962," will be found in *International Court of Justice, Reports* (The Hague 1962), 151-308. The opinion will also be found in *Purchase of United Nations Bonds*, 469-598. Summaries of the opinion will be found in *United Nations Review*, IX (August 1962), 11-13, and *International Organization* XVI (Autumn 1962), 865-71.

[12] See Leo Gross, "Expenses of the United Nations for Peace-keeping Operations: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice," *International Organization*, XVII (Winter 1963), 1-35.

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General Assembly." Reflecting the position taken by the United States, the majority affirmed that the General Assembly, and only the General Assembly, has the authority to apportion the expenses of the Organization and that these might be apportioned either according to the regular scale or to a special one adopted for a specific purpose. Furthermore the Court reasoned that the Assembly might utilize funds voluntarily contributed or it might "find some other method or combination of methods for providing the necessary funds." Refusing to take a narrow interpretation of the powers of the General Assembly, the majority enunciated the view that "While it is the Security Council which, exclusively, may order coercive action, the functions and powers conferred by the Charter on the General Assembly are not confined to discussion, consideration, the initiation of studies and the making of recommendations; they are not merely hortatory. Article 18 deals with 'decisions' of the General Assembly on 'important questions.' These 'decisions' do indeed include certain recommendations, but others have dispositive force and effect. Among these latter decisions, Article 18 includes suspension of rights and privileges of membership, expulsion of Members, 'and budgetary questions.' "[13]

In the final analysis, the Court held that expenditures must always be tested "by their relationship to the purposes of the United Nations." If they are within the purposes of the United Nations and are incurred as a result of resolutions passed by the Security Council and the General Assembly, and of measures taken at the direction of the Secretary-General acting thereunder, they are legitimate "expenses of the Organization."

Without denigrating the reasoning set forth in the various opinions written by the minority judges, we must pass on to the sequel to the Court's opinion. The immediate result of the Court's deliberation was to return the issue to the General Assembly with almost as many differing interpretations as before it was sent to the Hague. A majority opinion was mustered for the thesis that the peace-keeping expenditures voted by the General Assembly were legitimate "expenses of the Organization" and that Members were under obligation to pay their assessments for these. But strong judicial support was also lent to the contentions that apportionments voted by the Assembly in these instances were only recommendations and not binding upon Members who failed to consent to the majority votes in the Assembly. In debating matters at the XVIIth General Assembly session, it was not lost

[13] *Purchase of United Nations Bonds*, 479.

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to sight that the Court's reply was only an advisory opinion, not a judgment. The Assembly did adopt, by a roll call vote of 76-17-8, a resolution "accepting" the opinion. But delegates of some countries did not omit to point out that this was only a legal opinion, that each Organ is its own interpreter of the Charter in last analysis. It was also emphasized that an advisory opinion, unlike a decision of the Court, does not require compliance by a Member under Article 94 of the Charter. And it was maintained that countries are under no more legal constraint than before to pay assessments which they believe to be illegal or otherwise non-obligatory.

In the majority voting to "accept" the Court's opinion were numbers of states that had been delinquent in their payments to one or both peace-keeping accounts—43, to be exact.[14] From this fact, and from the votes on four related steps—namely, (1) requesting the Secretary-General to explore all possible avenues to wipe out the arrears on the Regular Budget (voted 96-11-1);[15] (2) establishing a Working Group of 21 to report on methods for financing peace-keeping operations and paying arrears thereon (78-14-4);[16] (3) authorizing the Secretary-General to continue expending substantially the same sums for UNEF and the Congo operations up to June 30, 1963 (two votes: 76-11-8 and 75-12-13);[17] and (4) calling a special session of the Assembly to convene before June 30, 1963, in order to consider the financial situation of the Organization, including a report from the Working Group of 21 (77-0-21)[18]—there may be room for hope that numbers of Members will sooner or later resume paying. The Soviet and French delegates, however, declared that their countries would not pay where they felt no obligation.

Conceivably, a combination of these steps, together with the Court's opinion, possible reduction in the Congo expenses, and persistent diplomacy, may turn the tide. If further strife in the Congo can be averted and the UN force reduced to something on the order of 8,000 men, with expenses held to an estimated $30 million for the second half of

[14] The vote is recorded in UN Document P/V.1199. The text of the resolution, 1854 (XVII), adopted at the 1199th plenary meeting, December 19, 1962, will be found in *United Nations Review*, X (January 1963), 103.

[15] Resolution 1863 (XVII), Working Capital Fund for the Financial Year 1963, section B, par. 1, 1201st plenary meeting, December 20, 1962; text in *ibid.*, 107.

[16] Resolution 1854 (XVII), cited above, section B, paragraphs 1-6.

[17] Resolution 1864 (XVII), United Nations Emergency Force, adopted at 1201st plenary meeting, December 20, 1962. Text in *ibid.*, 107. Resolution 1865 (XVII), United Nations Operations in the Congo, adopted at 1201st plenary meeting, December 20, 1962, *ibid.*

[18] Resolution 1866 (XVII), Convening a Special Session of the General Assembly, adopted at the 1201st plenary meeting, December 20, 1962; text in *ibid.*, 107-8.

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1963 and further reductions reasonably likely in 1964, this would contribute substantively to an alleviation of the UN's difficulties. Solid evidence that the Congolese are making progress in relieving the UN of tasks it has had to assume in their country would undoubtedly encourage some hesitant Members to resume their payments, for hope could then be seen that the endless spiral of expenditures and assessments would come to a halt. It is this, quite as much as the differences over the handling of the Congo business, that has alarmed many Members. On a different front, the rumblings heard in the 87th Congress about continuing large U.S. foreign aid grants and liberal subventions to the UN if other states continue to hold back on their obligations could not fail to convey a warning that the large voluntary contributions heretofore made by the United States to keep the UN going might dry up unless others reformed their practices. The proof of a change will be attested only when payments resume their normal patterns of completion.

V. Looking to the Future

If the actions taken in the closing days of the 1962 General Assembly session marked a turning in the UN crisis, as many delegates asserted, there is still much to be done to place the Organization on a solid financial basis.

Aside from accepting the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the validity of the expenses in the Middle Eastern and Congo peace-keeping operations and the binding obligation of the assessments therefor, the General Assembly in its December 1962 resolution explicitly affirmed "the collective financial responsibility of Members of the United Nations" and indicated that arrangements must be made, "within the letter and spirit of the Charter," to clear up the arrears owing to the institution. At the same time it acknowledged that "peace-keeping operations, such as those in the Congo and in the Middle East, impose a heavy financial burden upon Member states, in particular on those having a limited capacity to contribute financially." It accepted that a "different procedure is required" to meet these expenditures than to meet those applied for the Regular Budget, and called for consideration of a "possible special scale of assessments." In establishing a special Working Group of 21 to examine administrative and budgetary procedures, it instructed this group to study anew "the criteria for the sharing of the costs" of peace-keeping operations, including "special factors" relating to particular operations that might suggest variations in the methods of sharing, and the "degree of eco-

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nomic development" of member states. And it also directed its subcommittee to give "particular attention" to "a special financial responsibility of members of the Security Council" for meeting peace-keeping costs.

This omnibus resolution was obviously a compromise package. Conceivably a proposal with somewhat stiffer terms on the payment of arrearages or with fewer concessions to those who want a special scale could have gotten a majority. It is difficult to tell without access to the full diplomatic record. The chances are it would have been a less impressive vote. However this may be, a solid consensus was evidenced that something should be done about matters. The Working Group was given a definite mandate. A time was set for a special session of the Assembly. And the Soviet bloc and France were isolated in their opposition to efforts to put the UN on more solid ground.

We have spoken at length about the action of December 20, 1962, for it seems likely that whatever is done from this point on will rest in part upon elements agreed upon then.

Although the Working Group of 21 was not able to reach agreement upon any specific course of action to recommend to the General Assembly for solving the UN's financial problems, its deliberations did help to clarify positions further while at the same time affording an opportunity for exploring suggestions with respect to a special scale.[19] One of the most important things that emerged with the Committee's report was a formal appeal that member states "who are in arrears and object to making payments to meet the expenses of these peace-keeping operations on political or juridical grounds are invited nevertheless to make a special effort toward solving the financial difficulties of the Organization by making this payment." This clearly revealed that the great majority of the group were in favor of the payment of arrears and of reestablishing the financial stability of the UN.

Looking ahead, numerous ways can be seen in which efforts might be made to collect what is due to the United Nations and to resolve its needs for future funds. For purposes of convenience, we will group those that can be touched upon here under six general headings.[20]

[19] For the report of the Working Group, see Document A/5407, March 29, 1963, *Financing of United Nations Peace-keeping Operations.*

[20] Numerous proposals were discussed in the former Working Group of 15; for its Report, see Document A/4971 (XVI), November 15, 1961. These, and other suggestions advanced outside of the UN, are analyzed at some length in a research memorandum prepared by the author for the Brookings Institution, entitled *Financing Future United Nations Peace and Security Operations* (Cambridge, M.I.T. Center for International Studies, C/62-22, October 15, 1962). Reference may also be made to three other research memoranda prepared for the Brookings project, containing discussions of pro-

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A. COLLECTION OF ARREARS AND CURRENT ASSESSMENTS

Aside from possible further appeals for payment of contributions and the invocation of Article 19 if need be, there are other measures that may be taken to strengthen the financial situation. One of these is the suggestion that the General Assembly create an office of United Nations Minister of Finance at the Under-Secretary level. Such an officer, if he was of national cabinet standing and world repute, and was authorized to deal directly with the highest fiscal officers of member states instead of with diplomats in New York, might be helpful in procuring earlier and fuller payment of assessments and in stimulating increased voluntary contributions. Such an officer could also be a valuable aide and counselor to the Secretary-General in planning UN operations and in ensuring utmost efficiency in the use of available resources. This appointment would carry no reflection upon the work of the Comptroller and his aides, who presumably would be under the supervision of the Minister or Under-Secretary. These officials have rendered able service in the sphere allotted to them. Experience with the voluntary programs has demonstrated, however, that leaders who have been in a position to make direct personal and official contact with the chief fiscal authorities of member states who control budgets and payments—i.e., the ministers of finance—have been most effective in eliciting large and prompt payments to their funds. Ambassadors in New York are several stages removed from those who determine the fiscal affairs of their countries and are seldom in direct line of communication with them. A person of the experience and stature of a Eugene Black or a Paul Hoffman, able to contact at once the highest authorities, might serve as a model for a UN Minister of Finance. Senator Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts has already suggested that the United States take the lead in securing approval of such a step.[21] The recent appointment of Eugene Black, former President of the World Bank, as Financial Adviser to the Secretary-General is indeed a move in the right direction. Mr. Black will not only aid the Secretary-General in approaching governments to pay their arrearages but advise him generally on dealing with financial matters. His long experience and wis-

posals relating to the main sources of UN funds: John G. Stoessinger, *The Financing of United Nations Peace and Security Operations* (Washington, Brookings Institution, October 1962, mimeograph); Walter R. Sharp, *The Voluntary Programs* (same); Norman J. Padelford, *Some Thoughts on the Financing of the Special Voluntary Programs* (same). Various proposals are also discussed in J. David Singer, *Financing International Organization: The United Nations Budget Process* (The Hague 1961), 138-46.

[21] *Congressional Record*, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, April 5, 1962, 5611.

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dom in handling problems of international finance should be most helpful to the Organization.

Evidence that appeals directly to governments are having some effect is afforded by the fact that 23 states made payments to the Regular Budget, UNEF, and UNOC between the first of January and early April 1963.

B. BUILDING UP A CONTINGENCY RESERVE

One of the most important steps to restoring the financial vitality of the United Nations and enabling it to cope with future emergencies would be to have a sizable reserve that could be drawn upon to get an operation started until such time as the General Assembly could decide how the activity was to be further financed. A small reserve has existed in the item for Unforeseen and Extraordinary Expenses voted each year by the General Assembly and backed by the Working Capital Fund. Responding to diplomatic initiative by the United States and others, the XVIIth General Assembly voted to raise the amount that might be expended under this heading in 1963 to $10 million [1862 (XVII)], and to increase the Working Capital Fund from $25 to $40 million [1863 (XVII)], to be covered by assessment at the normal scale. This will not go far in an emergency on the order of the Congo crisis, but it will provide at least a small backlog. If the Working Capital Fund can eventually be built to something on the order of $100 million through unexpended accumulations, a larger reserve could be maintained, both for peace-keeping and for other types of extraordinary expenses. This might not take care of all expenses of future operations involving international forces or other large operations of an emergency or extraordinary nature, but it would certainly be a help to have such a "bank account" in reserve.

It has been suggested alternatively that a separate standing Fund for Peace and Security be established that would be available expressly for such purposes and be larger in amount than what might be divertible from the Working Capital Fund or other sources.[22] Amounts ranging from $25 million to $500 million have been mentioned as a base figure for such a fund. Although the latter would more than have sufficed for the Congo from 1960 through 1962, it would hardly have footed the bill for an operation such as the defense of the Republic of Korea in the Korean War, had that been left to the United Nations.

[22] See Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, *First Report to the General Assembly at Its Fifteenth Session*, GAOR, XVth Session, Supplement No. 7 (A/4408), 1960, 9.

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Such a fund might be raised from regular or special assessments, voluntary contributions, loans, or some combination of these. One possibility might be to use proceeds from the bond sale as the nest egg. Another might be to have a consortium of interested states advance the capital stake through a long-term, interest-free loan to be repaid gradually out of amounts set aside in the Regular Budget or from special assessment. It has even been suggested that private individuals, groups, and philanthropic foundations might be allowed to contribute to such a fund as a means of expressing their interest in the maintenance of international peace and security. Complications could conceivably arise from the latter course under some conditions. If, for instance, private contributions were to compose the bulk of the fund, would such large contributors be entitled to claim a voice in determining when and how the fund should be spent? This could become awkward. It would seem better to have such a fund sought from member states through contributions or loans and be backed for long-term sustainment and pay-off of any loans involved by amounts set aside in the Regular Budget. Ultimate control of expenditures from this fund should rest in the hands of the General Assembly in common with other expenses of the Organization. The Security Council acting under the powers given to it by the Charter to maintain international peace and security, and the Secretary-General acting under instructions from either the Security Council or the Assembly, should be able to draw upon this for duly authorized operations. This might not care for all expenses in every type of situation involving a UN peace and security action. But it would provide a source that could be tapped until the General Assembly had time to reach agreement upon other procedures.

C. FURTHER USE OF DEFICIT FINANCING

Some suggestions have been made that the United Nations treat the 1962 bond issue as an opening gambit for covering other emergencies in a like manner. Although the response to the present bond issue might warrant grounds for believing that another issue could be successfully floated, it seems sounder on the whole to the present writer, both from a fiscal and from a political point of view, for an international institution such as the United Nations, dependent as it is upon external sources of money and having no large independent resources of its own upon which to base credit, to be kept on a straightforward contribution and pay-as-you-go basis. Unless employed with utmost care, deficit financing of controversial operations could easily land the Organization in quicksands of trouble. It would be better to cover the

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costs of future peace and security and other extraordinary expenses by resort to a special fund or by instituting a special scale of assessment, or both. This applies with equal validity in my opinion to any extensive soft-loan economic development program.

D. DEVELOPING A SPECIAL SCALE FOR FUNDING EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES

Notwithstanding that the scale of assessment applicable to the Regular Budget makes extensive allowances for the position of the countries with low capacity to pay, it is obvious from the UN debates that many of the low-income states would like to see "extraordinary expenditures," such as those for peace-keeping in the Middle East and the Congo, covered by a separate scale of assessment—one that would place a larger share of the burden on the higher-income states.

In considering the issue of a special scale there are certain principles other Members feel must not be ignored. These are first that every member state should expect to pay something on UN expenses; there should be no exemptions. Second, any deficit occasioned by a reduction in apportionment ratios should be broadly divided and not left to be shouldered by a few Members, voluntarily or otherwise. Third, it would be reasonable to make some allowance for those who place forces at the disposal of the Organization, particularly where there is danger to life. Fourth, no state must be required to pay more than one-third of the total assessment. And fifth, as the economic growth of states proceeds, they should expect to have their apportionment ratios re-adjusted to correspond with their increased capacity to pay.

Four alternative possibilities may be suggested for a special scale. In the first place, the United Nations might keep the essentials of the 1962 financing arrangements—that is to say, separate accounts and assessments for each major peace-keeping operation, the 80-80-50 per cent rebate feature for countries on the EPTA list, and an appeal for voluntary contributions to make up the deficit due to the rebates. This formula has not proved altogether satisfactory. And it throws a heavy responsibility upon one or a few countries that are willing to make up the differential by voluntary contributions. These should not always be counted upon.

A second plan would be to keep the rebate feature but apportion the resulting deficit among all member states not eligible for reductions and add this to their assessments in accordance with the normal scale. This would reduce or eliminate dependence upon voluntary contributions. It would spread the load more widely. Voluntary contributions would still be possible, but if none were given, the budget would still

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be in balance, assuming that all Members paid their assessments. Reapportionment of the deficit would inevitably raise the ratios of states not granted rebates. In the case of all excepting the five largest payers, this would add less than one-half of 1 per cent to their assessments. For the United States this would add more than 5 per cent and bring the total demanded of it to something over 37 per cent.[23] Although the United States has in fact supplied over 47 per cent of the support for UNEF and UNOC, this has resulted from the combination of assessments and voluntary contributions. As we have seen, the Congress has made it unmistakably clear, by the permanent restriction clause enacted with the 1952 appropriation legislation, that the United States shall not be obligated to pay more than 33 1/3 per cent of any UN apportionment. This was deliberately established by the Congress. It rests as well, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Richard N. Gardner has pointed out, upon a fundamental principle long accepted by the General Assembly that in an association of sovereign states, where each nation has one vote, it is not in the interest of the organization to depend too much upon the financial contributions of any one state.[24] Unless there were to be a major change in circumstances, it is hardly likely that the United States Congress would take readily to a call for this country to pay a larger assessment than one-third of the whole.

United States Delegate Francis T. Plimpton told the Working Group of 21 that the United States would not pay assessments for the peacekeeping operations for the last six months of 1963 in excess of the established 32.02 per cent, and that for any succeeding periods would consider going above this only if the UN financial situation were markedly improved and others had shown a comparable willingness to pay.[25] In my opinion the United States should hold to this position. It would seem that 110 member states should be able to find among them ways and means of providing the balance. Moreover, the United States should not be asked to pick up the tab that others refuse on political grounds to pay. The other Members of the United Nations should not expect the United States alone to assume what is a joint responsibility and obligation. Even in the sphere of voluntary contribu-

[23] See John G. Stoessinger, "The Price of Peace: Who Should Pay?" *Saturday Review*, November 3, 1962, 21-22. An estimate of the rates that would be payable by various states will be found in Padelford, *Financing Future United Nations Peace and Security Operations*, Table III, 63. The pages that follow this table suggest some possible modifications in this plan.

[24] Richard N. Gardner, "Financing the UN," *Department of State Newsletter* (April 1963), 23.

[25] *Christian Science Monitor*, March 7, 1963.

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tions, there is a question whether the United States has not been too ready to advance large sums while others hold back. The Charter creates responsibilities that encompass the entire membership. This should be honored.

A third type of approach was suggested, in differing ways, by numbers of states during the meetings of the Working Group of 21. This would apportion expenses below a basic amount, such as $5 to $10 million, among all Members according to the normal scale; then apportion up to half of a next stage—say, $20 to $25 million—among all states on the same scale, with the balance being paid by the Permanent Members of the Security Council and the "developed" states; followed by other similar divisions on the same principles until a $100 million maximum was reached, above which all amounts would be apportioned by an *ad hoc* scale of assessment.

A fourth plan would be to develop a separate scale that would provide a simple, straightforward ratio of assessment for each state without resort to reductions, deficits, and the need for voluntary contributions or reapportionments. Such a scale could be constructed around the same basic data as the regular scale. It could start the percentage of payment at a low point for the lowest-income states and gradually raise the percentages as GNP and economic growth rates rise. Small increases in percentages above the normal scale could perhaps be introduced for the middle and higher income levels. By careful construction such a scale could stay within the 33 1/3 per cent limit for the United States and still do no injustice to any member state. Such a scale could have as its minimum starting point .008 per cent instead of the present .04 per cent. This would correspond almost exactly with the 80 per cent reduction authorized for the developing countries under the 1961 Congo and UNEF resolutions. The reduction percentages might then decrease by slowly graduated steps, closely corresponding to rising GNP and the rising points on the normal scale, until something approximating the plus $9 billion GNP rate and the normal apportionment point of 1.00 per cent were reached, at which reductions from the normal level might stop. Above this point there might be slowly graduated increases in the apportionment rate, corresponding again to rising GNP and the rising points on the normal scale, extending possibly to a maximum addition of 1.30 per cent in the case of the United States. The United States assessment rate might then rest at 33.32 per cent, within the legislatively established limits. Table VIII illustrates a scale constructed on this principle.

Variations could of course be made in the reductions or increases

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TABLE VIII. ILLUSTRATIVE SPECIAL SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES

	Normal Assessment		*Per cent of total*		
35 states at	.04 to be assessed	.008 =	.28%	80% reduction.	GNP $30-559 million
10	.05	.008	.08		
1	.06	.01	.01		
4	.07	.02	.08		
3	.09	.03	.09		
1	.10	.04	.04		
1	.11	.04	.04		
3	.13—.14	.05	.15		
3	.15—.16	.07	.21		
3	.20	.08	.24		
3	.21—.23	.10	.30		
2	.24—.26	.12	.24	50% reduction.	GNP+$4.5 billion
1	.32	.20	.20		
2	.36—.38	.22	.44		
3	.40—.41	.24	.72		
4	.42—.45	.27	1.08		
3	.52—.53	.38	1.14		
2	.56—.58	.45	.90		
1	.74	.66	.66		
1	.86	.77	.77		
2	1.01	1.01	2.02	No reduction.	GNP+$9 billion
1	1.03	1.05	1.05	*Increase begins.*	GNP+$13 billion
1	1.17 Czechosl.	1.20	1.20		
1	1.20 Belgium	1.30	1.30		
1	1.28 Poland	1.38	1.38		
1	1.30 Sweden	1.50	1.50		
1	1.66 Australia	1.86	1.86	12% increase.	GNP+$17 billion
1	1.98 Ukraine	2.25	2.25		
1	2.03 India	2.35	2.35	15% increase.	GNP+$30 billion
1	2.24 Italy	2.55	2.55		
1	2.27 Japan	2.52	2.52		
1	3.12 Canada	3.60	3.60	15% increase.	GNP+$37 billion
1	4.57 China	4.57	4.57	(Special case)	GNP $1.70 billion
1	5.94 France	6.50	6.50	9% increase.	GNP+$60 billion
1	7.58 U.K.	8.18	8.18	7.8% increase.	GNP+$73 billion
1	14.97 USSR	16.17	16.17	8% increase.	GNP+$169 billion
1	32.02 USA	33.32	33.32	4% increase.	GNP+$525 billion
104	100.00%		100.00%		

from the Regular Budget norm as the Committee on Contributions and the Assembly might see fit. Thus, special allowance could be made in the assessments of states providing manpower for UN forces. Such a scale would be straightforward. It would avoid the rebate, deficit, and reapportionment problem. It would be adaptable. It would conform to the principles of the December 1962 resolution and remain within the acceptable ceiling for the highest apportionment. Further-

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more, it would be adaptable for raising funds for other extraordinary expenses approved by the General Assembly in the future.

Special scales and dual standards are awkward to administer and can lead to further disputes. Notwithstanding their attractiveness under present circumstances, there is much that can be said against freezing matters into a formal mold at this time. Experience with financing extraordinary expenditures is still fairly limited. There would be advantages in keeping the method of handling these flexible, learning from additional experience what may be the most suitable ways of meeting different conditions. It is difficult to predict what the requirements of future peace-keeping operations may be. Furthermore, it is quite apparent that the differences presently separating the powers are not conducive to universal accord on any one formula. If the expenditures in the Congo can be sharply reduced in the near future, the need for a special scale of assessment may disappear. In my opinion it would be better to try other means of clearing up indebtedness and funding emergency operations until a wider diversity of experience has been gained or there is a larger measure of consensus among states.

E. RELYING UPON PARTIES AT INTEREST TO BEAR COSTS

United Nations costs for peace and security activities could be reduced or held to a minimum if the parties directly involved in situations calling for UN intervention were to assume the primary expenses, other than those of UN meetings, investigations, and good offices. The procedure in the Korean War is a case in point. There the parties responding to the UN appeal to aid in the defense of the Republic of Korea bore the costs of the armed forces that they themselves put at the disposal of the Supreme Commander, and the United States paid for the transportation, supplies, etc., which it provided. The principal expenditures of the UN were for the holding and servicing of meetings to consider the situation, communications among the parties involved, the time and travel expenses of the Secretary-General and other members of the Secretariat, the costs of the UN Commission which was already in Korea, and the refugee and reconstruction program undertaken by UNKRA, which was based upon special voluntary contributions.

Another case is the temporary United Nations administration in West Irian in 1962-1963 (UNTEA). While the United Nations provided the administrative personnel to administer this territory in the interim between Dutch and Indonesian rule, and while it arranged for the Pakistani troops that were sent to the island for police duty,

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the expenses of this operation were borne by the Netherlands and Indonesia in equal parts, according to the agreement of August 15, 1962.[26] The United Nations expenses were thus limited principally to those of the mediation team that was able to secure the agreement, and the time and costs involved in the UN meetings to discuss the situation and approve the various arrangements.

Not all situations requiring UN interposition are equally susceptible of handling in these manners. When observation or investigation commissions are needed in a region where hostilities are occurring or emotions are highly inflamed in regard to a contested area—as, for example, on the Greek borders in 1948-1949—the UN should be free of all ties and normally assume the costs of the teams it dispatches. Similarly, when it engages in a mediatorial effort—as in the Palestine fighting in 1948 or in the negotiations leading up to the Hague Agreement for the independence of Indonesia in 1949—it should be in a position to act quite independently of the parties and expect to foot the expenses of its mediator or good-offices committee. And when it is necessary for the United Nations to act rapidly to assemble and station an international force or commission to take over an area where fighting has been going on, in order to allow the parties to disengage or to keep them separated from one another, it should never have to wait for agreement to be reached among the contestants on such a detail as the financing of the peace force. The interests of world peace and security are paramount in such a situation. It is for such circumstances as these that the Organization needs to have stand-by funds for extraordinary and emergency expenses. The UN may always ask member states to volunteer assistance of different kinds. This may include not only money but also such things as an airlift—as the United States did at the beginning of the Congo crisis—supplies, use of strategic bases, communication facilities, personnel, and so forth. There are many ways in which UN expenses can be held down. It is to the interest of all Members that this be done wherever possible without sacrificing the mission the Organization is called upon to perform.

F. DEVELOPING INDEPENDENT MEANS OF INCOME

In looking to the future, one alternative that never ceases to intrigue some minds is the possibility of international organizations' having independent sources of revenue. The UN does have some direct income —e.g., from its sale of publications and stamps, the operations of its postal administration, the gift and souvenir shop, catering service, in-

[26] *United Nations Review*, IX (September 1962), 4-5, 39-42.

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vestment income, staff assessment-tax equalization fund, and so on.[27] These bring in modest sums that are useful, but they do not involve the kinds of money needed to fund large and expensive operations or to reduce assessments or voluntary contributions. Furthermore, there are limits to their possibilities for expansion.

Private donations have played a part in the overall financial support of the United Nations. Some of these have been very substantial and contributed significantly to the UN's activities, as in the instance of the $8 million gift of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., for the land and headquarters of the UN in New York and the Ford Foundation grant of $6 million for the construction of the UN Library building. A host of small contributions have continually flowed into many of the refugee, relief, Children's Fund, and other humanitarian programs. Some movements have been started by groups, such as the Quakers, to develop regular support for UN projects. Others have volunteered to buy UN bonds and to promote a UN endowment fund.[28] But all of these add up to only a small proportion of the UN's needs. They beg questions of how far private support for an intergovernmental agency should be encouraged, whether this will undermine government responsibility or raise issues of non-governmental participation in decision-making on the use of such funds. They are doubtful as steady, dependable sources of income.[29]

Of a different nature qualitatively are such proposals as giving the United Nations the benefits of a surcharge upon such things as international mails, cables, air and sea transportation, passports, use of weather satellite data, and the like, to be levied and collected by states but turned over to the UN. Suggestions have also been made that it be permitted to levy service charges for technical assistance activities rendered to governments. And, going a step farther, it has been proposed that the Organization be given jurisdiction over the polar regions, over activities in outer space, and the right to collect a percentage of the revenues derivable from the exploitation of petroleum and other riches found beneath or in the sea beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.[30] Pro-

[27] These are discussed in a research paper for the Brookings project by Marcia Rosenfeld, entitled *Existing Sources of Independent Revenue for the United Nations* (Washington, Brookings Institution, October 1962, mimeograph).

[28] An extensive examination of these and other private support efforts will be found in another research memorandum for the Brookings project by Norman J. Padelford, *Private Support of the United Nations* (Cambridge, M.I.T. Center for International Studies, C/62-11, October 1962).

[29] J. David Singer, *Financing International Organization,* 145. See also Arthur N. Holcombe, *Strengthening the United Nations* (New York 1957), 259-61.

[30] A number of these proposals are set forth in an offset memorandum by Eugene Staley, "Direct Revenue for the United Nations" (Stanford, Stanford Research Institute,

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ceeding even farther, to the point of requiring a sweeping change in the basic premises upon which the United Nations rests, are proposals that would give the Organization outright powers of taxation upon individuals, groups, and associations.[31]

Revenues of a fairly substantial nature, even possibly equaling or surpassing those derived from assessments, might conceivably be obtained from a system of levies, surcharges, and royalties if the member states were ready to allow the United Nations to impose and collect such charges. Many of the claims that have been made in this direction lack adequate supporting analysis, however.[32] Some of the proposals, such as taking over the polar areas or getting into outer-space activities, could easily result in far-reaching expenditures with little definite assurance of substantive income in the near future. As Howard Taubenfeld has wisely remarked: "It would be more humane for the U.N. to raise funds and develop the needy areas on earth, charging interest and living off it, than to raise the huge sums necessary for realizing gains from the remote areas, thus draining the resources represented by the investment capital from needy human beings."[33]

There is little evidence that states are ready to concede jurisdiction to the United Nations either over important potential mineral deposits beneath the high seas or over the business of international transactions, communications, and circulation. The surcharge levied upon shipping in the Suez Canal after 1956 was agreed upon only as an exceptional measure to pay for the work of reopening, deepening, and improving the facilities of the Canal. States may be willing on other specific occasions to authorize similar limited surcharges for reimbursement of a particular activity. It has yet to be demonstrated, all things considered, that it would be desirable to confer unrestricted powers upon the UN or any other world body to raise independent revenues. The power of an independent purse could become the prelude to the seizing and exercising of independent power. This could be detrimental to national independence and even ultimately to personal freedom. A number of questions

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November 13, 1961). Some are further developed by John H. E. Fried in a research memorandum for the Brookings Institution, entitled *United Nations Revenue Through Levies on International Activities* (Washington, Brookings Institution, November 1962, mimeograph). The field as a whole is critically appraised by Howard J. Taubenfeld in a paper entitled *Long-Range Possibilities of Independent Revenue for the United Nations* (Washington, Brookings Institution, October 1962, mimeograph).

[31] For example, Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law* (2d edn., New York 1961), xxxvii-xxxix, 349-58.

[32] U.S. Senate Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, *Budgetary and Financial Problems of the United Nations*, Staff Study No. 6 (Washington 1954), 19.

[33] Taubenfeld, 48-49.

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raised in the Congress some time ago still hold with respect to taxation proposals:

> (1) Would not a direct tax on individuals cause resentment among the people and lose public support for the U.N.? (2) Would the American people, already objecting to extensive foreign aid programs, agree to substantial increases in U.N. expenditures? (3) Could agreement be reached on the kind of taxes that would be fair and equitable in view of the various conditions that exist in different states? (4) Who would be responsible for the collection of such taxes? (5) What machinery would be set up for the enforcement of tax laws against individual citizens?
>
> These may not be insuperable problems. But given the present state of world affairs they are tough enough to make unlikely the adoption of any U.N. tax system in the near future.[34]

There is one area in which the United Nations can deal with its financial situation within its own bounds. This is in maintaining a strict control upon unnecessary expenditures. The problem is not a lack of monitoring of the expenses of authorized activities. A careful watch is kept upon these. The real problem is the tendency of UN debates and agendas to become longer and longer; to require more meetings in which to get business done. This is in part a by-product of the admission of large numbers of new members. But it is also a result of an inclination on the part of many delegates to speak on nearly every question, to exercise freely their right of reply, and to feel that they must restate positions they have set forth in committee meetings when subjects come to plenary gatherings for final action. This is a sphere that calls for restraint and selectivity—where silence will not impair vital interests. Restraint can also be practiced in requests for unnecessary documentation. The conduct of the XVIIth session of the General Assembly under the presidency of Sir Zafrullah Khan of Pakistan afforded a model of business-like procedure that deserves to be emulated by future meetings and other organs. In the area of economic and technical assistance, temptations can easily arise to ask for UN assistance in order to be on the list with other countries and for the prestige this may gain in internal politics. But such temptations must be kept in hand if UN finances are to remain viable. Members need to remind themselves that the Organization does have built-in limitations; that it must be kept solvent if it is to accomplish its purposes.

The "problem" of UN finances cannot be resolved unless all Members are prepared to work at it together and along all fronts simultaneously. The pinching off of sustenance, whether it be in the nature of po-

[34] Senate Subcommittee on UN Charter, Staff Study, 21.

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litical or of financial support, is bound to impair the health of an international organization no less than an embolism in the blood stream of an individual. If the United Nations is to remain at all effective in the settlement of international disputes and maintenance of peace, if it is to assist economic and social advancement in a meaningful way during the Decade of Development, there must be a freeing of the flow of its lifeblood, a reknitting of the vessels of its support. The small and emergent countries have a vital stake, perhaps even greater than the more developed countries, in the continuance and effectiveness of these activities.

The purposes for which the United Nations was founded, and which have come to be seen in a larger light in the expanded world community of the 1960's, cannot be served without assuring the institution adequate financial means. They cannot long be maintained if there are to be self-appointed evaders of the common responsibility for paying for what the Organization legitimately and concertedly decides to undertake. Nor can blind cutting or curbing of expenditures on the familiar "meat-axe" principle known in the Congress in Washington serve the interests of the Members. At the same time there is need for preserving an enlightened sense of balance with respect to the number and cost of activities the Organization should be asked to assume. For its future can be put in jeopardy by undue haste and zeal as well. This is no doubt a part of what Secretary of State Dean Rusk had in mind when he recently remarked that an "increased sense of responsibility among all" is needed in approaching the problems and the future of the United Nations.[35]

[35] Press conference, March 8, 1963.

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POLITICAL MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN JAPAN

By ROBERT E. WARD*

I

THE term "political modernization" is of late encountered with increasing frequency in the literature of political science. Its antecedents are somewhat diffuse. In the most general sense, it seems to represent a specialized adaptation of scholars' long-standing concern with the question of whether the process of social change is determinate or variable, random or patterned, continuous or episodic, cyclic or evolutionary. Within this tradition "political modernization" is a concept opposed in tendency to the relativistic character of much modern scholarship in the field of politics. It would seem to be oriented more in the direction of a patterned and evolutionary—although not necessarily determinate or value-laden—interpretation of social change.

In a more restricted sense, this concept is perhaps more directly related to the search for new methodological principles which has been so notable an aspect of the discipline of political science for the past ten years. For at least this period, students of comparative politics have been systematically seeking analytic concepts and categories of inquiry broad enough in ambit and yet sufficiently sensitive and researchable to permit meaningful cross-national comparisons of political systems and their component parts. This concern has focused upon problems of both cross-sectional and developmental comparison and it is in the latter context that the concept of "political modernization" has seemed promising.

Third, the concept also finds a more practical provenance in the expanding commitments of the United States government to the "development" of many so-called underdeveloped areas. While initial efforts in this campaign were largely confined to the economic and military spheres, it was rapidly discovered that durable economic development required a comparable degree of political development. This circumstance has reinforced general professional interest in the process and determinants of "political modernization," and provided unusual opportunities for both study and experimentation in actual field situations.

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Finally, the concept of "political modernization" is to some degree indebted to recent theorizing and writing in the analogous field of "economic development." This new concern within the profession springs, therefore, from a variety of sources. Since it has not as yet, however, gained general acceptance, it might be well at this point to provide a working definition for it.[1]

The concept of "political modernization" assumes and is intelligible only in terms of the existence of a "modern" society as the essential environment for a modern political system. A modern society is here viewed as a massive and new type of social development which has come upon the scene in mature form only in the course of the last century. It is characterized by its far-reaching ability to control or influence the physical and social circumstances of its environment, and by a value system which is fundamentally optimistic about the desirability and consequences of this ability. More specifically, in its non-political sectors it is also characterized by low birth, death, and morbidity rates and by high ratios, degrees, or levels of: (1) inanimate to animate sources of energy; (2) tool technology, mechanization, and industrialization; (3) specialization and professionalization of labor; (4) gross and per capita national product of goods and services; (5) urbanization; (6) differentiation, achievement orientation, and mobility in social organization; and (7) literacy, mass education, and mass media circulation.

No society, of course, possesses all of these qualities in a complete or polar sense. Even the most "modern" society contains substantial admixtures of what might be described as pre-modern or traditional elements and is, in this sense, mixed or dualistic in character. Despite the measure of commonality which this fact ensures to all societies, there obviously exist profound differences in the proportion and pattern in which modern and pre-modern elements are distributed or "mixed" in various societies. In some cases, the "mix" is such as to yield almost purely traditional types such as Yemen or Afghanistan; in others, it produces something as innovational, as "modern" as the United States or the USSR. In this sense judgments of modernity are more concerned with the central tendency or thrust of societies than with any undiluted conception of uniformly modern or traditional social characteristics.

A "modern" polity is a subsystem of a "modern" society. As such it has separable characteristics, the most important of which are a high degree of both functional differentiation and integration of political structure and political roles; a rational, secular, and scientific system of

[1] This definition is adopted from Robert E. Ward and Roy C. Macridis, eds., *Modern Political Systems: Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963), 445.

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political decision-making; and the volume, range, authority, and efficacy of its output of political decisions and administrative actions. More specifically, it is also characterized by: (1) a reasonably general and effective sense of popular identification with the history, territory, myths, and national identity of the state concerned; (2) widespread popular interest and involvement in the political system, though not necessarily in the decision-making aspects thereof; (3) an allocation of political roles in accordance with standards of achievement rather than ascription; and (4) judicial and regulatory techniques based upon a predominantly secular and impersonal system of law.

Other attributes of importance to a definition of the process of political modernization can doubtless be adduced but, for present purposes, this may serve as a working list of central tendencies possessed by all political systems generally regarded as being "modern." It should be added that while political modernization is, of course, a continuing process—unachieved and probably unachievable in the ideal-type sense—it is not necessarily open-ended or permanent. It is quite possible to conceive of the emergence of other types of political systems differing in important respects from that defined above as "modern." In this sense—bizarre though the semantics may be—there may be point in speculating about the characteristics of post-modern polities, as we already do about those of pre-modern polities. Such speculation aside, however, the present utility of the concept of "political modernization" rests upon the hope that it validly and objectively defines the essential features of the political developments which have occurred in all so-called advanced societies and that it also represents the pattern toward which politically underdeveloped societies are now evolving.

Two other aspects of the concept should be noted. First, no political system is completely modern in this sense. Even those regarded as being the most modern have substantial admixtures of what are by definition pre-modern or traditional elements. These seem capable of coexisting with the dominant modern component for very substantial periods of time, perhaps indefinitely. In fact, their role is sometimes supportive of the political modernization process in important respects. Second, the concept of political modernization in its present form is neutral with respect to the philosophic or ethical orientation and particular form of government of political systems. It regards all such systems—whether democratic, totalitarian, or intermediate in type—as either actually or potentially modern. The form of government is not a critical factor. Both the United States and the USSR represent politically modern societies in this sense.

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II

This statement of the characteristics of a modern society and political system poses the question of Japan's current status. How modern are contemporary Japanese society and the Japanese political system? How do their performances compare with those of other Asian and Western states?

No single indicator can provide a satisfactory answer to this question, but by combining a variety of indices one can achieve helpful insights. For the present, let us confine ourselves to some of the more obvious statistical measures of modernity. In recent years Japan's birth and death rates per thousand of population (17.5 and 7.4 respectively in 1960) compare very favorably with those of the United States, the USSR, France, or Great Britain, as does her population's expectation of life at age 0 (65.2 for men and 69.8 for women in 1959). Approximately 98 per cent of her population is literate, a figure that places Japan among the world's leading societies in this respect. The school enrollment ratios at the primary and secondary level are fully the equal of those of the leading Western countries, while her college and university enrollment ratios are considerably higher than those of Great Britain or France. In circulation of daily newspapers per 1,000 of population, Japan's figure of 398 in 1958 was exceeded only by the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, and Luxembourg. Sixty-three per cent of her population is urban in residence, and secondary or tertiary in employment characteristics. In 1961 her steel output ranked fourth in the world, ahead of Great Britain's, while for the sixth straight year she led the world in shipbuilding. Her gross national product on a per capita basis, while still low by Western European standards ($399 in 1961), is the highest in Asia if one excepts Israel. And it is increasing rapidly as a consequence of an economy which has been expanding at a rate of 18 per cent in 1959, 14 per cent in 1960, and 10 per cent in 1961. These are among the world's highest rates of economic advancement where already developed societies are concerned.

Thus, judging by the common statistical measures of modernity, Japan's performance is outstanding. Viewed in terms both more qualitative and more specifically political, her record, while somewhat less unequivocal, is impressive. Her formal political structure is among the most modern, rational, and functionally differentiated in the world. Her decision-making system, while still displaying a considerable number of traditional characteristics, stands far in advance of the norms for

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Asia or the underdeveloped world in general. The same is true of her output of political decisions and administrative actions.

By any standards of modernity, therefore, Japan indubitably possesses developed and modern social and political systems. The distance which separates her from American or Western European performance in these spheres may still be appreciable, but it is far less impressive than the gulf which separates Japanese performance from that of practically all other parts of Asia.

Against this background, it is our purpose to examine in a quite general and selective way certain aspects of the political modernization process in Japan in an attempt to clarify at least some of the circumstances which contributed to a successful outcome in this one historical case. It is not claimed that Japan's path to political modernization can or should be the sole or complete model for Asian or other developing societies seeking a similar result. Some aspects of the Japanese experience are doubtless unique. But since Japan is the only indigenous Asian society that has succeeded in achieving types and levels of political performance which practically all other Asian states either desire or consider necessary, the nature of the Japanese experience inevitably becomes of extraordinary interest. It may not point to the only or the most effective path of political modernization for other developing societies, but it does represent the only mature specimen available for analysis. As a specific and concrete case it also affords opportunities for checking and enriching the types of relatively abstract and theoretical speculation which necessarily bulk large in the early stages of investigation in fields such as this.

III

As one looks back upon the history of political modernization in Japan, one might well be impressed first by the neatness of the manner in which it is usually periodized. In gross terms, for example, one is accustomed to distinguishing periods called Tokugawa (1603-1868) and post-Restoration (1868—) in Japanese political history. For somewhat more specific purposes, many distinguish an overlapping Restoration Period (ca. 1850-1890) when considering the beginnings of modern Japanese political development. Over the years these convenient denominators for the categorization of historical data have assumed an authority and potential for distortion which were never intended.

The series of events attendant upon the so-called Restoration in 1868 of the Emperor Meiji to the position of temporal authority putatively

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enjoyed by his distant forebears undoubtedly constitutes the major single turning point in the political modernization of Japan. It marked the initial and critical success of the political forces which underlay and made possible the specific modernizing developments that followed. Despite this, the extent to which this year, or even the Restoration Period as a whole, marked a time of new beginnings in an across-the-board political and social sense has, until very recently, been seriously exaggerated by both Japanese and foreign scholarship. So-called "revolutionary" incidents in any national history seem to share this literary fate. In the earlier stages of analysis, the political and social discontinuities to which they allegedly give rise command the attention of practically all commentators. At a later stage—perhaps very much later—the underlying continuities of social fabric and development, which were there all along, are suddenly rediscovered and a revisionist school of historical interpretation is born.

In the Japanese case, this emphasis upon the Restoration and its aftermath as a time of revolutionary, i.e. discontinuous, new developments —especially in the political and economic spheres—acquired added force from a subsequent episode in Japanese historiography. This was the widespread practice of interpreting pre-Restoration Japan—the Japan of the Tokugawa Period (1603-1868)—in terms of a "feudal" model. Indeed, at a later period, this was compounded by the addition of the notion that the Tokugawa shoguns had in effect intervened in the normal course of Japan's historical development and succeeded in refeudalizing the country in the early seventeenth century at a time when its immanent tendencies were modernizing. Thus, pre-Restoration Japan came to be viewed not only as "feudal," but, in Professor J. W. Hall's apt phrase, as a "feudal throwback."[2]

One can readily appreciate the consequences attendant upon so dichotomous a treatment of post-sixteenth-century Japanese history. For many the Restoration tended to become a watershed more formidable than the Rockies. What lay behind it was normally viewed as "feudal"; what lay on this side of it became either "modern" or a "feudal survival"—that is, an undesirable remnant of earlier practices or attitudes slated for eventual discard. This tendency was probably reinforced by real ignorance where the actual circumstances of life and society in Tokugawa times were concerned. It is only within the past few years that professional research in this period has become at all fashionable, and it is still seriously neglected in favor of more "glamorous" subjects

[2] John W. Hall, "Feudalism in Japan: A Reassessment" (unpublished paper, 1962), 47.

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drawn from the Restoration and later periods. As a consequence, the real beginnings of modernization in Japan have frequently been overlooked or attributed to much later periods than was actually the case.

The degree of literacy and of formal institutionalized education in pre-Restoration Japan provides a case in point. The educational preparation of at least sizable segments of a population is a basic factor in both the general and the political modernization process. Until recently it has been widely assumed that any really critical advances in this sphere waited upon the introduction of compulsory mass education in the 1870's. In fact, this was far from true. Consider, for example, the following statement by Professor R. P. Dore in this connection:

> The first thing to be stressed [with respect to education during the Tokugawa Period] is not simply the kind, but the sheer *amount* of formal education that went on. If the Tokugawa Period was a time of stagnation in some respects and of cyclical fluctuation in others, at least in the field of education there was a steady trend of growth. In Ieyasu's time a samurai who could express himself cogently on paper was a rarity, and total illiteracy was common. But gradually peace "civilized." Saikaku, by the end of the seventeenth century, already speaks of an illiterate samurai as sadly behind the times, and by the middle of the nineteenth century the situation was vastly different. Nearly every fief had its fief-endowed school and there were hundreds of private schools for samurai. Not only was every samurai capable of reading and writing his own language; most of them had undergone a sufficiently prolonged and disciplined intellectual training to be able to read some Chinese as well.
>
> If public provision for formal education was limited to the samurai class, the lower orders were already managing to provide very well for themselves. In the towns a good proportion of the population could read and write Japanese. Parents bought such education for their children, voluntarily and with hard cash, from teachers who derived their total income from fees. In country districts paternally disposed richer villagers did a great deal to supplement the operations of an otherwise private enterprise system. At a very rough estimate it would seem that by the time of the Restoration forty to fifty per cent of all Japanese boys, and perhaps fifteen per cent of girls, were getting some formal schooling outside their homes.
>
> This suggests a spread of literacy greater than in most modern underdeveloped countries, and greater than in any European country at a comparable stage of economic development, with the possible exceptions of Prussia and Holland. It even compares favorably with some mid-nineteenth century European countries. As late as 1837 a British Select Committee found that in the major industrial towns only one child in four or five was ever getting to school, and it may have been more than a desire to jolt his fellow-countrymen which prompted one Frenchman to write in 1877 that "primary education in Japan has achieved a level which should make

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us blush. . . . There is no village without its school, hardly a person who cannot read."[3]

Dore concludes that, despite the Confucian orientation of most of this pre-Restoration education, "the attitudes to popular education, the sense of the contingency of social institutions on the human will, the training in abstract analysis and the application of evaluating principles to policy, the development of a respect for merit rather than status, the stimulation of personal ambition and the strengthening of a collectivist ideology . . ."[4] represented important contributions to the modernizing process in Japan, and that all of these had undergone very considerable development long before the Restoration.

In a more specifically political sense, the same could be said of the origins and development of another major element in the modernizing process—the emergence of a professionally trained, rationally structured, and achievement-oriented bureaucracy. In this connection, consider the following statement by Professor J. W. Hall:

> If the relationship of shogun to daimyo exhibited a balance between feudal and bureaucratic techniques, the trend toward centralized bureaucratic procedures was conspicuous within the *han* (fiefs). The key institution in this regard was the *kashindan*, or the assemblage of retainers, which comprised the staff of the shogun and the daimyo. In the early years of the Tokugawa Period, the relationship of housemen to daimyo was still in the main personal and voluntary. Though many of the retainers were stipended, the upper strata were individually enfeoffed. But later, with the nearly complete withdrawal of the samurai from the land to live in the castle headquarters towns of the daimyo, the members of the *kashindan* lost their individual identity. Grouped by rank into an army-type organization, they were placed under appointed leaders and assigned freely to civil and military duties. Throughout the Tokugawa Period the tendency within the shogunal and daimyo administration was for the central authority to gain at the expense of the independent vassal. Within the *kashindan* the number of landed and high-salaried officers was instantly reduced while the number of dependent and stipended men increased. Eventually even the remaining land allotments were fictionalized. In certain instances daimyo without territory received rice incomes from the shogun's granary. In the *han*, supposedly enfeoffed retainers actually received only stipends, losing all powers of interference in the affairs of the villages which once comprised their fiefs. By the beginning of the eighteenth century nearly ninety per cent of the daimyo had forced their entire retinues to draw their subsistence from the domain granaries.
>
> These changes were accompanied by important changes in the nature of

[3] Ronald P. Dore, "The Legacy of Tokugawa Education" (unpublished paper prepared for the first seminar of the Conference on Modern Japan, January 1962), 1-2.
[4] *Ibid.*, 2.

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the bond which tied samurai to daimyo. The pledge of loyalty, once so sacred as to be sealed in blood, became increasingly formalized and perfunctory. In many instances the personally sworn oath was dispensed with and required only when a retainer took an important post in the daimyo's service. Thus in most areas of Japan "personal vassalage privately rewarded by enfeoffment was giving way to a system of military statuses which fed into a civil and military bureaucracy. Loyalty was becoming a principle rather than a private commitment." The daimyo became more a legal symbol than a personal despot.

In other sectors of Tokugawa society also authority was being exerted less as a personal right than through institutional or legal channels. The authority of the samurai class, asserted under the feudal system as a privately exercised prerogative over fiefs and cultivators, gave way to a more impersonal and public administrative system. For the farming class the condition of personal bondage gave way to the status of taxpaying tenant of the daimyo. Local administration was absorbed into the daimyo's bureaucracy and no longer subdivided among the daimyo's retainers. Corvée labor and personal indenture was increasingly replaced by paid labor and paid domestic service.[5]

In the light of insights such as these into what was actually taking place throughout the Tokugawa Period in Japan, one begins to appreciate the long, gradual process of institutional and attitudinal preparation for modernization which was well under way at least a century before the Restoration. Comparable "preparations" may readily be identified at the village level or in the economic sphere;[6] there is nothing unduly selective about these examples. Japanese society during the Tokugawa Period may still be appropriately described by such terms as "centralized or nationalized feudalism" but, if so, it was feudalism with an important difference. Japan had come a long way from the hierarchic, personal, loyalty-focused relationships and the intricate structure of fiefs and practically enserfed villagers which had characterized the polity in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. On balance the "feudal" attributes of the society perhaps still predominated. But mingled with and gradually subverting these were a number of the most salient and potent elements of "modern" society.

When evaluating the modernization of Japan, it is useful to keep in mind this long, complex history of covert preparation from which the society benefited. This still stands as a unique accomplishment in Asia, but its main roots are buried at least two hundred years deep in the country's social and political history. The florescence of national

[5] "Feudalism in Japan," 49-50.

[6] See, e.g., Thomas C. Smith, *The Agrarian Foundations of Modern Japan* (Stanford 1959).

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leadership during the early Meiji Period, combined with the international circumstances and opportunities of the times, had a great deal to do with the amazing speed at which Japan modernized, but in a more fundamental sense Japanese society seems to have been prepared for the experience to a degree still unmatched in some important respects among many contemporary Asian societies. In this context, the Japanese preparations for more modern forms of social, economic, and political organization may not be so completely different from their Western analogues as the apparent persistence of a "feudal" period until 1868 makes it seem.

IV

This extension in historical depth of the development of a modern society and polity in Japan also calls attention to what Professor Almond has termed the "dualism" of political institutions.[7] All modern polities contain substantial admixtures of traditional elements, and these are frequently not confined to isolated or backwater areas but may play a prominent and functionally important role in the modernization process.

In the Japanese case, this is well illustrated by our earlier account of the historical development of a professionally trained, rationally structured, and achievement-oriented bureaucracy in Japan. In this instance it was pointed out that what seemed to be a purely feudal institution performing functions of major importance in a predominantly feudal society was at the same time gradually acquiring more and more of the basic characteristics of a modern professional bureaucracy. In a historical sense, therefore, the late Tokugawa bureaucracy played a Janus-like role. It faced both backward toward the truly feudal institutions and times of the sixteenth century and forward toward the emergent modern society of the twentieth. It also served in gradually shifting proportions the purposes of both waning and emergent societies, and it continued to do this for upward of one hundred and fifty years. In other words, the capacity for peaceful coexistence—and even mutual supportiveness—of "feudal" or traditional with modern elements within a given institution, as well as within a society, is well demonstrated by the Japanese experience.

But the context has shifted since Tokugawa times. First, it was the existence of modern elements and tendencies within a feudal environment that seemed noteworthy. Now it is the "survival" of numerous

[7] Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 20-25.

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so-called feudal or traditional traits within the predominantly modern context of present-day Japan which seems striking and gives rise to comments which are apt to be emotionally charged. To some these "survivals" represent the old, the "real," the quintessential Japan and are to be treasured and savored; to others they represent discreditable vestiges of an outmoded, or "Asian," or "feudal" past which should be given speedy burial.

The explanation of such reactions would seem to lie in the dichotomous way in which the terms "traditional" and "modern" are usually related in our thinking. They tend to be viewed as mutually exclusive or polar opposites. The institutions and attitudes associated with one come to be regarded as antipathetic to the other. From here, it is but a step to the conclusion that any given traditional "survival" is fated for elimination from a "modern" society through some inexorable process of social purgation impelled by a drive toward institutional self-consistency.

The history of the modernization of Japan challenges the tenability of any such thesis. It demonstrates in many ways not only the ability of "modern" institutions and practices to coexist with "traditional" ones for very substantial periods of time, but also the manner in which "traditional" attitudes and practices can be of great positive value to the modernization process.

The modernizing experience is a strenuous one for any traditionally organized society. If successful, it demands sacrifice, discipline, initiative, and perseverance in quantities and for periods of time which are certain to place the people concerned under very severe strains. One of the greatest problems of leadership under these circumstances is to devise conditions and motivations which will both liberate and focus an appropriate amount of popular energy, initiative, and resources and at the same time minimize dysfunctional behavior on the part of all significant elements in the population. Consider briefly some of the techniques used in Japan to achieve these goals and note the role played therein by traditional elements.

Most obvious of all, perhaps, was the use made of the emperor. This is not to say that there was not some measure of sincerity and philosophic or ethical commitment in the movement to restore the emperor to at least the semblance of temporal power. But the subsequent revival and institutionalization of Shinto and the cultivation of mass loyalty, obedience, and reverence for the emperor were too systematic and innovational to be anything but a deliberate and very clever attempt by the Meiji leadership to channel popular attitudes and conduct along

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lines which they considered constructive. In this instance the appeal was to an institutional complex that not only was traditional in terms of the circumstances of the 1870's, but would have been equally so in terms of those of 1603. The tradition of imperial rule, with very few exceptions, had possessed little validity since approximately the ninth century, while Imperial Shinto as a national cult had been moribund for at least as long, if indeed it had ever before existed in comparable form.

Again, one of the real keystones to the successful modernization of Japan was the device of holding constant, i.e. traditional, the circumstances of life in rural and agricultural Japan while at the same time using and exploiting the countryside as a means of building and rapidly developing the urban, commercial, industrial, and military sectors of the society. Modernization is an expensive undertaking and the costs must be borne by some segment of the population. In Japan in the early and critical years, it was the peasantry who, through the land tax, bore the bulk of this burden. A docile and productive agrarian labor force was, therefore, an element of crucial importance to the leaders of a modernizing Japan. In a social engineering sense, they strove to ensure this result by altering the actual socio-political circumstances of the pre-Restoration countryside as little as possible. Land reform was assiduously avoided; the existing political, social, and economic elites of the villages were insofar as possible confirmed in their status and authority; the traditional community and family systems were not only maintained but in a number of ways were reinforced and given new legal status and sanctions.

A systematic endeavor was made to ensure the tranquility, obedience, and loyalty of the countryside, and the control devices utilized were almost without exception traditional. This not only assured the government of a maximal flow of food, revenue, recruits, and urban-bound emigrants from the countryside, but also left them free to concentrate their attention and resources on the building of the more critical urban aspects of the national economy and defense establishment. This was a strategy of enormous importance to the rapid development of Japan, and its success rested ultimately on the effective enlistment of traditional institutions and appeals in the service of the modernizing process.

If one looks to the contemporary rather than the historical scene in Japan, many examples of this type of "reinforcing dualism" may still be discerned. The most reliable and important element in the long political dominance of the Liberal-Democratic Party in the postwar period has been its control of the rural vote. Below the surface of this

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phenomenon, one will find a political support system compounded of largely personalized allegiance and loyalties reaching downward through the prefectures to roots in every farm hamlet in Japan. The ultimate approach of this apparatus to the voter is based upon a very shrewd admixture of appeals to personal and local advantage phrased in terms of traditional values and relationships. Again, the primacy of personal and hierarchical relations and loyalties in Japanese politics is obvious and well-known. The persistence of *oyabun-kobun* and similar forms of traditional fictive family relationships is but an extreme form of this trait. It would probably also be proper to regard the national predilection for consensual rather than adversary forms of decision-making and the dualistic nature of the national economy as other examples of the continued vitality and real functional importance of traditional attitudes and practices in the Japan of 1963.

In short, post-Restoration Japan has continuously represented a very complex amalgam of traditional and modern elements, a sort of mutually supportive or "reinforcing dualism" in which the relationship between the two sectors has often been symbiotic rather than antagonistic. This has been true to such an extent that it is probably accurate to claim that Japan could not have been successful in modernizing so rapidly and effectively had it not been for the many planned and unplanned ways in which traditional values and behavior positively contributed to and supported the process. Furthermore, there is a good deal of evidence indicative of the continued vitality of some segments of the traditional sector. It is still too early to predict even their gradual displacement by what we regard logically as more modern traits.

V

Any characterization of modern political culture in Japan must take into account at least two sets of factors: those making for unity and stability, and those making for diversity, tension, and change. Although the former are not at present of major concern, they do condition and set limits to the operations of the factors making for tension and change, and should thus be noted as an essential part of this picture. For present purposes they may be described briefly.

Japan's combination of insularity and racial and linguistic homogeneity makes under modern circumstances for a high degree of in-group feeling and national unity vis-à-vis the non-Japanese world. Particularly since the loss of her empire, the country has had natural frontiers sharply demarcated from foreign territory—in all but the Rus-

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sian case—by sizable bodies of water. Historically, these have given to the Japanese people a degree of national security unprecedented among major states. They have also, until recently, sharply limited any opportunity for massive contact or interaction with foreign peoples, enhanced and supported the popular sense of the uniqueness of being Japanese, and encouraged a sort of narcissistic absorption in Japan's own culture, problems, and viewpoints. This last attribute has persisted throughout all of the country's recent periods of intense acculturative experience and has invariably reasserted itself. These centripetal tendencies are reinforced by practically complete linguistic uniformity, qualified only by a few dialect problems, and by a degree of racial homogeneity unmatched among major states. Japan is 99.3 per cent pure in terms of racial composition, having fewer than 700,000 identifiable aliens among her populace. Immigration by non-Japanese peoples has never been a problem of serious proportion in the past two thousand years.

The contemporary Japanese also inherit a myth of national unity at least twelve hundred years old. Despite the fact that much of the history of this period was marked by localism, civil strife, and the emergence of powerful clans and nobles with high degrees of independence within their own territories, the tradition and forms of national unity and of a Japanese state have always been maintained. The symbol—some would claim the embodiment—of this tradition has been the imperial institution which, although its fortunes and authority have varied widely, has existed continuously and has continuously asserted both its own legitimacy and the essential unity of the state. Although today the efficacy of the imperial institution as a legitimizing and unifying force has doubtless diminished—especially where important sectors of the youth of Japan are concerned—it would be a mistake to overestimate the degree of either its obsolescence or its impotence as a symbol of the nation's unity. The very absence of acceptable alternatives lends it a strength and resilience which may not be immediately apparent.

A still more important factor making for national unity and stability is the spectacular success of the Japanese state as an instrument for the achievement and sharing of values. This has historical dimensions to it which evoke past greatness and satisfactions, somewhat flawed by the disastrous defeat of 1945. But, for the present, this is overmatched by the sense of shared suffering and accomplishment in postwar times. The Japanese economy has expanded at a startling rate and the resulting prosperity has been more widely shared than ever before in the

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national history. It is hard to establish the extent to which the Japanese political system is entitled to credit for this accomplishment, but in practice it gets a great deal. It has worked and, after a painful wartime lapse, is working again. The people are prospering and—party politics aside—they tend to have few basic or bitter criticisms of the system. This element of practical success is a very important aspect of the factors making for unity and stability in present Japanese political culture. Indeed, it is possible to feel considerable concern as to whether it may not be the crucial factor. The resiliency and strength of the postwar Japanese political system have yet to be tested under conditions of real economic adversity or political stress, and it is difficult to predict what the reaction to such circumstances would be.

The former are all unifying forces in the political culture of Japan. As established parts of the political scene they also tend to have a conserving or stabilizing effect. Their weight tends to be exerted more on the side of maintaining what is and has worked than of making for changes therein. But what elements of political culture work against these conserving forces and engender political change of a modernizing sort?

Under modern conditions, a certain amount of incremental change in political culture seems simply to be attendant upon the need or probability of certain administrative or popular responses to existing problems, programs, and commitments. This is a systemic and more or less self-generating type of change which may be modernizing in tendency. Other political changes seem to proceed more directly from diversity and tensions which seek political release and political forms of expression. One means of gaining some insight into a political system's potential for and possible directions of change, in the latter sense, is to examine its subsystem and group characteristics on the assumption that these embody antagonistic as well as symbiotic elements and that the former will provide clues to the major organized sources of tension and strife within the system as a whole and thus to the sources of modernizing political change.

In the case of Japan, one must start such an endeavor by emphasizing the pervasiveness of political factionalism. Any large cross-cut through the political system—such as urban vs. rural, generational, or right vs. left—must, in an organized political sense, be discounted for its factional characteristics. Factionalism in this sense refers to an informal and relatively small subsystem of political organization based ultimately on personal or parochial loyalties or values and operating within a larger, ostensibly unified, political system. The effective ambit of the

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loyalties and obligations involved is apt to run considerably beyond the specific political goals of the group. Such types of organization have long been characteristic within the Japanese imperial court, nobility, civil and military bureaucracy, political parties, and regional and local elites. They are, of course, familiar in many societies, including the most politically modern. As societies modernize, however, there seems to be a tendency for this particular type of political organization to be—not supplanted—but diluted by the more limited, programmatic and functionally defined allegiances represented by modern interest groups and political parties. In this sense, it might be legitimate to regard factions as constituting, in part at least, a traditional analogue of interest groups.

In postwar Japanese political culture, one can quite clearly detect the erosive effect on factionalism of these newer forms of political association, but the process has not proceeded as far as it has in some Western states. Perhaps it never will. In any event any refined understanding of important decisions and developments within the Japanese political system depends in significant part on one's knowledge of the interplay of factions. These may in recent times have partly shifted their basis of association toward the programmatic or functionally specific end of the spectrum, but, even within so rigorously ideological a group as the Japanese Communist or Socialist Party, personally based and widely ranging loyalties still play an unusually important role. Until recently politics was normally conceived of in Japan as a struggle cast in essentially personal and household terms. It is hard to determine with much precision, but it is probable that the concept of limited programmatic allegiances as a basis for political association and action did not really gain an appreciable foothold on a national scale in Japan until after the First World War, and did not come to compete on anything like equal terms until after the Second. Factions thus continue to be a natural and comfortable form of political organization for the Japanese and they penetrate and complicate almost all other forms of political association and action.

Factionalism in this form and degree may, of course, itself be regarded as a traditional element in contemporary Japanese political culture. The values which it serves and the attitudes upon which it is based have long and honored histories which far predate the Restoration. Again, it provides a splendid example of the continued viability of premodern forms of political association, and the way in which they can be adapted, in part at least, to the operations and needs of quite modern institutions and groups.

After this background note about the pervasiveness of factionalism,

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we can now proceed to a brief examination of other aspects of Japanese political culture which are productive of tensions and changes affecting the course of political modernization. The basic question is which elements in the political culture are conserving in tendency, and which are innovating from the standpoint of political modernization as we have previously defined it. It would take a very detailed inventory, accompanied by an imposing and exhausting list of qualifications, to provide a satisfactory answer to such a question, but some quite crude and oversimplified approaches might be possible along the following lines.

There are several dimensions of Japanese political culture which tend to correlate roughly or partially with the traditional-modern dimension. An obvious case in point is the urban-rural dimension or continuum. Political party affiliations aside, it would seem safe to say that the urban environment and populace have been more receptive to and supportive of political innovation and modernization in Japan than have the rural environment and populace. The reasons for this have more to do with patterns of social organization and the attitudes engendered thereby than they do with politics. The traditional forms of social organization have been less rapidly and extensively affected by the forces of modernization in the countryside than in the city. Household and community solidarity are more vital forces in the villages and they carry with them a set of political attitudes and behavior patterns that are conserving and traditional in tendency. The bulk of the urban populace, on the other hand, is composed of individuals and families who have migrated from the countryside within the last two generations. The fact of migration alone—particularly when individuals rather than family groups are involved—represents a partial but important rupture of the bonds which tie individuals to the traditional forms and attitudes. Migration to a city does not in itself emancipate or modernize the individual migrant, but it often provides him with an environment in which changes in political as well as social attitudes and behavior are a more practicable and probable development.

There is no necessity attaching to such changes, however, as a consequence of movement to the cities. It is in fact quite misleading to think of even the major metropolitan areas of Japan as inhabited solely or predominantly by *émancipés* in this sense. Even since the war, there have been sizable segments of the urban population who live in the equivalent of "small societies" in the heart of Osaka or Tokyo, and who may be surprisingly untouched by their larger environment and its potentialities for socio-political emancipation or innovation. Despite this, however, it still seems that political development and change in

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modern Japan are considerably more apt to stem from the urban than from the rural sectors of the population.

A somewhat similar linkage with political innovation can be seen in the case of big vs. small and medium industry in Japan. In general, big business, despite a number of persistent traditional characteristics, provides for both its management and its employees an environment appreciably more hospitable to both social and political innovation than does most small or medium industry. This is an important aspect of the significance of the term "dual economy" as applied to Japan. Alongside the large modern businesses and factories of Japan exist a great number of smaller businesses and industries organized on household and traditional lines. They replicate in the cities the patterns of social organization, attitudes, and behavior which are normally associated with village society. And comparable patterns of political attitudes and behavior tend to accompany these. In other words, the particular type of economic organization associated with small and middle business in Japan is apt to have a conserving and inhibiting influence on the process of political modernization.

It is probably also true that the so-called "conservative" political parties in contemporary Japan have a greater stake in the preservation of certain aspects of the traditional society than do the "progressive" parties. This is more a matter of electoral strategy than of conscious principle, but to an important degree the political ascendancy of the conservatives rests upon clever exploitation of the old patterns of household and community solidarity and the complex hierarchical systems of influence and obligation associated therewith. This has not prevented governments controlled by the conservative group from playing an innovational role where many aspects of political change and modernization are concerned, but one should not forget that they also have, for the present at least, an important political stake in the preservation of certain aspects of the traditional society and political system.

One is tempted also to postulate a similar situation with respect to the political attitudes and behavior of older vs. younger generations in Japan, but reliable information in this field of generational differences is so scant and partial as to render this very risky. It seems probable on general theoretical grounds that the older generations would be more conserving and the younger more innovational, but few facts have as yet been established in this field.

There do, therefore, exist in contemporary Japanese political culture elements which are in some degree mutually antagonistic with respect to the issue of conserving traditional political institutions and attitudes

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vs. supplanting them by more modern forms. Their interactions give rise to tensions which ultimately involve decisions that affect the existing balance of traditional and modernizing elements within the system. But, despite the existence of such elements within the Japanese political system, it would be difficult to claim that they constitute a major source of tension, diversity, or political change. The issues involved in political modernization are simply not that much in contest in present-day Japan. The mode or central tendency of the political system is predominantly, if not exclusively, modern. There does not exist any significant political party or group with an across-the-board or major commitment to traditional as opposed to modern political institutions, values, or behavior.

No one in Japan today is seriously questioning, for example, the value or essentiality of a highly differentiated and systematically integrated system of political structure and roles, or the need for as rational, scientific, and secular a system of political decision-making as the government is able to institute. Similarly, the regulatory and social-service state, with its broad ambit of official concern and enormous output of political decisions and administrative actions, is more or less taken for granted. None but a small minority of dedicated ideologues dissent seriously from the principles of national identity or of the Japanese state as the proper unit of organization for the society's political life. Broad and increasing involvement of the people in the political system is simply a fact of life and of the terms of political competition in postwar Japan. The notion of allocating political roles by some standard other than achievement would probably come as a genuine shock to most Japanese, if viewed as a question of principle. And the country has a predominantly secular and impersonal system of law and regulatory action. To be sure, there is an endless diversity of view as to the degree to which any of these standards should be applied in given cases, but these are issues of degree; the principles of the modern polity are no longer in question.

Japan has thus achieved the "modern state"; in Rostow's terms, she has passed her stage of "take-off" and entered upon a stage of "self-sustaining development." As a consequence, tensions, competition, and decisions in the Japanese political system tend to relate only tangentially or instrumentally to the traditional-modern dimension within Japanese political culture. Certain aspects of traditional culture offer tactical advantages to certain participants in the political struggle. They, therefore, try to preserve these aspects as long as possible, but usually with some recognition of the fact that their returns are diminishing and that other

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tactics will eventually have to be devised to replace the traditionally based ones. The commitments involved tend in this sense to be limited and instrumental rather than ultimate and principled. Increasingly, the terms and goals of political competition in Japan tend to focus on the quest for specific sorts of economic or political advantage for functionally defined groups or interests along lines already familiar in the West. Japan has now largely outgrown political competition based upon the desirability of the constituent elements of a modern polity. These exist and are generally accepted in Japan as in other modern states.

VI

The course of political modernization in Japan raises some interesting questions with respect to the form and organization of authority in modernizing societies. It was pointed out earlier that states which have achieved modernity may have democratic, totalitarian, or some intermediate type of political organization. The form of government does not seem to be a defining factor in mature cases of political modernization. The experience of Japan, however, makes one wonder if the same judgment applies with respect to forms of political organization in all earlier stages of the political modernization process. Is the process neutral in this respect throughout, or can one identify stages which demand authoritarian forms of government and which are antipathetic on grounds of developmental efficiency and potentiality to the introduction of democratic institutions on more than a very restricted basis? The question is of great importance from the standpoint of those who would prefer to see "backward" political systems develop along lines which are both modern and democratic. These are compatible but not necessary consequences of the developmental process. This poses the problem of how one can maximize the probability that developing polities will become both modern and democratic.

The experience of Japan alone certainly cannot provide definitive answers to either of the above questions. But neither is it irrelevant, and in circumstances where it represents the sole mature non-Western exemplar of the modernization process in all of Asia, it should be examined with unusual care and attention. The Japanese experience seems to suggest: (1) that authoritarian forms of political organization can be extraordinarily effective in the early stages of the modernization process; (2) that they need not debar the gradual emergence of more democratic forms of political organization; and (3) that some such

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process of gradual transition from authoritarian to democratic forms may be essential to the emergence of politics that are both modern and durably democratic. It should be emphasized again that these are no more than highly tentative hypotheses based upon the experience of Japan, but they do possess at least this much historical sanction and support. Let us then consider in a general way selected aspects of Japan's experience with the political modernization process which relate to the above three propositions.

First, authoritarian forms of political organization can be extraordinarily effective in the early stages of the modernization process. It is implied—though not demonstrable on the basis of the Japanese experience—that democratic forms are significantly less effective and that their early introduction may in fact result in conditions that will seriously inhibit the prospects of long-term democratic development.

This contention rests primarily on observations with respect to the relationship between the political modernization process and the process of social modernization in a general or total sense. The former is not autonomous, not a goal in itself. It is instrumentally related to the larger process and goal and should serve and expedite its purposes. This larger process of modernization entails for the society concerned, especially in the critical early or "take-off" stages, a series of shocks and strains of major proportions. It equally creates emancipations and new opportunities for some, but for major segments of the population this is apt to be a lengthy period of adjustment to new economic, social, and political situations and demands. Large-scale material and psychological stresses are invariably involved. One of the routine consequences of such a situation—at least in the non-Western world of the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries—seems to be a greatly expanded role for government. A certain and perhaps very important amount of the modernization process may still take place under private auspices, but in recent times the needs and expectations which set the standards of modernization have been so urgent and expensive that national governments have had to assume a leading and dominant role. Only power organized at this level seemed capable of massing the resources and taking and enforcing the wide-ranging and difficult decisions involved.

This primacy of government in the modernizing process is more or less taken for granted throughout the underdeveloped world today. The situation was doubtless historically different in the case of the modernization of certain Western European societies and their offshoots, but in present-day underdeveloped societies there simply are no plausible and

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politically viable alternatives to the primacy of government as an agent of modernization. This was also true in the Japanese case at the time of the Restoration.

The overriding problems and goals of the 1870's and 1880's in Japan were well expressed by the popular political slogan of the day—*fukoku kyōhei* (a strong and wealthy nation). This captures the essence of the complex of forces and aspirations which underlay the Restoration movement and motivated its leaders in the difficult days that followed the initial successes of 1868. The greatest and most urgent needs were for national unity and the creation of armed strength sufficient to guarantee the national security against both real and fancied dangers of foreign imperialist aggression and economic exploitation. Instrumental thereto, of course, was the creation of a strong and stable government to lead the nation along suitable paths. Fortunately for Japan, her leaders were wise enough to define these goals in broad and constructive terms. Military strength meant to them far more than a large army and navy well-equipped with Western armaments; it also meant the industrial plant to sustain and expand such a military establishment and appropriate training for the men who must staff it. National wealth came to mean a radical diversification of the predominantly agrarian economy, urbanization, systematic mass and higher education, planned industrialization, new commercial and financial institutions, and a variety of other commitments which were perceived as essential to survival and effective competitive status in a Western-dominated world. Not all of these commitments were either generally perceived or welcomed at the outset by the leadership group, but in their search for national unity, strength, and security they found themselves embarked upon a species of "modernization spiral" similar in some respects to the "inflationary spiral" of the economists. The most intelligent and able of them adapted to the general course set by the imperatives which these goals entailed; the others were eliminated from leadership circles.

The realization of national goals of this sort did not come easily to a society such as Japan's, even given the forms of covert preparation for modernization which had characterized the later Tokugawa Period. The really critical years between 1868 and 1890 must sometimes have seemed an unending series of crises. Civil war, the threat of international war and the fact of foreign economic exploitation, a series of economic crises, inflation and deflation, the recurrent threat of samurai conspiracies against the government, the embitterment of the peasantry at the failure of the government to improve their lot, the dearth of desperately needed technical knowledge and personnel, and all of the

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widespread fears and tensions which attend a time of new beginnings —these were merely some of the problems which constantly confronted the new political leadership. Yet, by 1890, policies capable of dealing with all of these problems had been developed and the country was firmly embarked on the path to modernization. The foreign threats had been faced and Japan's international position was secure; the menace of civil war had been permanently liquidated; the structural vestiges of feudalism had been eliminated and the country effectively unified; the position and authority of the government had been confirmed and regularized by constitutional arrangements; the economy had been stabilized and a promising start made upon its diversification and industrialization; a system of mass compulsory education had been inaugurated and mass media of communication established; in every critical category the strength of Japan showed remarkable and promising improvements.

Under such circumstances it may be that some measure of democratic participation could successfully have been introduced into the political system. There were those who advocated such changes. The *Jiyūminken Undō* (Freedom and Popular Rights Movement), for example, called for the establishment of a national parliament, a limited suffrage, and some dispersion of political authority. Had this been attempted during these years, the results need not have been fatal to the modernization of Japan. But under conditions of more or less constant political or economic crisis, widespread popular disaffection and lack of understanding of the necessity for the sacrifices entailed by many government programs, the unpredictable qualities and perils of the country's foreign relations, and what we have learned in general of the limitations of fledgling democratic institutions in largely unprepared contexts, it is difficult to envisage the feasibility or practicality of any very significant democratic innovations at this time.

These years from 1868 to 1890, or some similar period, would seem to be a time in Japan's modernization when an authoritarian form of political organization offered distinct advantages where rapidity of response, flexibility, planning, and effective action were concerned. This is said with full appreciation of the fumbling and shortcomings of authoritarian leadership groups and irresponsible bureaucracies—including the Japanese of this period—in all of these departments. It thus assumes the availability of some at least minimally competent and unified political leadership. If this is not available—and there are obviously cases where it is not—political modernization is not a practicable proposition for the countries concerned.

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In the Japanese case, however, it seems on balance highly improbable that (1) the addition of any significant or effective democratic institutions to the decision-making apparatus at such a stage of national development could have had other than deleterious effects upon the speed and decisiveness with which urgent problems were handled; and that (2) this stage of the modernization process, beset as it inevitably was by so many and such desperate problems, would have been an appropriate time to launch so delicate an experiment as democratization.

Our second hypothesis was that the dominance of authoritarian forms of political organization in the initial stages of the political modernization process need not debar the gradual emergence of democratic forms of organization. This is not intended to imply any quality of inevitability in such a development, although in a secular sense some such tendency may exist.

In the Japanese case, no significant measures of democratization were introduced into the political system until the enactment of the Meiji Constitution in 1890, twenty-two years after the Restoration. Even then it is very doubtful if any of the authors of this document thought of their handiwork as an act of democratic innovation. It is certain that their so-called "liberal" opposition did not. Rather does it seem that the Meiji leadership group conceived of this constitution primarily as a means of regularizing the structure and operations of political authority —the absence of any rationalized or stable structure and the continual innovation and experimentation of the intervening years must have been very trying—and of further unifying and solidifying both the country and their own authority. As a consequence of this and a variety of later developments, there has been a tendency to undervalue both the degree of political change which the Meiji Constitution brought to Japan and the measure of democratic development which took place under it.

It is helpful to look at the Meiji Constitution and its attendant basic laws both in terms of the general political standards and practices of 1890 and in terms of its actual operations as well as its legal and political theory. If this is done, one will note that it makes public, explicit, and authoritative a particular theory of sovereignty and the state, and derives from this a functionally differentiated and rationally organized governmental structure; it establishes the legal status of citizens and specifies their political and civil rights and duties; it distinguishes legislative, executive, and judicial functions and, although establishing a dominant and protected position for the executive, does provide for their separate institutionalization; it specifies legal equality before the

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law and creates means for the assertion of popular against official rights; it establishes a restricted but expansible franchise and, in terms of this, a popularly elected house in the national legislature; it provides for some measure of decentralization in government, and renders inevitable the introduction of a much greater measure of pluralism into both the Japanese oligarchy and the political system in general.

Against the background of Tokugawa and Restoration political practices, these are notable and democratic innovations. They did not, of course, put an end to the period of authoritarian political rule in Japan. But they certainly launched a process of democratization which has continued to play a major, although usually not dominant, part in Japanese politics ever since. In this sense the history of the democratization of Japan, viewed in the light of present circumstances, is a product of erosive and catalytic agents. Much of the story is told, until 1932 at least, in terms of the erosion of the authoritarian political forms and practices characteristic of the pre-constitutional period. This process never reached the point of establishing what the contemporary West would regard as an authentically democratic political system, but, by the 1920's, the degree of pluralism, responsibility, and popular participation characterizing Japanese politics would certainly have surprised, and probably appalled, the great leaders of the Restoration Period. Between the 1920's and the 1960's there intervened, of course, the resurgence of military and ultranationalist rule, the war, and the Allied Occupation of Japan. This last acted as a catalytic agent on the submerged but still vital forms of Japanese democracy and gave them institutional and legal advantages, authority, and prestige beyond what they could have hoped for on the basis of their own political position and strength. The consequence has been a great and apparently sudden florescence of Western-style democracy in Japan. In fact, however, the roots of this development lie deep in the political experience of post-1890 Japan.

There are two things about this gradual emergence of democratic politics from the authoritarian system of pre-1890 Japan which might have more general validity and interest. The first is that even the concession of a very carefully restricted and seemingly impotent governmental role to a popularly elected body can, over a period of time, have consequences well nigh fatal to sustained authoritarian rule. It would be hard to be optimistic about the influence or authority of the Japanese House of Representatives in terms of the provisions of the Meiji Constitution or the relevant basic laws. These faithfully reflect and implement the desire of the founders to make of the House an appealing but

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powerless sop to the demands of the opposition and public opinion. But the lessons to be learned from the subsequent history of the lower house are: (1) that it provides a means of institutionalizing and enlarging the role of political parties; (2) that, in modernizing circumstances, even vested powers of obstructing the smooth and effective flow of governmental decisions and actions can be critical—positive powers of initiation and control are not necessary; and (3) that in circumstances where a popularly chosen body can thus blackmail an authoritarian leadership, there is a fair possibility of forcing the latter into piecemeal but cumulative accommodations which are democratic in tendency.

The second generalization suggested by the history of democratic development in Japan relates to the conditions necessary to support an effectively authoritarian system of government. Japanese experience suggests the existence of a close relationship between effective authoritarian rule and the unity and solidarity of the oligarchy involved. The limits involved cannot be described with much precision, but authoritarian government in Japan began to disintegrate as the heretofore fairly solidary oligarchy began to split into competing cliques and factions. The probability of such rifts seems to be very high in modernizing societies. The development of role specialization and professionalization even at high levels is an essential part of the process of modernization, and this makes it hard for an oligarchy to maintain the degree of unity and cohesion feasible in revolutionary or in simpler times. Pluralism in this sense seems to be built into the process. And as an oligarchy breaks down into competing factions in this fashion, the terms of political competition in that society undergo an important change. Extra-oligarchic groups such as emergent political parties acquire new room for maneuver and new political leverages, and the ex-oligarchic cliques themselves acquire new incentives for broadening the basis of their support. Out of these altered political circumstances are apt to come new political alliances involving elements of the former oligarchy with elements of more popularly based bodies—in particular, with political parties. The total process is dilutive from the standpoint of authoritarian government and supportive of the gradual emergence of greater degrees of pluralism and democracy.

It is not intended to depict either of the foregoing generalizations on the basis of Japanese experience as controlling or inevitable. But they did occur within a fairly authoritarian context in Japan's case and there seem to be some reasons for regarding them as of more general validity. The conclusion would seem to be that an initial or early stage of au-

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thoritarian government on the path to modernization (1) does not commit a polity to long-term adherence to authoritarian forms; (2) does not necessarily make an authoritarian course of development probable; and (3) may even contain built-in elements calculated with time and development to break down and liberalize such authoritarian forms.

Our third hypothesis is even more tentatively stated and adds up to a feeling that some such process of gradual transition from authoritarian to democratic forms may be essential to the emergence of a political system which is both modern and durably democratic. In this connection Japan's experience suggests several notions of possible interest.

First, our commonly employed systems of periodization may involve serious distortions where the history of political modernization is concerned. Thus, in Japan's case, while the feudal-modern or Tokugawa-Restoration frameworks have a plausible amount of relevance to the emergence of a modern Japanese political system, they also serve to obscure important aspects of the process. They are calculated, as is the prewar-postwar framework, to produce an overemphasis on the significance of certain dramatic and allegedly "revolutionary" events in a country's history—in this case, the Restoration or the 1945 defeat plus the Occupation. This is conducive to a dichotomous view of the political development process which seriously overstates the enduring importance of alleged discontinuities in a national history at the expense of the less dramatic but fundamentally more important continuities.

Second, if the history of the development of democracy in Japan is weighted for this distorting effect of the commonly employed categories and system of periodization, the differences in preparation, timing, and depth of democratic experience which are often held to distinguish a democratic political system in Japan from its Western analogues would perhaps seem appreciably less valid and important than is usually assumed. The two patterns of development probably have more in common than is generally recognized.

Third, if the foregoing assumptions are valid, one is tempted to conclude that all practicing and at least ostensibly solid and durable democracies today are the products of lengthy and multifaceted evolutionary processes. In the Japanese case, if one looks only to the direct antecedents, seventy-three years intervene between the Meiji Constitution and the present. But far longer periods of preparation are involved if one looks to the less direct consequences of the introduction of mass literacy or a rationalized bureaucratic structure. In this sense

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it is questionable whether history provides any very encouraging examples of short-cuts to the achievement of a democratic political system.

Finally, such a train of argument suggests the importance of the relationship existing between a "modern" political system and a "democratic" political system. One hesitates to claim that all or a specific proportion of the attributes of a modern polity must be achieved before a society becomes capable of durably democratic performance or achievement, but Japan's experience at least suggests an important correlation between the two. It is hard to specify the proportions involved, but, in a rough and approximate way, one might say that perhaps only modern societies with modern political cultures of the sort defined in Section I are practical candidates for democratization.

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EURATOM

A Study in Coalition Politics

By H. L. NIEBURG

THE two industrial nuclear-power blocs in Western Europe, EURATOM (European Atomic Community—the Common Market) and ENEA (European Nuclear Energy Agency, organized under the auspices of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation), represent a significant political cleavage in Europe. Both supranational groups are consortiums for the generation of industrial nuclear power, including fuel production, reprocessing, and isotope separation. EURATOM represents the Continental Six under French-West German leadership;[1] ENEA, a more loosely organized bloc under British sponsorship.[2]

The most significant factor underlying these bifurcated nuclear programs has been the policy adopted by the United States and Britain of excluding their continental NATO partners from independent nuclear-weapons production and coequal strategic control of the alliance. EURATOM was begun as an effort to create an independent capability both for electric power and for the production of weapons material. ENEA was designed as a countereffort to split the Continental Six and to isolate the French weapons interest. The U.S.-British maneuver was brilliantly successful and brought about an interpenetration of both ENEA and EURATOM. This fact and the shaky economics of nuclear power undermined the impetus of both, reducing ambitious plans to modest levels and consigning both programs to minor roles in subsequent intra-alliance politics. By means of U.S. loans, subsidies, technical aid, and equipment, the EURATOM program was redirected and controlled, depriving France or any other continental nuclear aspirant of the combined resources of Western Europe for producing weapons material.

In achieving this success, the United States and Britain helped to block an auspicious effort at greater European integration, playing West Germany and the small nations against France, intensifying French obstructionism in NATO and the divisive forces of European politics

[1] Including also Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

[2] Including also Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and West Germany. (Greece, Iceland, and Ireland, also members of OEEC, eventually dropped out of the ENEA program.)

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generally. In the name of the nuclear unity of the alliance, the U.S.-British maneuver increased political disunity and heightened problems of NATO collaboration.

Since 1958, Britain has chosen virtually complete military dependence upon the United States instead of closer political collaboration with the Continent. By placing itself under the sheltering wing of the United States, Britain sought not only to be secure against Russian aggression but also, and perhaps more immediately important, to avoid subservience to an integrated Europe.

Whether NATO nuclear unity or European political unity has greater priority is now the subject of anguished debate in NATO councils, the British Cabinet, and the State Department. In the face of French persistence in "going it alone" to create its own nuclear arsenal and in refusing to integrate forces on French territory, and the increasing pressure from West Germany and elsewhere for an independent NATO strategic arsenal, the nuclear leaders are faced with a painful choice. Further attempts to maintain a policy of nuclear exclusion may fail in any event and will certainly solidify further the developing schisms of the coalition.

I. Beginnings of Euratom

The beginning of German rearmament in 1955 and the dominant role played by Britain and the United States in the defense strategy of NATO led the French to accelerate an initiative toward nuclear weapons. The French resented exclusion from the favored position which the United States accorded the British. Premier Edgar Faure announced in March 1955 that France was going to demand practical demonstrations of Allied collaboration now that West Germany was to be rearmed. The Premier declared that France was prepared to manufacture its own nuclear weapons if necessary. What was needed, he declared, was to make up France's handicap in research. At the end of two years, France would be in a position to embark on an independent nuclear arms program, if it wished to do so.

EURATOM was created by the six members of the European Coal and Steel Community.[3] At the July 1955 meeting of the Council of

[3] The final agreement, which emerged in March 1957, established the machinery of EURATOM, including an Assembly, a Court of Justice, a Social and Economic Committee, a Council of Ministers (with the same representation as the Council of the Economic Community) that would have final authority except for appeals to the Court, a Commission (five members of different nationality, decision by majority vote), and a Scientific and Technical Committee, consisting of twenty members appointed by the Council for five-year terms. The agreement stipulated that the budget for research and development would be shared, with France and West Germany paying 30 per cent, Italy 23 per cent, and the balance divided equally among the three smaller states.

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Europe, the goal was formulated for construction of a gaseous diffusion plant for the separation of uranium isotopes, a costly project which France hoped it would not have to undertake itself and without which Europe would remain dependent upon the United States or Britain for usable uranium fuels, whether for peaceful or military purposes.

The original EURATOM concept arose from the desire to avoid the infringements of sovereignty involved in the bilateral arrangements for power reactors required under U.S. and British law and policy. The United States demanded the right to apply unilateral safeguards in the case of any nation which received atomic aid for peaceful purposes. Such agreements for cooperation granted the United States full access to "maintenance, production, and operating records, and other data necessary to accomplish accountability for all special nuclear materials," and the right of access "to all places and data necessary to verify compliance" with the terms of the agreement. The United States also obtained the right to approve "the facilities to be used for chemical reprocessing."[4]

The control and safeguard features were onerous to recipient nations. Several nations whose friendship was strategically important to the United States refused to sign agreements because of these controls. To assuage resentment, the United States announced its firm intention to transfer all safeguard restrictions and their enforcement to the International Atomic Energy Agency just as soon as that agency could develop a control and safeguard program of its own. This issue, a central concern in the U.S. policy of preventing a spread of nuclear weapons, soon became extremely troublesome.

The first problem raised by the control and safeguard features of bilateral agreements came into the open in September 1956. An agreement had been signed with the Swiss government in June providing for the sale of 1,100 pounds of uranium, reactor equipment, and the exchange of scientific information. The standard provisions were included for U.S. control over the stocking and utilization of fuel and engineering plans, and U.S. access to the facilities, administrative records, and books. When word of these controls became known in Switzerland, an intensely independent and neutralist country, the Swiss newspapers expressed vigorous misgivings. A "secret annex" was included in the agreement about which the Swiss government had said nothing. As a result of the clamor, both governments were forced to give elaborate assurances. The significance of the Swiss reaction was not lost: it gave notoriety to the control and safeguard features.

[4] U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, *Twenty-third Semiannual Report* (Washington 1958), 198.

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The most significant recoil from the safeguard requirements occurred in the case of France. France, as a key NATO ally, qualified for a classified power-reactor bilateral. However, the French rejected the controls such a bilateral would involve and pushed ahead with their own program. France sought instead to create a further basis for European integration by means of an independent nuclear consortium. Backing for the plan and its objectives came from a wide range of political parties and labor organizations in the six participating nations. Paul Henri Spaak, then Belgium's Foreign Minister, strongly urged the integration of nuclear resources in a speech before the European Consultative Assembly.

British alarm at the plan was revealed in January 1956 when Prime Minister Eden announced on short notice a trip to Washington for consultations with President Eisenhower. The issue confronting the United States and Britain at this juncture was whether the six nations would be willing to abandon their right to manufacture nuclear weapons material and rely upon the United States and Britain to supply their nuclear fuels. The diplomatic mill indicated the British government was anxious to get American support for a plan that would be effective in countering the separatist threat implicit in independent nuclear facilities. This was confirmed by the counterplan immediately thereafter proposed by Britain and quickly endorsed by the United States.

As the EURATOM plan developed, the necessity was recognized to establish a ruling body with real executive power, including a first claim on nuclear ores and fuels produced by any of the six members, and community ownership and control (in order to assure equal access to these materials by all six and, in case of scarcity, distribution in proportion to need). A considerable degree of sovereignty would therefore have to be delegated to EURATOM.[5]

On July 11, 1956, the French National Assembly, after a mighty debate, authorized the government to continue negotiations for the creation of EURATOM. Prime Minister Guy Mollet explained that France reserved the right to produce its own nuclear weapons during the intervening period. Mollet assured the deputies that "French membership in EURATOM in no way interferes with or limits national defense."[6]

In the negotiations, France pressed for a commitment to a common nuclear technology for both power and weapons, but this was dropped from the EURATOM treaty owing to strong pressure from the United

[5] Sir George Thomson, "Britain's Drive for Atomic Power," *Foreign Affairs*, xxxv (October 1956), 103.

[6] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Letter*, August 1, 1956, 26.

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States and Britain. Instead, it was agreed that any member could pursue weapons development outside EURATOM without upsetting the integration of power facilities. In effect, this modification glossed over the essential French motive without thwarting it. France accepted a compromise which would permit EURATOM to hold title to all fissionable materials *except* those diverted to military use, which would become the property of individual nations under the control of the Western European Union (a nominal control based on voluntary coordination of armaments among the Six and Britain).[7] In effect, the compromise still served an important French interest. The combined resources of the Six would create a unified nuclear facility without undue economic sacrifice. Large quantities of enriched uranium and by-product plutonium would become available to the consortium, as well as facilities for refining and processing these materials. The creation of a full nuclear technology would make European nuclear weapons production but a short step away, and thus force the United States to accept the full nuclear partnership of the Continent in the strategic control of NATO. The originally proposed facilities were to include large power reactors (capable of production of plutonium) and a gaseous diffusion plant for reprocessing reactor fuels and for separation of weapons-grade material.

In late 1956, the Action Committee for the United States of Europe recommended that the Council of Foreign Ministers appoint "three wise men" to study the future power needs of Western Europe and outline a concrete program for nuclear power.[8] The Suez crisis in November 1956, precipitated by Egyptian seizure of the Canal, accelerated the timetable. Western Europe hoped to find a future source of power to replace Middle Eastern oil. More important, the U.S. role in the crisis tended to confirm the French charge that American interests diverged from those of Europe, that Europe could not base its strategic defense on U.S. nuclear weapons, and that progress toward genuine European federation, based on European interests alone, was imperative. This recognition strengthened French leadership on the Continent.

The "three wise men" conferred extensively with the British and Americans and, after their return to Europe, issued a report, "A Target for EURATOM," which proposed that the Atomic Community adopt as its goal an installed nuclear-power capacity of 15 million kilowatts by 1967. This was a bold and, as experience proved, overly optimistic target. The report asserted that "EURATOM will represent our nations as a

[7] *Ibid.*, September-October 1956, 53.
[8] *Ibid.*, 36.

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single unit vis-à-vis other states, and will be far better placed to obtain full cooperation from them than our countries separately." They noted that "our talks in Washington convinced us that, on the healthy basis of a two-way traffic, a close partnership as equals can be built up between the United States and EURATOM."[9]

The Soviet Union was quick to perceive the strategic importance of the creation of an independent nuclear technology among EURATOM powers. On July 13, 1956, it initiated a propaganda campaign against EURATOM, warning the West Germans that consummation of the plan would make German reunification impossible and warning France that the plan would open the way to German domination of Europe. It called EURATOM "a tool of military blocs" and a means of putting nuclear weapons in the "hands of a remilitarized West Germany." As if to reveal that the underlying motivation of EURATOM was not atomic power, the Soviets proposed an alternate plan embracing all Europe for the development of such power. It promised to participate in such a program and invited the United States also to lend aid.

As the EURATOM negotiations continued, an impasse developed between France and the West Germans. German industrialists objected to giving a supranational authority a prior right to buy all nuclear material and also objected to the French demand for a special position in the Customs Union. In November 1956, Chancellor Adenauer went to Paris for discussion of these issues. The issues were resolved by an understanding that EURATOM should have a monopoly in supplying materials *if they were in adequate supply*, but that purchases could be made elsewhere if EURATOM were unable to meet the members' needs or if the prices outside the community were lower. This compromise provided the key by which Britain and the United States were able to counter the separatist tendency of EURATOM—by offering more attractive fuel-leasing and reprocessing facilities to EURATOM nations through the ENEA and bilateral agreements.[10]

In March 1957, the EURATOM and the Common Market agreements were signed. A few weeks later, a West German government bulletin published a summary of the stipulations of the treaty, disclosing that West Germany was to have access to the military atomic secrets of its partners, including France, and vice versa. This specifically included

[9] "Report of Messrs. Armand, Etzel, and Giordani," May 4, 1957, reprinted in full in JCAE Hearings, *Proposed EURATOM Agreements*, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, July 1958, I, 47.

[10] See the extensive analysis of these issues in *The Times* (London), February 23, 1957, 6.

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secret information which any of them obtained from outside nations.[11] Britain was placed in a difficult position. She would have to choose between nuclear collaboration with EURATOM on equal terms with the other members, or maintain her special relationship to the United States.

The London *Times* asserted in February 1957 that the rapprochement between France and Germany presented the Western allies "with a dilemma in the development of atomic weapons." Under the proposed EURATOM arrangements, "the French position is that France is determined to have an independent atomic arms industry but needs assistance in building it up; and Germany, though well able to carry out research and though economically strong, cannot at present produce atomic weapons because of treaty restrictions. . . ." The United States faced a sharp dilemma. On the one hand, it wished "to consolidate a strong, prosperous, and united Europe." On the other hand, it was withholding information in an effort to discourage "a bifurcation of atomic arms development in the Western World." The British government also faced a dilemma. It would have liked to coordinate production of nuclear weapons with the United States "and to arrange an exchange of information as full as possible. . . . meanwhile France and Germany . . . wish for cooperation with Britain. . . ." It was clear that British cooperation with the continental allies would run counter to American policy concerning the spread of independent atomic capabilities and thus jeopardize the British chance of completing "a satisfactory exchange of information with the United States government."[12] From its inception through 1957, the British remained aloof from the EURATOM proposal. Adopting a "wait-and-see" attitude, Britain's leaders expressed a diplomatic "friendly interest" and offered a task force of technical men and assistance in the training of scientists at English installations. The British carefully refrained from public comment on the political questions.

The United States' official reaction to the proposal was friendly, if not enthusiastic. On February 9, 1956, President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles assured René Mayer, chairman of the Coal and Steel

[11] The disclosure by the German federal government's *Bulletin*, made under the heading "Exchange of Information," included the following: "Knowledge, whether patented or not, that has been gathered by the Community or which has been acquired from third parties, will be available to all the interested members of the Community within the territory of the Community. The exchange also comprises such knowledge which for reasons of the individual states is subject to secret regulations." (Cited in *NATO Letter*, April 1957, 22.)

[12] *The Times* (London), February 23, 1957, 6.

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Community's High Authority, that the United States would support the plan.

In 1957, Secretary Dulles failed to bring home to Congress the political and military issues raised by the EURATOM plan. This fact gave rise to an injection of EURATOM into the Democratic campaign against Administration atomic power policies. The Congressional Joint Committee asserted that limited U.S. assistance to EURATOM was the result of the backward state of the U.S. domestic power-reactor program.[13] After the 1958 switch in State Department policy to large-scale support of EURATOM, the Democrats charged that the Administration opposed government programs in the United States but favored government programs in Europe. Confused with the public-private power issue, the real issues of NATO collaboration and U.S. nuclear strategy were never raised in the debate.

II. Beginnings of ENEA

In spite of their aloof but friendly official position, the British were obviously disturbed by the implicit political threat. Under British initiative (following talks in Washington), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) proposed a broader atomic-power plan early in 1956. The seventeen OEEC governments appointed a special committee which prepared a draft plan stipulating that the program should *not* involve formation of a pool and should *not* in any way limit the sovereignty of the members. It was described by Harold Macmillan, then Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, as a "comprehensive flexible approach." This plan was based upon a prior U.S.-British understanding; within a month the United States offered $560 million worth of fissionable material to be made available for OEEC programs, promising to cooperate fully in specific future projects. This move was in marked contrast to the hesitant and ambiguous nature of American support for EURATOM proposals.

The British suggested that the OEEC build an isotope plant to produce U-235, a chemical separation plant for irradiated fuels, a heavy-water plant, and a prototype testing reactor.[14] The British wanted to discourage development of such facilities under independent EURATOM

[13] AEC Commissioner Thomas E. Murray told the JCAE: ". . . as a result of the policies we have pursued, the state of our reactor industry permits us to render but limited assistance to EURATOM. . . . We certainly could have been better prepared. . . ." (JCAE Hearings, *On the Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry*, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1957, 60.)

[14] Thomson, 102-3.

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auspices, as was being proposed. Soon thereafter, a liaison group was set up between the OEEC and the Brussels Conference to consider the suggestion that the OEEC participate in a EURATOM Study for a gaseous diffusion separation plant. At the same time, the United States announced support for the EURATOM plan to establish a multimillion kilowatt atomic-power industry within ten years. The United States proposed to supply atomic technicians and information to get the program started, and later would furnish nuclear fuel, suggesting that it would be uneconomic and unnecessary for the Six to produce their own gaseous diffusion facility.

In October, the OEEC steering committee announced proposals for nuclear power stations to serve as prototypes and constitute the first step of a more ambitious program. The setting up of a special working party to coordinate the power programs of the member states, including the EURATOM members, was the beginning of formalized interpenetration of the two groupings. In 1958, the ENEA began to tighten up its organizational machinery. A directing committee was established and security measures were adopted to provide for inspection of plants, quantitative control of nuclear fuels, and on-the-spot supervision in each participating country. A procedure for the settlement of intramember disputes was adopted. Twelve of the seventeen nations agreed to establish a new administrative entity, called "Eurochemic," organized under the ENEA, which would build and operate facilities for the separation of irradiated fuels (for recycling in power reactors). A plutonium separation plant was to be located in Mol, Belgium. In December 1957, it was announced that Eurochemic would seek "close cooperation" with EURATOM.[15]

On December 20, 1957, ENEA was formally established by a pact signed by the OEEC Council of Ministers. At the same time, the Council signed a convention of security control to assure that none of the materials provided by the agency would be used for military purposes. All the members of EURATOM were members of Eurochemic (with the exception of Luxembourg), but the precise relationship between the nuclear agency and EURATOM remained to be worked out. It was announced in July that the AEC would provide design assistance for the chemical separation plant at Mol.[16] EURATOM members had little to gain by duplication of these facilities in collaboration with France.

[15] *NATO Letter*, December 1956, 21. Nations involved in the Eurochemic plan were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and West Germany, assisted by Britain and the United States, which remained outside.

[16] AEC, *Twenty-fourth Semiannual Report*, 1958, 26.

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It meant that France still faced the necessity of producing its own weapons material.

The French initiative was severely weakened by the ENEA-Eurochemic plan, but all the cards had not yet been dealt. New decisions and programs involving NATO strategy emerged at the same time, providing France with new opportunities to bargain with Britain and the United States for greater attention to continental political demands.

III. The 1957 Decisions

Sputnik I in October 1957 demonstrated to Western Europe that Russia was on the verge of developing operational medium- and long-range missile systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads. This fact, already well-known to governments, was dramatized for the people. After the Soviet rocket threats of the 1956 Suez crisis, the nations of Western Europe began to exert steady pressure upon the United States for missile systems of their own to deter the use of these weapons for diplomatic threats by the Soviets. At the same time, Europe sought greater political partnership with the United States and Britain in defining the nature of the threat which would justify the launching of nuclear weapons by the West. Sputnik I also served to stimulate neutralist feeling in Western Europe and increased pressure for a veto over decisions of war and peace taken by NATO.

Britain and the United States held urgent negotiations in late 1957 which led directly to Administration proposals to amend the Atomic Energy Act, to bring Britain into full atomic collaboration, and to place IRBM missiles in Western Europe. The IRBM proposal was designed to achieve three main purposes: (1) to "close the missile gap" by locating shorter-range missile installations near enough to the Soviet heartland to make possible the threat of missile retaliation; (2) to reassure Western European nations that the Soviets would be restrained from using nuclear missiles for tactical support or for threat against Western European territory; and (3) to yield greater control to NATO members over the use of the missiles by permitting national custody of the means of delivery while the nuclear warheads were stockpiled nearby under American custody (thus giving both the United States and the recipient country control over the trigger).

The third objective was compromised by the fact that the United States still maintained the ability to launch strategic weapons (without prior consultations) from its SAC bases around the fringes of the USSR and from the American mainland. This situation led to prolonged and difficult negotiations, in which continental countries refused or

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delayed missile installations while they bargained for some control over the independent American-British striking force.

A few days before the British-American talks, the French made a series of public declarations concerning their ability and intention to produce an atomic bomb if forced to do so. The French spokesman at the United Nations, M. Jules Moch, said that France would not be content forever to remain the only one of the four big powers not producing its own nuclear weapons. "We are producing atomic material," he declared. "We hope it can be used for peace, but if other nations continue to produce and stockpile . . . we shall do the same."[17]

The close of the NATO Parliamentarians' meeting (November 1957) was chosen for the first official statement of the new proposals which the United States and Britain were preparing to offer during the December NATO Council meeting. Neil H. McElroy, Secretary of Defense, announced that the United States would seek launching sites in Europe for intermediate-range ballistic missiles and was considering a plan for giving certain NATO allies the warheads as well as the missiles.

A few days later, Secretary Dulles held a press conference, at which he said: "When we talk about a NATO nuclear stockpile, we are talking about much more than the intermediate missiles, or the warheads for the missiles. There are in existence today quite a large variety of nuclear weapons." The United States was proposing that "these would become so situated that they would also be available to the forces of our allies." Dulles stressed three points: that the United States would help to establish missile bases in NATO countries that wanted them; that stockpiles would be provided nearby under American custody, and European units would have access to them in case of war; and that the United States would seek to give its allies "a deeper sense of responsibility for their safety" under the modernized weapons system by ensuring "a very considerable measure of allied participation" in the handling of these missiles.[18]

On the opening day of the NATO Council meeting (December 1957), the United States circulated to the members a policy paper which proposed that continental stockpiles of warheads be in charge of the Supreme Commander (who would act as a U.S. officer, not as a NATO commander in keeping custody of them). The stockpiles would be established in accordance with strategic needs in the nuclear-capable forces

[17] *NATO Letter*, November 1957, 7.

[18] Excerpts from the transcript of a press conference held on November 19, 1957, in *ibid.*, December 1957, 15.

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of NATO. Who would pull the trigger to fire the missile? "The United States . . . is ready to make the decision a joint one. It would be made by the United States and each nation having missile bases on its territory."[19]

The European reaction was negative. France objected to continued American possession of warheads, the American veto on their use, and the fact that the continental nations would have no say over strategic weapons outside NATO. French officials commented informally that if such stocks were established on French soil, with all the risks of enemy attack that this might entail, France would be better off if she had her own atomic armaments. The London *Times* noted that "it is common in French official and political circles to hear the statement . . . [that] the European nations should draw closer together in their own interests."[20]

Other European powers were aggrieved because of the "ambiguity" of the American position. They questioned whether the separation of weapons from warheads would make practicable the use of the warheads in dispersed, mobile tactical weapons. An important surprise in Dulles's verbal presentation had not been included in the official policy paper. It appeared as a last-minute effort to overcome the negative response: the United States would turn over to any interested ally—Congress willing—the secrets of how to build an atomic submarine such as the Nautilus. The response to this offer, according to Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, "was immediate and indicated that this step would make an important contribution to the military and political strength of NATO."[21]

The latter proposal tended to reflect subtle changes under way in Western strategy—changes whose implications had as yet neither been faced nor resolved. In Lord Selkirk's words, "The guided missile submarine approaches nearer to the ultimate weapon than anything we have seen before,"[22] providing an invulnerable second-strike deterrent. Because of the difficulty of locating missile-carrying submarines, a potential enemy would have no hope of destroying the power of retaliation by a surprise attack. It would provide maximum protection against nuclear attack even for small nations which had no possibility of absorbing a first strike. Dulles's proposal raised an alternative to immediate

[19] *New York Times*, December 11, 1957, 1.

[20] *The Times* (London), November 21, 1957, 10.

[21] See statement of Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, JCAE Hearings, *To Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954*, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, 93.

[22] Statement of Lord Selkirk, First Lord of the British Admiralty, *NATO Letter*, November 1957, 14.

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sharing of the custody of nuclear weapons and suggested that this issue be postponed. When such submarines were ready for service, the issue could be raised again in order to resolve the question of political control of the submarine force and its missile systems.

The submarine-missile system, unlike the land-based IRBM's which were installed in Britain, Italy, and Turkey in 1959, constituted a more credible strategy, specifically designed to deter a first strike by the enemy by reserving means of retaliation against enemy cities. It was a defensive design, credible without being provocative; it could not be pinpointed by the enemy and therefore would not tempt a pre-emptive or preventive enemy attack. On the other hand, the land-based IRBM's were "sitting ducks" for a Soviet first strike. Their only military value was for a Western first strike, the threat of which was used by the West as a means of deterring all kinds of Soviet diplomatic pressures in Europe. Not only were they provocative, but they tempted a Soviet nuclear attack to remove them in the early stages of any diplomatic confrontation. They therefore lacked credibility and forced the West to ambiguous and empty nuclear threats as a means of endowing them with renewed deterrent value. The Soviets had already learned how to probe the Western nuclear position so as to raise anxiety in Europe and to undermine American diplomacy elsewhere in the world. Dulles's submarine offer in 1957 reflected a growing consciousness of the contradiction of massive retaliation, at least as felt by Europeans. But the Polaris system was still on the drawing board, and the Eisenhower team was not yet prepared to abandon faith that the credibility of its strategy could be enhanced by repeated "all-or-nothing" protestations. The issues involved in the subtle change of emphasis were not clearly formulated until over a year later.

Lacking a real disarmament agreement with the Soviets, Dulles believed that "nuclear weapons are probably going to be the weapons of the future." Under these conditions, so long as the United States contrived to keep its allies nuclearly disarmed, they would "either go neutralist or just say there is no role for us to play." The NATO countries might "either intensively seek to develop nuclear weapons capacity for themselves, or move toward neutrality, or, at least, non-participation." The first alternative "would divert the efforts of our allies into a needless and costly duplication." The second would "place a far greater burden on the U.S. and radically alter the power balance with serious damage to our vital security interests."[28] In spite of this reasoning, Dulles

[28] JCAE Hearings, *Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954*, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, 448, 463.

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still wished to maintain nuclear exclusion of the continental partners and keep nuclear weapons in American-British hands. The submarine offer appeared to promise at best a postponement of the issue of political control; but in fact it failed to defer European pressure and revealed the strategic ambivalence of the U.S. position.

France was the nation most interested in the submarine offer. Administration officials expected that the offer would also be taken up by other NATO members with navies, such as Italy, Western Germany, and the Netherlands. The French interest was focused on obtaining the highly enriched uranium used as a fuel in U.S. submarines. France was already at work on a submarine reactor using natural uranium that would be considerably larger, a severe handicap in submarine design. The French moved quickly to open negotiations with the United States to obtain a definite commitment.

As the proposed amendments to the Atomic Energy Act started their uncertain route through the Congress in 1958, the United States went ahead to conclude agreements with Britain concerning the establishment of IRBM bases. The two countries signed a memorandum which provided that the U.S. supply Thor missiles, the ownership of which would pass to Britain as soon as personnel had been trained to operate them.[24]

The continental NATO powers, dissatisfied with their envisaged inferior role, launched a series of political moves designed to force the United States and Britain to bring them into a position of greater equality in the alliance. Early in 1958, it was announced that France, West Germany, and Italy would merely suspend, not eliminate, the question of the production of atomic weapons as part of the EURATOM plan while they awaited implementation of the new U.S.-British policy. Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Defense Minister of France, said that the question of atomic weapons had been "reserved." He linked the question of the establishment of medium-range missile bases on French soil to U.S. aid in helping France build her own nuclear rockets, saying, "We want to be placed in a position to produce nuclear material for ourselves."[25]

IV. The United States Waters down Safeguards

The 1957 NATO decisions reserving the key political role for the United States (with Britain as a junior partner) did not satisfy the

[24] Duncan Sandys, British Defense Minister, emphasized to the Commons that they would not be launched "except by a joint positive decision" by both governments. (*The Times* [London], February 25, 1958, 8.)

[25] Quoted in *New York Times*, February 8, 1958, 2.

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demands of continental powers. Resistance to the stationing of nuclear stockpiles and IRBM's upon their territory was not the only bargaining counter available to them. It was complemented by the continued threat of a continental nuclear consortium under French leadership. Other continental nations were willing to use France as a means of enhancing their own bargaining power with the United States.

As negotiations on the NATO proposals continued, the EURATOM nations pushed ahead with their original plan. This led the United States and Britain gradually to abandon critical parts of their atomic policy. The basic compromise was the abandonment of U.S.-enforced safeguards. While the agreement contained all of the wording of the standard U.S. bilaterals, the heart had been delicately and imperceptibly removed. Under the EURATOM agreements (and the OEEC agreements which soon were integrated with the EURATOM program), the policing of safeguards was placed in the hands of the participating nations themselves, while the United States sought other means of controlling the by-product plutonium of power reactors and of denying France the political leverage provided by attainment of national atomic bombs.

A joint U.S.-EURATOM working group was established in late February 1958 and meetings were held over a three-month period. The State Department and the AEC offered substantial help in the construction of from four to six commercial-scale nuclear power reactors which would give EURATOM an additional one million kilowatts of power by 1961. They offered to establish contact with American manufacturers to accelerate construction. In exchange, the United States insisted on the right to inspect plants to ensure that there was no diversion of plutonium to weapons manufacture.

EURATOM officials questioned being treated less favorably than Britain and argued that they were quite able to establish accounting and inspection provisions themselves. The State Department reluctantly acceded to the EURATOM position, and early in May agreement in principle was reached. The State Department saw no alternative to accepting EURATOM conditions, but the AEC continued to insist that U.S. strategic interests and American law required that the United States itself must enforce the safeguard provisions. The EURATOM nations adamantly opposed the surrender of inspection functions to outside agents. The key clause of the U.S.-EURATOM agreement about which the AEC and the State Department could not come to terms granted all policing authority, not to the United States, as in other bilaterals, but to the EURATOM Commission itself.[26]

[26] See attachment B to Appendix C, *Proposed EURATOM Agreements*, 21.

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The United States accommodated itself to this basic change as the result of a series of diplomatic bargaining engagements, not as a result of a deliberate plan. Realizing that their NATO proposals had failed to halt the separatist tendencies on the Continent, the United States and Britain moved to find a basis for transforming EURATOM into a harmless regional effort to develop nuclear power reactors. The United States agreed to the face-saving safeguards formula, hoping to use its information and technical and financial subsidies to switch the emphasis of EURATOM entirely to peaceful purposes. As part of this move, the United States offered to buy back the plutonium by-product, paying twice as much as was paid to domestic producers. The diplomatic significance of the large subsidy was not presented to the Congress and was rejected by it during the 1958 debate on amending the Atomic Energy Act (although it assented to buy back at the domestic price).

The policy of Britain and the United States came to focus upon two aims: (1) To support strongly the development of a nuclear technology for all the NATO nations both in EURATOM and in OEEC, providing the basis for early generation of electrical energy to replace the diminishing fuel supplies of the Continent, but ultimately holding out the hope of a European weapons technology from which Britain and all the small nations would not be excluded. This would eventually mean that Europe could develop an independent production capability for weapons, but that no single nation could accomplish this without assuming a prohibitive and unnecessary burden on its economy. The French-German axis would be broken up. (2) To hold out hope for an early transfer of custody of nuclear warheads, not to individual national forces, but to NATO integrated forces. This promise, which would meet the strategic demands of West Germany, tended to isolate France within the continental sector of the alliance, confronting her with a choice between integrating her forces under a NATO still dominated by the United States and Britain, but with potential possession of an independent deterrent, or persisting, at great sacrifice, in developing her own deterrent without German cooperation.

In effect, the developing policy was designed to compel France to accept a secondary role in an integrated NATO alliance. France declined this role and pushed toward an independent deterrent in spite of the burdens which this imposed upon her substance.

As the U.S.-EURATOM negotiations went forward, the British moved through the Western European Union, of which it was a member, to establish a West European arms pool for the research, development, and production of various types of arms, including missiles, but

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excluding nuclear weapons.[27] The goal of the British move was ostensibly to eliminate duplication in research, development, and production, but the strong secondary objective was to limit the influence of an arms production agreement of France, Italy, and West Germany and to open the planning of arms production to all European members of the Atlantic alliance. Under these arrangements, Britain and West Germany would work closely together in developing integrated arms, again isolating the French unless they should be willing to enter the program on terms acceptable to Britain.

In June 1958, the Eisenhower Administration submitted the EURATOM agreement to the Congressional Joint Committee. The agreement had been ready for Presidential action for several weeks but had been delayed by AEC objections to provisions giving EURATOM rights of self-inspection. The President finally supported the Secretary of State, casting aside AEC contentions that this was a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of U.S. atomic laws.[28]

The success of the negotiations found France, under President Charles de Gaulle, less interested in the EURATOM plan and more determined than ever to enter the nuclear club. Even if the Algerian war were ended, it would be difficult for France to fulfill her conventional force commitments to NATO while concentrating her resources on developing nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the French did not exclude themselves from the U.S.-EURATOM program. Although it had failed as a device for uniting continental Europe in independent nuclear production, they were prepared to take a leading part in supplying nuclear power for the program. France announced in July that she was planning to enlarge her nuclear-power program by 250,000 kilowatts and to make this additional power part of the U.S.-EURATOM undertaking. In the following months, the U.S.-EURATOM program was tied in closely with the WEU arms pool and the British OEEC atomic agreements. On February 4, 1959, Britain signed an agreement with EURATOM for cooperation. Similar negotiations began with Canada to ensure that Canadian uranium ore would be made available to the EURATOM bloc.[29]

The Soviet Union was quick to characterize EURATOM as a military arrangement. When the United States proposed that an EURATOM observer be permitted to join the International Atomic Energy

[27] *The Times* (London), April 18, 1958, 12.

[28] See "A Brief History of Safeguards," JCAE, *Review of International Atomic Policies and Programs of the United States*, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1960, III, 850.

[29] Etienne Hirsch, "A Guide to EURATOM," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XV (June 1959), 265.

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Agency, Ambassador Emelyanov said that if the Board of Governors issued such an invitation, it might be setting a dangerous precedent: "No arguments can conceal the military nature of EURATOM; that can be clearly seen from the control system for which the treaty establishing EURATOM provided." Apart from his obvious propaganda motives, he accurately picked out the key to the change in U.S. safeguards policy. The State Department itself had agonized over the necessity of this change.

V. Euratom and the U.S. Congress

In late May 1958, the Administration held its first secret briefings with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. State Department and AEC officials came away from these meetings with the impression that Congress would require a good deal more briefing. Members of the Joint Committee came away charging that the AEC and the State Department were split on the safeguards issues and insisting that they come to agreement before asking Congress to do any approving. Members of the Joint Committee were later to ascribe the delay caused by the dispute to a tricky maneuver by AEC Chairman Lewis L. Strauss, designed to sidetrack this country's EURATOM negotiations until after Congress had acted on the AEC's bill for sharing nuclear secrets. It was not until late June that the internal difficulties of the Administration were resolved and a Memorandum of Understanding was agreed upon by the United States and the EURATOM nations.[30]

Congress responded to the Administration's initiative and provided the essential action, but the debate was couched not in terms of the NATO problems and the diplomatic situation which had basically shaped the agreement, but rather in terms of the domestic demands for an increased power-reactor program and for the protection of private rights in that program. In its public presentations, the State Department seemed deliberately to avoid emphasis upon the real diplomatic significance. The central issue was touched upon very lightly indeed. Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon bore the main burden of presenting the State Department's position. He emphasized that "the fundamental strength of the program is that it is rooted in benefits to the enlightened self-interest of both parties."[31] The diplomatic problems were hinted at: "I think the whole question . . . is whether or not

[30] For full text of the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and EURATOM, see Appendix 15, AEC, *Twenty-fourth Semiannual Report*, 1958, 398-404.

[31] *Proposed EURATOM Agreements*, 23.

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. . . the Congress does enough to ensure or make possible that the European countries will stay with this program and not go somewhere else." That "somewhere else" was, of course, the independent nuclear consortium envisioned by the original EURATOM plan. Dillon warned that if the Congress passed the agreement without implementing it, "it is our considered judgment that the chances are far more than even that the European countries may break out from this program."[32]

Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter, in a letter to JCAE Chairman Carl Durham, wrote that the agreement alone would "not be sufficient assurance to the Europeans of United States intentions to proceed with the program." Herter declared that the United States could not "necessarily expect that in the absence of Congressional action on the substance of the program the United States can reactivate it next year," and that critical negotiations might collapse, bringing about irreversible consequences which threatened U.S. interests.[33]

It was a curious and symbolic coincidence that on the same day that the President signed the EURATOM legislation, the AEC announced the U.S.-British agreement on increased integration of nuclear weapons. In a real sense, this coincidence demonstrated once again that the EURATOM program was an effort to appease the sense of inequality felt by the continental powers of the NATO alliance. An agreement was formally signed in November 1958 under which the United States pledged a $135 million loan and enough enriched uranium for twenty years. The agreement provided for the operation of from six to eight reactors capable of producing one million kilowatts of power by 1966.

VI. Implementation of the Agreement

Only a year later, it was clear that the bright hopes of EURATOM were dimming rapidly. In April 1959, an invitation was issued by EURATOM for proposals to construct atomic power plants with a completion date in 1963. Despite formal extension of the deadline, the only project proposed was the SENN boiling-water reactor plan previously undertaken in Italy and already supported under a U.S.-Italian bilateral agreement.[34] This project, carried out by the Societa Electronucleare Nazionale (SENN), expected its 150 thermal-megawatt boiling-water reactor to achieve criticality in 1963. A second invitation for proposals was issued on September 2, 1961, calling for the construction of a large-scale, U.S.-designed, nuclear power plant to begin operating no later

[32] *Ibid.*, 442.
[33] Letter from Herter to Durham, August 12, 1958, text in *ibid.*, 514.
[34] *Review of International Atomic Policies,* 1960, 1, 13.

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than December 31, 1965. The Franco-Belgian Society for Nuclear Energy of Ardennes (SENA) submitted the only acceptable proposal (for a 210,000 electrical-kilowatt pressurized-water reactor to be built near Givet, France). This deadline too had to be extended for sixty days because of the disappointing response. In mid-1962, SENN and SENA were the only two reactor projects under the EURATOM plan, although it appeared likely that another project in Germany would win approval.

What had begun under Secretary Dulles as a major maneuver by the United States to counter the disintegrating tendencies in NATO became in the hands of Congress a purely peaceful atomic program forced to stand or fall on the basis of competition between nuclear and conventional fuels. As such, it has not so far been a success, owing to the shaky economics of nuclear power itself. But, as a diplomatic play designed to undercut a strong threat to the nuclear unity of NATO, it brilliantly succeeded. By means of ENEA, Eurochemic, and bilateral American economic and technological support, it isolated the main French motive, one also shared elsewhere in EURATOM: creation of an independent nuclear technology to enable the continental nations to challenge the U.S.-British strategic nuclear monopoly.

The cost of this diplomatic success was an abandonment by the United States of unilateral enforcement of safeguards over Western European reactors, a hardening of French recalcitrance in the alliance, and the beginnings of a reactor complex in Europe which one day could sever its American link and move the next short step to the production of nuclear weapons.

VII. The Program Falters

Under the pressure of Congressional insistence, United States support was forced to base its subsidies upon the same economic principles which were applied for domestic U.S. nuclear proposals. Utilities in the EURATOM nations felt that the weakened guarantees tended to diminish the value of American support. The view of the Congressional Joint Committee was expressed by Senator Anderson in an article in *Nucleonics Magazine* (March 1959).[35] The Committee was concerned, he wrote, "about the problem of bail-out for existing projects." The JCAE was suspicious because the Administration had given assurances that the subsidy provisions would not be used to relieve utilities or suppliers

[35] "The Outlook for the U.S. Atomic Energy Program," reprinted in Appendix III, JCAE Hearings, *Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry*, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1959, 543.

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of obligations already assumed, yet EURATOM definitely moved in that direction.

In the budgetary requests for 1960, the AEC asked for $14 million in addition to the $3 million authorized in 1958. In view of the notably reduced urgency of the program and as part of the Congressional effort to cut Administration programs while pushing its own, the Joint Committee voted to reduce the EURATOM authorization to $5 million.[36] Moving for reinstatement of the funds, AEC Commissioner John Floberg pointed out that "the EURATOM program is fighting valiantly against a series of circumstances which have arisen within the past very few months which are outside the control of either EURATOM or ourselves." These circumstances combined to make the EURATOM program less attractive than it had been, and "any action on the part of the United States that could be interpreted as a reduction of our enthusiasm . . . will make it that much more difficult for the EURATOM organization to sell European utilities on the program and keep them sold." At "this delicate stage of the game," he feared, the two-thirds reduction in U.S. funds "would be a body-blow to the future of the whole EURATOM program and could mean its demise."[37]

Under Floberg's urging, the Congress upped the amount to $7 million, just half the amount sought. In March 1960, as the AEC sought to find unexpended funds which could be used to push Project Rover, $3 million was taken from the EURATOM appropriation.[38] In the 1961 Authorization Bill, the AEC sought no additional funds for EURATOM. It was revealed that, of the $10 million technically authorized and appropriated, only $1.3 million had been obligated. Testifying before the JCAE, Commissioner Floberg declared in February 1960 that "The joint power reactor program . . . has not developed to the extent originally expected. . . . Long-term interest in nuclear power is continuing, but the emphasis is shifting in Western Europe, as elsewhere," to technological development leading toward the reduction of costs rather than to early large-scale construction.[39] The goals of the program therefore were drastically cut and emphasis was shifted to research and development.

For 1963 the United States authorized an additional $5 million. There were indications that the previously appropriated funds would also be

[36] JCAE Hearings, *AEC Authorizing Legislation*, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1959, 673-74.
[37] Letter dated May 11, 1959, printed in *ibid.*, 682.
[38] *Ibid.*, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, 1961, 179.
[39] JCAE Hearings, *Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry*, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1960, 50.

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committed by the end of the year. The U.S.-EURATOM agreement was amended in 1962 to permit EURATOM to lease enriched uranium fuel as an alternative to the previous deferred-payment sale arrangement. This represented a reversion to the plan favored by the United States during the initial negotiations, but rejected by EURATOM because of its infringement upon the independence of the organization.[40] The new amendments permitted a U.S. supply of uranium fuels, enriched above 20 per cent Uranium-235, making possible power reactors of more sophisticated types. Finally, the amendments contained language to permit, when approved by the United States, chemical reprocessing of enriched uranium of U.S. origin by the Eurochemic Mol facility, rather than by the United States as required under the earlier agreement.

The 1960 McKinney Panel Report commented that "widespread expectations that EURATOM could achieve prompt and effective technological and economic gains were disappointing." The report termed these expectations "not realistic," because they "ignored the original decision of the six member countries not to pool their peaceful atomic research and development capabilities" (as had been urged by France originally). It pointed out that EURATOM had in effect "created a seventh and supra-national sovereignty to be dealt with in addition to their own national programs." Faced with these organizational problems, the McKinney Report continued, and in some respects in competition with national programs, "EURATOM is especially vulnerable to the damaging effects caused by delay in achieving economically attractive atomic power."[41]

There remain some long-term projects in EURATOM which are moving modestly but steadily ahead. In addition to power reactors, EURATOM is now pressing research in marine propulsion with plans for three surface vessels. The Governing Board of EURATOM has continued to press for greater unity among the six participating powers, attempting to counter by exhortation the disintegrating effect which interpenetration by the OEEC program has brought about.[42] The extent to which French incentives for the support of EURATOM were undermined by the high-handed diplomacy of the United States and Britain became evident in 1961 when President de Gaulle announced the removal of EURATOM Commission President Etienne Hirsch, a

[40] See statement of A. A. Wells, JCAE Hearings, *International Agreements for Cooperation*, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1962, 29.

[41] *Review of International Atomic Policies*, 1960, 1, 62.

[42] European Atomic Energy Community, *Third General Report* (Brussels 1960), 7-8.

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French citizen. France is entitled to the presidency of EURATOM under an agreement which gives the presidency of the Common Market Commission to a German, Walter Hallstein, and the presidency of the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community to an Italian, Piero Malvestiti. The immediate pretext for Hirsch's removal was the support he gave to a plan to spend $32 million for the construction of reactors of American and British design as required by the U.S.-EURATOM agreement. De Gaulle contended that this money should be spent in supporting reactor component production by the EURATOM members themselves. The French government supported the election of a candidate more responsive to de Gaulle's European policies, Pierre Chatenet. This action deeply offended the Dutch and Belgians, who emphasized that EURATOM officials should be European civil servants and act independently of their own governments.

In mid-1962 Britain applied for full membership in EURATOM as part of its bid for membership in the Common Market. Later in the year Britain learned from the Continental Six that this question would be reserved while awaiting the outcome of the Common Market talks.

VIII. Some Conclusions

It is probably true that our treatment of the British, predicated on independent progress in nuclear science, set a clear example for the French and tended to make the French nuclear complaint appear to be the main problem of NATO collaboration. Nuclear exclusion therefore continues to intensify the problem of creating a military strategy upon which effective NATO political and military collaboration can be based. Further, it tends to conceal this unresolved issue, overlaying it with the false issue of French nuclear exclusion. Efforts to satisfy French demands by supporting EURATOM's power reactors and a French nuclear submarine probably will not touch the underlying problem.

The French problem is basically part of the general problem of European defense strategy and of military, political, and economic integration. United States efforts to treat it as an isolated problem of nuclear exclusion are in effect an evasion of the deficiencies of Western strategic thinking and unwillingness to accept the fact that a united Europe is inevitably a Europe independent of American strategic domination, able to pursue independent foreign policies sometimes at variance with American interests.

Here the United States has drifted into the position of opposing the only kind of European integration which has made real strides during

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the last fifteen years, that is, the continental confederation based upon the Common Market. The United States desires that Europe concert its defense policies and strategy with that of the United States, that a unitary control be placed over all nuclear weapons in the alliance in the European theater, and that a united Europe do more for itself in conventional and local defense. At the same time, it insists that Britain, tightly bound to its collaboration with the United States, be a part of this arrangement to provide a check upon divergent political interests.

The expedient of a multilateral NATO force based on Polaris missiles does not promise to resolve this problem. There have been no indications that the United States has made up its mind on the critical issues: whether the European force would have the same rights which the United States has to use these weapons without the consent of its partner, or whether, in addition to consultation, each would have a real veto on the other. Unless these questions are answered, there appears little chance of persuading France to abandon its national nuclear effort.

The December 1962 Nassau Agreement between Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy marked a choice for Britain between continued U.S. strategic control of the alliance or the possibility of greater unification of Britain with Europe. Britain chose the first alternative and in so doing brought down the wrath of President de Gaulle. The French veto of British entry into the Common Market demonstrated the irritation of the French, founded upon a widespread feeling in all of Western Europe that a new factor of international relations was emerging. That factor was an economically advanced and potentially united continental Europe demanding full and equal partnership in NATO.

The rupture was inevitable. The Common Market, seen in perspective, is a bold attempt to arrest the progressive decline of Europe and lay a material foundation for a European renaissance. The growing conflict between continental Europe and the English-speaking nations is in many ways comparable to the growing conflict between Communist China and the Soviet Union. The schism in the Communist bloc already hints at the possible emergence of a tripolar world and recent tendencies in Western Europe indicate that other possible prefixes to "polar" must not be ruled out. Nor are they necessarily undesirable.

There has been a dangerous tendency to view the split in Europe solely as the result of the policies of nuclear exclusion pursued by the United States and Britain. This is a view which continues to bring frustration and disillusionment. There are many elements in

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Western Europe that prefer continued dependence upon the United States to making a defense effort of their own. This dependence tends to make less urgent the work of European union. Continued emphasis upon the role of nuclear weapons in defense strategy by Europeans tends to reflect the wish to delay deeper commitments to French leadership. In this diplomatic engagement, the United States and Britain have had powerful resources, including their economic relations with the separate European nations and their monopoly over nuclear strategy. France with its primitive nuclear weapons and its decimated military forces has had little material bargaining power, and yet has gained a great measure of success by mobilizing a compelling perception of a European national interest. This movement has so far endured the combined maneuvers of the English-speaking nations.

The problem of strategic collaboration has been superimposed upon the problems of European unification. This has injected certain neurotic elements. The United States says it favors a reborn and united Europe that can contribute to its own defense. Yet, the only kind of Europe which seems likely is one which the United States apparently does not favor. In a sense, the false emphasis on nuclear exclusion is the reflection of this more significant contradiction. The problems of strategic collaboration are tending to return NATO to its original concept, that of a traditional military alliance rather than the more recent concept of an integrated Atlantic Community. To salvage some Western advantages from the wreckage of a decade of abortive policies, the West may come to realize that traditional military collaboration and economic relations are preferable to the divisions engendered by attempts to impose "indivisible" controls over alliance strategy in the name of military efficiency.

Regardless of the intentions and policies of the participants, Britain's role in Europe has had the effect of serving an American interest: Europe has remained dependent on U.S. leadership. At the same time, however, this has frustrated the American policy goal of enabling Europe to meet the multiple costs of its own defense and to support a minimum levy of conventional troops. Britain may continue to exploit this role in order to preserve some control over the European balance of power, and also because it tends to enhance her influence with the United States.

Chancellor Adenauer put his finger on the basic problem almost a decade ago. In the long run, he said, the European nations cannot "develop their entire strength for their own benefit and that of mankind if they continue to find their salvation and their security exclusively

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under the patronage of the United States." If this became a permanent condition, he said, it would eventually "cause the energies of Europe to wither."[43] All of Europe perceives some divergence of interest and policy between the old world and the nation across the sea. There is a widespread feeling that the European allies cannot necessarily rely on American assistance in a crisis which sets these diverging interests against each other. In addition, Europe has now been reborn and could, if it ever escaped the schizophrenia of incipient integration, become a great power able to maintain its own interests without outside aid. Furthermore, such an independent Europe could hope for stability and security only by demanding and receiving respect for its independence from the Soviet Union as well as from the United States. In such a world, traditional military alignments, the delicate balancing of power, and the pursuit of traditional diplomacy might achieve greater stability than that which now maintains a precariously high level of armaments and the inescapable threat of war. Eventually an independent China, presently creating difficulties for Russia very similar to those created for us by France, could enter the arena also. There would be no respite from power politics and an alert pursuit of diplomacy, but this is the world with which we must manage.

In the light of this study, one is led to view pessimistically the future role of Britain in the developing institutions of a federated Europe. It appears doubtful that, short of a major military crisis in the East, or a sudden abandonment by the United States of its NATO commitments, Britain will choose Europe at the price of subordination to a European sovereignty. What appears more likely is that Britain will eventually make economic and political accommodations with the Continent while remaining outside. At the same time, it appears likely that the continental members themselves—slowly and painfully, to be sure—will draw closer together in federated institutions, military and political as well as economic. In so doing, the danger of a split in NATO, an independent nuclear capability, and an independent foreign policy will grow, just as U.S. policy-makers fear.

If this development is probable, one needs to reconsider whether American fears are still justified. Perhaps an independent Europe will take on more of its own defense responsibilities and, rather than falling into the Soviet sphere, which U.S. interests could never permit, make possible a more flexible and stable world balance of power.

[43] German Federal Government, *The Bulletin*, October 4, 1956, 1.

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE "VALUE" OF LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO THE UNITED STATES

By CHARLES WOLF, Jr.*

I. Introduction

IF one thinks seriously about any of the major international trouble spots in the world today, one soon confronts the problem of what really is the "value" of, for example, Cuba, Berlin, or Laos to the United States. The view put forward in this article is that, while the question is unanswerable in a rigorous and precise sense, some useful things can be said in approaching it, and in trying to distinguish between more and less unsatisfactory answers to it. In principle, of course, the value of other countries to the United States includes that of the advanced countries, and, most significantly, of Western Europe. The present article, however, will be primarily concerned with the value of less-developed countries to the United States, and with their value in certain extreme contingencies over a time period that is relatively short from the standpoint of history, though somewhat longer from the standpoint of economics.

Let me begin by clarifying some terms and concepts that will be employed. The first concept concerns the distinction between the *direct* and the *indirect* value of a country to the United States. By direct value is meant those aspects which can be immediately related to U.S. interests. By indirect value is meant those aspects of a particular country's value which relate to *other* countries that, in turn, are of direct value to the United States.

The second point concerns a distinction between value to the United States, and value to the Soviet Union or to Communist China. Particular countries may well differ in their cardinal and ordinal values to the United States, the Soviet Union, and to China; this article will be mainly concerned with relating value to *United States* interests.

The third point concerns the obvious distinction between the value of a particular country in connection with local wars, and its value in various central war contingencies. A further distinction can be made

* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

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between the value of a country to the United States in connection with wars involving China, and wars involving the Soviet Union, or with those involving both Communist powers.

Finally, there is a distinction between values, or components of value, that can be *quantified*, and those components which, at best, can only be *qualified*. The components of value that can be quantified are those for which an alternative cost can be estimated, or at least those aspects for which the concept of alternative cost has meaning. *Where it is possible to estimate the cost of achieving some given and constant consequence or outcome in two different ways, the value of one way can be considered to be defined, as an upper bound, by the cost of obtaining the same result in the alternative way.*

For some aspects of the value of a particular country, the notion of alternative costs can be usefully applied to give a rough indication of magnitudes involved in the quantifiable components of a country's value. For both the military and economic components of value, this approach has merit and applicability.

However, for other components of value this approach fails to make sense. When we discuss the political, psychological, and ideological components of a country's value to the United States, alternative cost does not help very much. For these aspects of value, we simply have to rely on opinions, discussion, and judgments. Moreover, these qualitative aspects of value may well dominate the ones that can be quantified. This does not mean, however, that we should refrain from trying to identify the relevant numbers wherever we can. Nor does it mean that all ways of expressing the qualitative components of a country's value to the United States are equally clear, comprehensive, and useful. One can be qualitative in better and worse ways, just as one can be quantitative in better and worse ways.

II. Some Quantitative Components of "Value"

Let us first consider those aspects of the value of other countries which can be approached quantitatively. My aim here is to give some idea of a method that might be employed, as well as a rough indication of some of the numbers that might enter into this work. Incidentally, when I use the adjective "large" or "substantial" to characterize my conjectures about these numbers, I will have in mind five-year costs that are, say, over $1 billion, while "small" will mean a guess that the figure would be below this threshold.

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A. MILITARY ASPECTS OF VALUE

The military value of a country or area can be upper-bounded by assuming the "loss" of the particular area, formulating a number of different war scenarios, and then asking what costs the United States would have to incur to make the expected outcome in these contingencies indifferently preferred, or equivalent, to the expected outcome without the loss of the country or area concerned. (In this context the term "loss" is used in a complete and unsophisticated sense to mean simply the inclusion of the country within the Communist bloc so that the bloc is enabled to derive whatever military benefits the area might confer on it. In making this purposely extreme assumption, the implication is not that such a "loss" is the *only*, or even the *most likely*, alternative to an existing relationship between the United States and the particular country. The implication is simply that the assumption of "loss," in this complete sense, provides a useful means for upper-bounding the military components of that country's value to the United States.)

The notion of value that I am trying to convey is depicted in Figure 1. S_1 is the assumed "present" status of a country. Moving to S_2—a hypothetical "loss" status—is assumed to require that additional military costs would have to be incurred by the United States to offset the military benefits derived by the Communist bloc from this change of status. The discontinuous "Z" line and the convex dotted line represent possible shapes of a resulting "equal military-effectiveness" or "indifference" curve. The *upper bound* to the military value of the given coun-



FIGURE 1

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try or area is represented by C_2–C_1 on the diagram. Only if we are prepared to assume that the United States *would in fact be willing* to incur these incremental costs can we assert that this upper bound represents the *actual* military value of the given country or area.

Let me illustrate this notion of value more concretely. To pick a hypothetical case, consider a scenario involving the buildup by North Viet Nam, China, or the Soviet Union of a consequential capability within South Viet Nam and Thailand for waging guerrilla war against the present governments in those countries. Now, assume the "loss" of Laos in the sense in which I am using that term. Given this assumption, we could then estimate the military "value" of Laos by examining several different kinds of "costs" that would have to be incurred in order to maintain an equivalent *counter*-guerrilla capability in Viet Nam and Thailand after this assumed "loss." One kind of cost would be that associated with maintaining enough additional surveillance along the 700-mile common border between Laos and Thailand, and the 200-mile common border between Laos and South Viet Nam, so that the support or buildup of guerrilla manpower, training, supplies, and equipment would be as difficult (i.e., as costly) as it would have been *without* the loss of Laos.

As an alternative, or supplement, to these surveillance costs, we could attempt to estimate the increase in Thai and Vietnamese paramilitary forces of the civil guard type that would be necessary to restrain the level of guerrilla, insurrectionist incidents to some "acceptable" maximum, even allowing for some increase in the flow of guerrilla manpower and supplies across the common Thai and South Vietnamese borders with Laos.

To take another example, consider a scenario involving a direct invasion of Thailand or of South Viet Nam by a Viet Cong or combined Chinese-Viet Cong force of consequential size. In this scenario, the value of Laos might be estimated by calculating the increase in Thai and Vietnamese forces that would be required to gain the same defensive time and hold the same military infrastructures to enable intervention by friendly—e.g., U.S.—forces, on the assumption that the loss of Laos meant that tactical warnings began from the time Red forces crossed the Mekong or crossed the *Chaine Annamite* from Laos, rather than from the time they crossed the borders from China proper or from North Viet Nam into Laos.

Note that in both of these rough scenarios the value of Laos is related to contingencies involving countries other than Laos itself. It is in this sense that the "stack of cards" or "dominoes" analogy, which

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has sometimes been applied to the countries of Southeast Asia, makes a certain amount of sense. A "loss" of Laos increases the vulnerability of environing countries; stated another way, such a loss requires that additional costs be incurred if the vulnerability of environing countries is to be held constant.

I might express a personal judgment here that both of the sorts of contingencies sketched above would require that large costs be incurred by the United States and the free world to maintain indifferently preferred, or equivalent, expected outcomes after the loss of Laos.

The same kind of analytical framework might be used to answer the question of the approximate military value of other Asian countries individually, or of all Southeast Asia (including Thailand, Viet Nam, Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia) taken together. In the latter case, one might substitute for the scenarios mentioned above other local wars involving, for example, the Philippines, India, Taiwan, and even Australia. For contingencies involving island countries like the Philippines, Taiwan, or Australia, the costs of maintaining equivalent military effectiveness, given the loss of all Southeast Asia, would probably not be substantial. Countries that are entirely littoral are, by that fact, already exposed to infiltration or invasion in a way that is unlikely to impose any additional exposure on them as a result of the loss of other mainland areas. If Indonesia were to be lost, it is likely that some additional cost would be required to keep infiltration into Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago in the Philippines to a constant level, but in general such incremental costs would be relatively modest. On the other hand, for countries like India and Pakistan, whose accessible land borders (with Burma) would be extended by the loss of Southeast Asia, the incremental costs of maintaining equivalent defensibility might be appreciable.

The value of all of Southeast Asia in central war contingencies could be taken as minor. Such value as the area has in central war scenarios relates primarily to central war targets that might be assigned to Air Force units based in or staging through the area. Inasmuch as reaching these targets from other sources, or through the use of other weapons systems not having such basing requirements, should not entail heavy incremental costs, the value of the region in central war is small.

It should be evident that in principle the same approach could be applied in North Asia to a consideration of the value of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, and to a consideration of the value of other underdeveloped areas, as well.

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In the North Asian context, for example, we would want to consider the effect of a loss of each of the three countries in turn on the costs of achieving an indifferently preferred defense posture in the other two. It should be emphasized again that I am referring here only to military costs. The psychological and political costs, to be discussed later, could well be both more significant and more difficult to overcome than the strictly military costs.

In a local war context, the loss of Japan would substantially increase the costs of maintaining equivalent defense capabilities in Korea, but this relationship is (from a military point of view) asymmetrical. In both the local war and central war contexts, the military value of Japan would be by far the greatest of the three. In central war (through the mid-1960's, at least), a loss of Japanese bases would involve appreciable incremental costs to obtain an outcome with equivalent expected damage to major Communist targets. Moreover, the "loss" of Japan could increase potential Communist nuclear capabilities, as well as the Communist recuperation base. To offset these effects would clearly entail substantial costs for the United States and the free world.

Of all the underdeveloped countries, those whose value in a central war context would probably be the greatest by far would be the underdeveloped countries in Latin America. Pursuing the above analysis, we might envisage a central war scenario with Communist missile sites in Cuba, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic.[1] Given such "losses," the problem would be to ascertain the incremental costs of maintaining an indifferently preferred military posture. Such costs, in connection with a bilateral counterforce strategy, for example, would involve the increased requirements for protecting our retaliatory capabilities against weapons of higher accuracy (and with lesser warning time) that could be delivered from such nearby sites. In the context of a strictly retaliatory or finite deterrence strategy, one would also want to look at the value of particular areas like Latin America from the standpoint of overcoming the loss of credibility that might be involved for the United States, owing both to the expansion of the recuperation base afforded the Soviet Union, and the relatively greater vulnerability of the United States to a continuation of the conflict as a result of the forward location of Communist bases.

It should be evident that in principle the same sort of analysis is ap-

[1] In the light of the Cuban crisis of October 1962, I hope I may be allowed the conceit of noting that this sentence, and the entire paragraph which contains it, were written in July 1961.

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plicable to investigating the military value of Western Europe as well as of the underdeveloped countries. In fact, a strong case can be made for extending the analysis to Western Europe, because, as in the case of Japan, there are important interdependencies, both military and non-military in nature, that link Western Europe to the less-developed areas.

B. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF VALUE

The economic aspects of a country's value to the United States can be divided into three components: the value of investments owned by American residents in the country; and the value of (or "gains" from) imports from and exports to the particular country or area. As in the case of military aspects of value, the economic components can be approached in terms of the foregone benefits (or opportunity costs) of the hypothetically "lost" investments, imports, and exports. (Incidentally, it should be noted that "loss" in a military context does not necessarily imply "loss" in an economic sense. A country might become a part of the Communist bloc, or even a Communist military base, and still continue to trade with the free world. Conversely, a country might expropriate foreign assets, and forego trading with the United States, while still refusing to permit Communist military installations on its territory.)

(1) The value of American investments in a particular country is the discounted value of the income stream associated with those investments. Though the concept is fairly clear, measurement is quite difficult because of the uncertainty connected with the income stream, and with the appropriate discount rate to use in calculating present value. However, as a practical matter, a number might be attached to this component of value by taking the average income received in the last four or five years from U.S. investments in particular foreign areas as a basis for estimating the income stream over, say, a twenty-year useful life, and calculating present values by using three or four alternative, but plausible, discount rates. Alternatively, and still more simply, this component of value might be quantified by making a suitable upward adjustment in the book value of American assets in particular countries or areas (and perhaps supplementing this estimate with a further upward adjustment in the book value of similar assets, both direct and portfolio, of Western Europe and Japan in these areas). As an indication of the orders of magnitude that are involved here, the following

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figures on U.S. private direct investments abroad in 1959 are of interest:[2]

Latin America	$ 8.2 billion
Europe	5.3 billion
Africa	.8 billion
Asia (excluding the Middle East)	1.0 billion
Middle East	1.2 billion
Canada	10.2 billion
Other	3.0 billion
Total	$29.7 billion

These figures are, of course, understated because they reflect book value, rather than present or market value. They are also understated, from the standpoint of the "value" problem, because they do not include the value of European investments in, say, the Far East and the Middle East, which are frequently greater than those of the United States, yet which are of indirect value to the United States. Anyhow, they give some indication of the general orders of magnitude that are involved.

(2) The value of a country as a source of U.S. imports can be represented not by the *value* of imports from that country, but rather by the *difference* between the money-value of imports and the cost of buying the same imports, or the next best substitutes, from alternative sources, including domestic sources. The value of a country as a source of imports can be less than, equal to, or greater than the actual money-value of imports from that country. In effect, the *value* that is involved here is the *loss* of consumers' surplus resulting from a shift in the supply curve due to exclusion or loss of the particular country as a source of imports.

In Figure 2, S_1 and S_2 represent world supply of exports to the United States of a particular product, "pre-" and "post-loss," respectively. D is the total U.S. demand for imports of the product. Q_3Q_1 is the amount of world exports to the United States provided by the particular country at the "pre-loss" equilibrium price P_1. P_2 and Q_2 are, respectively, the price and the quantity of world exports to the United States post-loss.

The net value of the foregone imports is, in effect, represented by the shaded portion of the above diagram. If demand is inelastic, if the country's share of world supply is large (and hence the shift in the supply function is considerable), or if the new supply curve is inelastic,

[2] U.S. Department of Commerce, *U.S. Business Investments in Foreign Countries* (Washington 1960), 91.

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

FIGURE 2

the loss of consumers' surplus which results can be greater than the value of the original imports from the country concerned.[3] This will, however, not generally be the case, and will fairly definitely not be the case for those imports for which the particular import source is only a minor source of supply, or for which domestic substitutes are available whose supply is relatively elastic.

To give a rough idea of the orders of magnitude involved, U.S. imports in 1960 from the less-developed areas[4] were $5.9 billion, or 40 per cent of total U.S. imports of $14.6 billion.[5] Imports from the less-developed countries by the United States plus Canada, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Japan were about $19.6 billion or 24 per cent of their total imports of $81 billion in 1960.

(3) The value of a particular country as a market for exports is the fall in U.S. export prices, or the reduction in earnings realized by U.S. factors of production producing for export markets, due to that country's "loss" and the resulting fall in demand for U.S. exports. The amount of this reduction will depend both on the extent of the shift in, and the elasticity of, the resulting demand curve, as well as on the elasticity of the U.S. export supply curve.

In Figure 3, D_1 and D_2 represent world demand for U.S. exports of a particular commodity, "pre-" and "post-loss," respectively. S is the U.S. supply of exports of the same commodity. Q_3Q_1 is the amount

[3] That is, the shaded quadrilateral may exceed the rectangle Q_1Q_3RT.

[4] Defined as the rest of the world excluding Canada, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Africa, and the Sino-Soviet bloc.

[5] *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1960* (New York 1962), 18-27.

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

FIGURE 3

of U.S. exports bought by a particular country at the pre-loss equilibrium price, P_1. The shaded portion represents the loss of producers' surplus or rent, resulting from the fall in world demand. Under unusual conditions, this loss of producers' rent can exceed the money-value of the original exports to that country,[6] but usually it will be well below the initial export value.

Again, to give a rough idea of the order of magnitude involved, exports by the United States in 1960 to the less-developed areas of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America were $6.5 billion, or about 32 per cent of total U.S. exports of $20 billion.[7] Exports to the less-developed areas, excluding Communist countries, by the United States plus Canada, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Japan were $21 billion in 1960, or about 25 per cent of their total exports of $85 billion.

It should be noted that the economic aspects of a country's value to the United States are easier to identify conceptually than empirically. However, with some reasonable simplifying assumptions, it should be possible to make fairly acceptable quantitative estimates.

Before going on to discuss the non-quantitative aspects of the value to the United States of other countries, further comment should be made concerning the quantitative components I have been discussing. Even if it were possible to quantify the military and economic aspects of a country's value in the manner I have been describing, this would not necessarily imply that we should be prepared to incur costs equivalent to this value in order to prevent the "loss" of the particular coun-

[6] That is, the shaded quadrilateral may exceed the rectangle Q_1Q_3RT.
[7] *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1960*, 18-27.

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try. To draw this inference, we would have to know something about the effects of such costs on the likelihood of the loss taking place. From this standpoint, all that the quantitative components of a country's value tell us is the upper bound to the costs we should be willing to incur to reduce the likelihood that the more costly alternative will occur.[8]

Actually, the latter formulation is not fully acceptable, either. The important non-quantitative aspects of value, discussed below, would tend to raise the cost that we should be prepared to incur to prevent a country's loss *beyond* the limits identified in the quantitative military and economic aspects of value. The point is, simply, that while the investigation of quantitative aspects of value in this instance may provide some illuminating orders of magnitude, its operational implications are ambiguous.

III. Political and Psychological Aspects of Value

As previously mentioned, some, and perhaps most, important aspects of value, in this context, are non-quantitative. This does not mean that a serious attempt to fill in the numbers should not be made, where possible. But it does mean that the qualitative aspects must be borne prominently in mind before reaching conclusions on the basis of the economic and military components alone.

The first major qualitative consideration arises from the political-psychological interdependencies among countries and areas. Some interdependencies (for example, those I have referred to between Laos on the one hand, and Viet Nam and Thailand on the other) can be identified in military and/or economic terms, costed, and compensated for, or simply accepted. But there are others, relating more to attitudes

[8] Consider a program (e.g., economic or military aid) costing X. Associated with X is a probability of "loss" of P. In the absence of X, the probability of loss is estimated as Π, with $\Pi > P$. Assuming the "value" of the country concerned is V, X is only justifiable if:

$$X + PV < \Pi V \quad (1)$$
$$X < V(\Pi - P) \quad (2)$$

In the case most favorable for the contemplated program, $(\Pi - P)$ approaches unity, so that V provides the upper bound for a justifiable X. Generally, however, $(\Pi - P)$ will be less than unity, because P will seldom approach zero. *Hence, a justifiable X ought to be appreciably less than V.* It is easy to adapt this formulation to allow for the fact that if "no-loss" occurs, with or without X, some further costs may subsequently have to be incurred to support the country under consideration. Under this circumstance, X will be less attractive the greater the subsequent "no-loss" costs are likely to be. Denoting these subsequent costs by S, (1) can be restated:

$$X + PV + (1 - P)S < V\Pi + (1 - \Pi)S \quad (3)$$
$$X < V(\Pi - P) + S(P - \Pi) \quad (4)$$

In this case a justifiable X must be less in relation to V than in (2) because of the higher probability that additional costs will be required after X, i.e., since $P - \Pi < 0$.

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which can be described in terms of phrases like "wave of the future," or "march of history," or "inevitable trend," that cannot be readily compensated for or accepted. Even though attempts can be made to take measures that will compensate for the apparent military and economic consequences of a particular country's loss, it is more difficult to find ways to compensate for the effect of even a dimly perceived notion of trend on the loyalties and confidence of other people and countries. While this applies particularly to the underdeveloped areas, it extends beyond them. We would be wrong to think that the "loss" of a country like India might not have nearly as profound a psychological impact on the United Kingdom and Western Europe, as, for example, the loss of Laos may have on confidence and loyalties in Thailand and South Viet Nam; or that the loss of South Korea might not have an equivalent impact on Japan.

Secretary Rusk has recently stated the point by saying: "If you don't pay attention to the periphery, the periphery changes, and the first thing you know, the periphery is the center." Even if there is more to a periphery than one point (or one country), there is an important truth in the Secretary's words.

When we try to relate the value of other countries to the character of U.S. society, the connections become more tenuous and certainly more difficult to measure, but not necessarily less important. If we consider any consequential subset of countries, clearly the military and economic consequences of their loss would probably be to raise the U.S. defense budget, including that part devoted to foreign military assistance, and to lower somewhat our real national product as well as its rate of growth. Notwithstanding some prophets of gloom, a 20 per cent, or a 50 per cent, or even a 200 per cent increase in the size of our defense budget would not "bankrupt" the United States, nor would a 2 per cent annual rate of growth in national product, rather than a 5 per cent growth rate, mean national doom. But it is probably fair to say that substantially increased defense budgets maintained over a protracted period, if associated with a relatively slow rate of growth in the economy, would be likely to have significant effects on the character and quality of U.S. society domestically: on the extent of bureaucracy, on the control of information, on the sense of tension and vigilance in daily living.

If we consider, further, various extreme contingencies concerning the progressive erosion of the free world, it might ultimately become extremely difficult for us to determine where the "iron curtain" began and where it ended. A progressive reduction in the area of the world

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in which we could freely travel would significantly curtail our freedom, quite apart from the effect of such insulation on the quality of domestic society in the United States. In effect, under such extreme contingencies, the "iron curtain" would become something around *us*, rather than around the Soviet bloc.

Finally, a world of such a piecemeal and sequential erosion would be one in which the temptations for new generations of Americans to affiliate with, rather than oppose, the trend would become increasingly difficult to resist. An inward-directed and withdrawn America might increasingly generate its own domestic opponents, as well as an increasing disposition to overturn it from within. It is all too easy to become gloomily apocalyptic about these matters if one lets one's imagination run wild. But if we posit a world in which the subset of countries whose value we are assessing is in fact the rest of the free world, the John Birch Society might come to have a genuine mission in life—and an increasingly difficult one at that!

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UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
Framework and Analysis

By ANDREW C. JANOS

THE importance and political implications of the subject of unconventional warfare are well known and need not be elaborated upon here. At the present time, the three branches of the American military services are expanding their "special" forces, preparing for the eventuality of conflicts of smaller scope than conventional warfare. On the Soviet side, the theory of peaceful coexistence—i.e., the thesis that capitalism should be eliminated by popular movements rather than by foreign armies—was reasserted at the January conference of the S.E.D. in Berlin, by no lesser authority than Nikita Khrushchev himself.

In the wake of such developments, there will no doubt be a proliferation of treatises on the subject. The danger is, however, that a number of fundamental questions concerning unconventional warfare will remain unanswered, and the whole body of literature may sooner or later become an impressive building built on the quicksand of half-formulated concepts and definitions. Whereas some aspects of the overall problem have been more than adequately covered, others have attracted very little attention or have not been noticed at all.

The following discussion will address itself to three areas that fall in this latter category. The first is the problem of a workable definition of unconventional warfare. The second concerns unconventional strategies *other* than guerrilla warfare. The third is the scope and variations of guerrilla strategies.

I

A brief glance at the available literature on the subject reveals that considerable uncertainty exists as to the meaning of "unconventional warfare." The term has been used interchangeably with "internal war," "revolutionary warfare," "class war," and "political warfare,"[1] or as a synonym for "guerrilla war." Members of a recent symposium on unconventional warfare defined their topic variously as "guerrilla warfare, escape and evasion, and conduct of subversion against hostile states

[1] Cf. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Unconventional Warfare in Communist Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, XL (July 1962), 567.

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in wartime,"[2] the employment of "guerrilla and sabotage units,"[3] or simply as a "weapons system."[4] The members of the same symposium then concluded that "the separate definitions needed to be brought within a systematic pattern . . . ," and that "the present language (at least in English) for the discussion of unconventional war and violence is ambiguous."[5]

Practical-minded students of unconventional warfare may object to this concern with the definitional problem on grounds that it could deteriorate into a petty game of words, diverting attention from "essentials." Indeed, it is easy to concur with Huntington's opinion that at this stage semantics seems to have outstripped theory in the study of violent political conflict.[6] What is needed today is not a new semantic device, but rather a simple definitional model to delimit the scope of the subject matter and to outline the range of operational alternatives that are potentially available to policy-makers.

Such a simple definitional construct is suggested by the term itself, which unmistakably calls up a certain image of *conventional* warfare that lies buried in the subconscious layers of our minds. This image, or model, from which unconventional (or "irregular") warfare deviates in one respect or another, concerns the confrontation of two armies of approximately equal strength. The conventional image of warfare has been abstracted from experience with violence between nations (organized political units), in which each of the parties has access to an organized apparatus for coercion, applied against internal or external enemies; at the same time, there exist institutional channels for the mobilization of manpower and resources as well as a territorial base of operations.

In contrast, unconventional warfare may be said to occur if and when the adversaries confronting each other have grossly disproportionate capabilities, whether in manpower, resources, or organizational base. In unconventional warfare, one of the participants possesses either an army of inferior size, equipment, and organization, or no army at all. Whereas one side can rely on a regular army, the other will

[2] William P. Yarborough, "Unconventional Warfare: One Military View," *The Annals*, CCCXLI (May 1962), 1.

[3] J. K. Zawodny, "Guerrilla and Sabotage: Organization, Operations, Motivations, Escalation," *ibid.*, 8.

[4] Salvko N. Bjelajac, "Unconventional Warfare: American and Soviet Approaches," *ibid.*, 74.

[5] Russell Rhyne, "Unconventional Warfare—Problems and Questions," *ibid.*, 102.

[6] Samuel P. Huntington, "Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Policy," in Franklin M. Osanka, ed., *Modern Guerrilla Warfare* (New York 1962), xv.

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have to fight the war with scratch military units, "part-time soldiers," non-military organizations, unorganized masses, or with tightly organized but numerically inferior groups of political activists. As has been frequently observed, this configuration of capabilities is likely to take place when one of the armies in the field has been eliminated from the political equation (the second phase of international wars), or, in internal wars, before one side has acquired the ability to outfit an army and hit the opponent in the "conventional" way. In this latter context, it should be pointed out, the use of unconventional methods is not restricted to insurgents against governments, but may be resorted to by groups close to the authorities. A government involved in an attempted military coup, for instance, may call for a civilian uprising in its defense—a weapon sometimes employed by Latin American governments. The classic case of unconventional warfare by the authorities against insurgents is that of the Socialist government of Germany in March 1920 against the troops of General Lüttwitz.

II

The first systematic political and military analyses of unconventional warfare appeared in the early nineteenth century. The principles and advantages of popular guerrilla warfare were summarized by Prussian generals at the time of the Napoleonic wars, and a few years later the French revolutionary Blanqui laid down the political and tactical principles of what may be termed "insurrectionary warfare."[7]

The theory of insurrectionary warfare that one can distill from the writings of European revolutionaries reflects conditions in Western Europe in the age of the industrial revolution, and as such it represents a strategic alternative to guerrilla warfare. The industrial revolution created large urban conglomerates inhabited by a socially unstable and frustrated working class. This working class and all the free-floating radicalism within these societies were kept in check by armies, which had become an indispensable factor in the domestic political equation. The army of the *Directoire* foiled Jacobin and popular opposition by a series of *coups d'état*, and the dragoons of the Duke of Wellington dispersed rebellious laborers on St. Peter's Field. But, while the standing armies proved brutally efficient in suppressing revolts, in time they too became susceptible to revolutionary appeals. With a few notable exceptions, the modern armies of Europe were based on *levées*

[7] See Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. by F. F. Graham (London 1918), II, chap. 26; and Louis Auguste Blanqui, "Instructions pour une prise d'armes," *Archiv für die Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung*, XV (1930), 270-300.

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en masse, and were often recruited from the most revolutionary strata of the population.

From the revolutionaries' point of view, the army had to be eliminated from the political equation. But since the insurgents were militarily inferior, their main strike was not envisaged as directed against the army's physical capabilities, but against its will to resist or fight back. Accordingly, the physical aspects of the battle were subordinated to the psychological aspect. Violence was to be applied sparingly to avoid failure to attain the strategic objective: the persuasion of the troops to desist from fighting. As far as the purely "military" prospects of the battle were concerned, the insurgents showed great realism. "There was general awareness"—to quote Engels—"that real victory over the military in street fighting, a victory as between two armies, is one of the rarest exceptions." But, Engels continues, "the insurgents also counted on it just as rarely. For them it was solely a question of making the troops yield to moral influences, which, in a fight between the armies of two warring countries, do not come into play, or do so to a much lesser degree."[8]

Insurrectionary warfare rests partly on the tactic of provocation. The essence of provocation is a demonstrative, often only symbolic, attack on the troops by organized crowds or by the population at large. Crowds may march against strategically located military units, heckle them, throw stones, storm government buildings, attack key personnel, and thereby force the troops to resort to violence against the insurgents. Typical of the tactics of provocation is the following scene from the Moscow insurrection of 1905, described by Lenin: ". . . on Strastnaya Square . . . the crowd surrounded the Cossacks, mingled and fraternized with them and persuaded them to go away. . . . In the Presnya district . . . two working girls, carrying the red flag in a crowd of 10,000 people, rushed towards the Cossacks and cried: 'Kill us!' "[9]

An army surrounded by a hostile population in a big city finds itself in an extremely delicate situation. In an internal war, the incumbent can only rarely be indiscriminately ruthless toward the general population. Under such circumstances a great superiority of forces is needed to pacify a city in a state of turmoil, to isolate rebellious districts, and to keep crowds off the streets. Everybody is suspect, but not everybody can be killed or arrested. Systematic and selective killings may be the

[8] Friedrich Engels, Introduction to Marx's "Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850," in *Selected Works* (New York, n.d.), II, 183.

[9] Vladimir I. Lenin, "Lessons of the Moscow Uprising," in *Selected Works* (Moscow-New York, n.d.), III, 350.

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answer, but this is exactly what the insurgents hope for. The act of opening fire on crowds will generally produce great psychological strains on the soldiers involved. It is usually at this point that the morale of isolated military units collapses, and the chain reaction of desertions or defections begins.

A "higher" form of insurrectionary warfare—to use the technical language of its theorists—is the barricade uprising. The barricade is a natural tactical instrument of warfare in a city. The pattern of the modern barricade tactic was set by the Paris revolution of 1830, but its origins go back to the earliest periods of urbanization and pre-modern city states. In medieval cities, barricades were most frequently used by the burghers against the feudal cavalry. Examples are numerous in the history of internal strife in Italian city states. In Paris, history records two "days of the barricades" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On May 12, 1588, a barricade uprising expelled Henry III, the last Valois king, and a similar rebellion forced Louis XIV to flee the city on January 6, 1649.

The purely military or physical function of the barricade is to impede the movement of the troops in the streets and to provide shelter against the firepower of small arms and primitive artillery. Its second, and more important, function is psychological. On the one hand, the building of barricades boosts the morale of sympathizers and provides for popular participation on a wide scale, and when the troops arrive, the barricade becomes the "touchstone of the morale of the army."[10] The troops are forced to combat these improvised fortresses manned by a hostile population, subject to physical and psychological influences produced by city warfare. Maneuvers become more difficult and dangerous, desertion extremely easy. The big-city environment is like a jungle, where the soldier has a better opportunity to disappear than in a regular campaign in the field. Furthermore, the contact between opponents is close, fire is exchanged at short range, and the soldiers are reminded again and again that they are "fighting their own blood," "killing their brothers," and the like.

The classic barricade tactic was the product of the military technology and social ecology of the industrializing countries of the early nineteenth century. In later revolutionary insurrections, whenever the tactic was applied, it was mostly for defensive purposes at the end of an uprising, rather than at the beginning.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, a number of developments in general technology and military weapons systems created great

[10] Karl Kautsky, *Krieg und Demokratie* (Berlin 1932), 263.

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odds against the tactics of the barricade. As Engels pointed out in 1895,[11] arms had improved; in particular, the firepower of artillery had become more effective. The development of transportation and communication systems made it possible to move troops rapidly from distant garrisons to centrally located urban areas. The passivity and the defensive character of the barricade now became a real hazard for the insurgents. Confronted with modern weapons and mobile troops, they could not hope to hold out for a sufficiently long time to break the morale of the regular troops. Instead of relying on the hazardous course of a mass uprising, insurgents began to resort to a new form of unconventional warfare: the revolutionary strike.

Reliance on the weapon of the strike against the military presumes a relatively complex social environment, a degree of interdependence between army and society, and some organization among the labor force in key industries and services. Consequently, the idea of using the strike as a weapon of unconventional war is relatively new. It was accepted by the Second International as an instrument of the political struggle in 1907. It was most successfully used against the military in the aforementioned Kapp-Lüttwitz *Putsch* of 1920, when a general strike forced the army out of Berlin. A great strike against the Fascist militia collapsed in Italy in 1922. In more recent years, a general strike (October 1945) saved Perón from an already successful military *coup d'état*, and others have acted as a check on military intervention in several Central American republics. The weapon of the general strike was applied against Soviet troops after the suppression of the Hungarian revolution in November 1956.

As an unconventional technique, the strike can be described as paraviolent. Its military value inheres in the fact that it paralyzes an army without the actual infliction of violence, merely by desisting from action. The strike can disrupt the functioning of military organizations without running the risk of antagonizing the troops. The regular army is forced to fight an invisible enemy that is hard to coerce and cannot be countered in open battle.

Beyond this physical function, the strike has the same psychological function as demonstrations and provocation or the barricade uprising. In its course, the soldiers are confronted with a massive show of popular unity that tends to demoralize them. Finally, the strike builds up in various sectors of society psychological pressures against the army that often have to be contained by acts of violence.

[11] Engels, 185-86.

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The feasibility and success of insurrectionary warfare are thus predicated on two factors. The first is the existence of a potential mass base that lends itself to mobilization through organizational channels or through mere physical concentration. Either one of the two—effective organization or concentration—is a prerequisite of insurrections, which further suggests that this pattern of unconventional strategy is most germane in relatively advanced societies where urban centers dominate the social, economic, and political life of the country.

The second factor is the susceptibility of the army to subversion by the opponent. Such predispositions are obviously not fixed properties, but depend on psychological relations between the army and the insurgents. Conscript armies, for instance, have been more "accessible" to revolutionary movements than standing, mercenary armies or armies recruited from a selected social base, such as some of the crack units of the Russian Imperial Army (Cossacks) or the Reichswehr of Weimar Germany (peasantry). Armies drawn from a different ethnic base than the native population, such as the armies of an occupying or colonial power, may be regarded as the least accessible.

Insurrections, therefore, are most likely to occur in internal conflicts similar to those in Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, where French (1830, 1848), German (1848, 1918-1919), and Russian (1905, 1917) masses were fighting against French, German, and Russian armies. Consequently, the European revolutionary doctrine was imbued with the concept of "fighting for the troops" which, in Lenin's words, "is inevitable in every real popular movement" and takes place "whenever the revolutionary struggle becomes more acute."[12] Mussolini, a revolutionary of the Right, but a disciple of the tacticians of the Left, expressed the same concept in his own flamboyant style: "Revolutions are made with arms and not without them, with armies and not against them."[13]

III

The alternative to insurrection is guerrilla warfare, a subject so extensively analyzed in the theoretical literature that any detailed discussion of its military and political principles is bound to be somewhat repetitive. As opposed to insurrectionary tactics, guerrilla warfare is a battle—or, rather, series of battles—*against* and not *for* the troops. What the two forms of unconventional warfare—in terms of our initial defini-

[12] Lenin, 349.

[13] Quoted in A. Rossi (Angelo Tosca), *The Rise of Italian Fascism* (London 1938), 258.

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tion—have in common is the position of military inferiority from which they are fought.

Following from the condition of military weakness, the ground rule of guerrillas is the avoidance of decisive strategic encounters. Instead of fighting "Napoleonic battles," they pick out the weak spots of the enemy for attack.[14] "They should not try to crack the core, but only nibble along the surface and on the edges."[15] In guerrilla warfare, the weaker party is strategically on the defensive, yet tactically always on the offensive in order to maintain the military and psychological advantages of attack and surprise. According to Mao's now famous sixteen-word formula: "Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue."[16]

Guerrillas move in small groups, trading numbers for space, and make no attempt to deploy masses against the opponent's army. In a guerrilla war the masses are not called upon to fight or confront the regular troops in the manner of the barricade uprising. Their role is passive, yet extremely important. The guerrilla fighters must rely on the population for logistic support and supplies. It is the population that shelters the guerrilla in retreat and provides intelligence in attack. In Mao's picturesque phrase, the guerrilla army needs the people as fish need water. The precondition of the success of operations is, therefore, a large degree of consensus and popular commitment to the guerrilla cause.

Guerrilla warfare, like insurrections, attempts to balance the inferiority of physical capabilities with psychological techniques, but the nature of its psychological aspects is different. In insurrections the objective of the psychological element is to transform the attitudes of the troops from negative to neutral, or from neutral to favorable, by trying to produce feelings of guilt. In guerrilla warfare, the psychological objective is to paralyze the opponent's soldiers by anxiety, fear, and frustration. The result is an inevitable escalation of bitterness and violence on both sides. The guerrillas thus should have, at a minimum, the capability of surviving the first counterstrikes of terror and violence, and of sustaining the psychological warfare over a prolonged period of time.

The pattern of guerrilla warfare varies with the capabilities of the insurgents and the physical-demographic features of the terrain. One

[14] Cf. Mao Tse-tung, *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War* (Peking 1954), 75.

[15] Clausewitz, as quoted in Peter Paret and John W. Shy, *Guerrillas in the 1960's* (New York 1961), 13.

[16] Mao, 69.

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form of guerrilla warfare, termed *yu chi chan* by Mao Tse-tung, comes close to the pattern of regular warfare, as defined at the outset of this article. *Yu chi chan*, hailed by many of its students as a strategic innovation, is essentially the application of the principles of mobile warfare to the requirements of a revolutionary situation. The precondition of mobility is that the inferior army should not have to maintain extended and complex supply lines or guard its rear from hostile civilian movements; in other words, it should be able to rely on the support of the population in the area of operations. The "irregular" forces of Mao's *yu chi chan* were small regular armies consisting of enlisted, "full-time" soldiers, who in the so-called "campaigns of encirclement and annihilation," numbered from 30,000 to 40,000 and were opposed by armies from three to ten times their size.[17] Similarly, during the Second World War, Yugoslav partisans operated five divisions in the province of Slovenia alone.[18]

In these cases, the numerical ratio of the opponents and the pattern of warfare were not much different from those in some of the well-known "conventional" campaigns of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as some of the campaigns of Frederick the Great, Washington's winter campaign of 1777, or the two campaigns of the Hungarian war of independence in the winter of 1848-1849 against the Austrian armies. In each case, these "conventional" campaigns were premised on the same conditions as Mao's *yu chi chan*—a friendly population animated by nationalist symbols, and sufficient space to permit retreat.[19]

The other form of guerrilla warfare, guerrilla terrorism, takes place when capabilities or terrain do not permit the conduct of *yu chi chan*. It should be obvious that in small countries like Israel or Cyprus, or in urban areas, the weaker party will not be able to attain the same degree of mobility as Mao's Red Army. Another limitation on the application of capabilities may be imposed by the absence of active popular identification. In other instances, the social and political situation may not permit the organization of a "full-time" guerrilla army. Frequently, therefore, as has been more than once observed,[20] guerrilla terrorism represents only a phase of preparation for *yu chi chan* and conventional warfare.

[17] *Ibid.*, 80.

[18] Dusan Kvader, "Territorial War: The New Concept of Resistance," *Military Review*, XXXIV (July 1954), 46-58.

[19] The "sufficiency" of space, of course, depends on the degree of absolute mobility, as determined by prevailing military technology. In the days of motorized troops and tanks, the space provided by Silesia or Hungary would not be sufficient for this type of mobile warfare.

[20] Cf. Klaus Knorr, "Unconventional Warfare: Strategy and Tactics in Internal Political Strife," *The Annals*, CCCXLI (May 1962), 56; and Brian Crozier, *The Rebels: A Study of Post-War Insurrections* (London 1960), 127-30.

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If *yu chi chan* is the war of the weak, guerrilla terrorism is the war of the very weak. In this form of unconventional warfare, the hard core of fighters often does not number more than a few hundred, but the principles of conducting the operation follow the general pattern of guerrilla strategy: seeking out weak spots, hitting and then retreating, though not necessarily into a wide area of open space, but into disguised civilian existence. The terrorist is usually a part-time fighter, operating in a small area around his place of residence, compensating for his extreme weakness by increased reliance on psychological warfare, attempting to terrorize the enemy soldier. This is most often achieved by systematic, although apparently random, acts of violence. Frequently, the actual act of violence and the attendant destruction of life and property are limited and symbolic, and the act of destruction carries less importance than the perception of the act of violence by others.

The difference between the terrorism employed by Cypriot and Israeli forces or the French Secret Army in Algiers, on the one hand, and the Maoist *yu chi chan*, on the other, is thus a matter of degree rather than of kind. One must, however, distinguish between guerrilla terrorism (the terminology is admittedly inadequate) conducted against the opponent's army or some other instrument of coercion, and terrorism directed against one's own potential mass following with the political objective of mobilization or neutralization. A further form of terrorism is the assassination or threatened assassination of political leaders (as opposed to private persons or members of the military and police forces) with the objective of influencing policy decisions.

IV

Owing to the element of force involved, unconventional warfare shares many characteristics with conventional techniques. In both cases, the objective is "to compel the opponent to fulfill our will"[21] and it is pursued by eliminating the opponent's instruments of coercion. Unconventional warfare, like conventional, is subject to the cardinal principles of military science.

However, violence as a means of exercising power operates on two levels: one physical, the other psychological. The physical destruction of an individual always serves the secondary purpose of bringing about a change in the state of mind of those who survive. In unconventional warfare, the psychological aspect assumes a near-decisive role. In the absence of physical capability to destroy an opponent, psychological means will be intensively applied to bring about the desired change,

[21] Clausewitz, I, 1.

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and physical violence will always be applied in such a way as to increase its psychological effect.

The second distinguishing mark of all unconventional warfare is that the lack of military capabilities is compensated for by widespread popular participation, though of varying intensity and character. This does not necessarily imply that unconventional warfare is invariably fought in terms of revolutionary symbols. The first instances of modern unconventional warfare were inspired by essentially conservative ideologies and directed against the expanding French Revolution.[22] But the symbols, whether religious, secular, nationalist, or social-revolutionary, should be able to capture the popular imagination and arouse popular sentiments. This "spontaneous" element can never be properly substituted for by organizational weapons or control over instruments of mobilization.

Nevertheless, while its conduct and outcome are premised on political conditions,[23] unconventional warfare should essentially be treated as a military phenomenon, a *form* of warfare appropriate to particular internal and international conflict situations. If the political objective of warfare is revolution—the transfer or destruction of organized power in society—then, on the other hand, we may speak of revolutionary warfare. The latter is a *type* of war that may be fought conventionally as well as unconventionally.[24]

This distinction between strategy and objective, between unconventional and revolutionary warfare, should be clearly borne in mind. Whereas the former, referring to the strategic principles of fighting a superior opponent, is as old as warfare itself, the social and political objectives implied by the latter are relatively new. Yet, at the same time the close empirical connection between the two should also be obvious. Unconventional warfare has assumed an increased importance within the framework of revolutionary ideologies and objectives, especially since the modern state and the development of mass-destructive weapons have tended to narrow rather than broaden the range of strategic alternatives.

[22] See, e.g., the insurrection in the Vendée, as described in Peter Paret, *Internal War and Pacification: The Vendée, 1792-1796*, Research Monograph No. 12 (Princeton, Center of International Studies, 1961). The guerrilla movement of Andreas Hoffer in the Tyrol and the Spanish resistance to Napoleon also fell in this category.

[23] Two perceptive analyses of the relation of political and military factors in unconventional warfare are Chalmers A. Johnson, "Civilian Loyalties and Guerrilla Conflict," *World Politics*, XIV (July 1962), 646-61; and Franklin A. Lindsay, "Unconventional Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, XL (January 1962), 264-74.

[24] Cf. Huntington, xix.

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Review Articles

THE REVIVAL OF DIPLOMACY

By STEVEN MULLER

George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*, Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, 301 pp. $6.00.
Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, 283 pp. $6.00.

DIPLOMACY is beginning to regain prominence in international relations. No coherent international system had existed after World War I marked the end of the nineteenth-century order; World War II unavoidably resulted from the inability of nations to regroup into a viable world system. In the 1960's, the effort is at long last under way again to establish a durable international order. This effort was effectively frustrated as long as either the United States or Russia could hope that supremacy in nuclear armaments would provide the opportunity quickly and decisively to gain world domination. The existence of the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile terminates such hopes. Checked by each other's ICBM's, the two superpowers are reduced in their rivalry to a prolonged struggle, unlikely to end in total victory or defeat for either. Last October's Cuban confrontation practically—and dramatically—"proved" this point. It is now possible to strive for a durable international system founded on the unresolved perpetuation of the East-West rivalry.

Accordingly, both books under review are most timely. Their common subject is alliance. They thus address directly the central problem of how nations can and will align themselves in a prolonged effort to compete for national gain without provoking the violence of a war that would be fatal to most of them. Professors Wolfers and Liska bring European training and an essentially historical approach to their subject. While obviously acquainted with the full range of current scholarship in the field, each prefers to rely methodologically on historical precedent for national behavior, rather than on decision-making analysis or the application of systems analysis to international relations. The two books complement each other. In *Discord and Collaboration*, Professor Wolfers offers a collection of essays, many drawn with minor changes from articles previously published, that in aggregate present a senior scholar's approach to, and conceptualization of, international

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affairs. Professor Liska's *Nations in Alliance* is a much more daring, and occasionally brilliant, attempt to derive from essentially the same approach a general theory of the possibilities inherent in national alliances as well as a prediction as to the nature of the international system that is now coming into being.

The joint approach of both authors is based upon the concept of the nation-state as the essential actor in world affairs. Although due allowance must be made for such phenomena as a particularly forceful individual personality, or subjective human relationships dominant in the calculations of a national leadership, or split loyalties engendered by ideological, regional, or ethnic groupings, it would, in Professor Wolfers' words, "be dangerous for theorists to divert their primary attention from the nation-state and multistate systems" (p. 24). Each author conceptualizes national states as organic entities whose historical needs and purposes limit the choices open to their leaders. Both stress the persistence of tradition in international affairs over the extent and rapidity of change. Their work is governed by the spirit of "*Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.*"

Of several reflections induced by these two volumes, perhaps the most crucial relates to the need of the United States to make diplomacy the central element in its foreign policy. At least since 1945, the core of our foreign policy has been military, not diplomatic. With increasing insistence up to and including the present time, strategic thinking derived from our military confrontation with Soviet power has tended to dominate our national consciousness and our relationship with other states. This was probably both inevitable and necessary during a period when war, total or limited, with all or part of Soviet power was either a daily fact (Korea) or a daily possibility. It is, however, anachronistic and harmful as the probability of armed conflict decreases and an era continues in which power rivalries among states express themselves diplomatically rather than militarily. This is obviously a matter of emphasis rather than an either-or proposition. Certainly Wolfers as well as Liska insists on the basic role that national military power plays in international affairs. And if the Cuban confrontation illustrates the ICBM stalemate, it also indicates clearly that strategic considerations are anything but obsolete. Nonetheless, concentration on strategic thinking to the virtual exclusion of other factors has dangers even when it is most "natural"—i.e., in times of war or cold war; and during a period when the threat of war is less imminent, it is apt to be counterproductive. Such recent foreign policy decisions as Skybolt, the Nassau Agreement, and the complaint directed at Canadian defense policy were the

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product of strategic thinking. Although justified on purely military considerations, they were diplomatic blunders. In the present era, our national system of alliances can ill afford them.

I am not arguing here in the least that in the United States civilian control over the military establishment has been lost. On the contrary: the paradoxical dilemma of American foreign policy is that at the very time when civilian authority over the military is being asserted with the greatest vigor, the civilians in control themselves have as a group —and the group of course extends beyond the Department of Defense —fallen into the fashion of strategic rather than diplomatic thinking. Symptomatically, in the official jargon, national security has replaced national interest as the touchstone of foreign policy. In a lucid, persuasive essay, Professor Wolfers dismantles the notion that "national security" has a specific meaning. "Normative admonitions to conduct a foreign policy guided by the national security interest," he concludes, "are seen to be ambiguous and misleading" (p. 165). The addiction to the phrase indicates that some of our national leaders are continuing in a habit of thinking less and less justified by actual events. What is required is a conscious effort to reintegrate the strategic and diplomatic elements of American foreign policy without giving automatic and unjustified pre-eminence to the former. During World War II, United States foreign policy was governed almost entirely by strategic considerations. This handicapped our postwar diplomacy. It would be deplorable if an overemphasis on strategy were now to handicap American diplomacy as one phase of the cold war ends and our rivalry with Soviet power enters an extended dimension. If it may be taken as a symbol, the fact that the State Department has failed to emerge clearly as the principal formulator of foreign policy is not reassuring.

A more diplomatic foreign policy will above all strengthen the change already under way in NATO, our principal alliance. Primarily defensive in character, NATO has always had the positive potential engendered by the European Recovery Program and embodied in Article 2 of the Treaty.[1] President Kennedy's call on Independence Day, 1962, for Atlantic partnership, supplemented by the Trade Expansion Act, marks a new American initiative toward a positive dynamic within the alliance. This positive dynamic is of importance for

[1] "The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."

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at least two major reasons. In the first place, it is probably the only basis on which even the defensive alliance between Europe and the United States can be sustained over the long run. Professor Liska is surely right in calling the contemporary state system an expanding one, and in referring both to America and to Russia as dynamic, rising states. He goes on to say that a rising state may be either a meteor, projected by momentary forces into fleeting pre-eminence; or that its power may grow out of a steadily expanding organic base (p. 288). America's future as a still-rising power appears to hinge on her ability to combine with an integrating Western Europe to form just such an expanding organic base. And the fusion of interests of the Atlantic partners on this base will both justify and sustain the preventive and deterrent alliance against the challenge of the East.

Secondly, the importance of the positive element of economic and political partnership within NATO relates to the need of the West to pursue a consistent and dynamic policy toward the less-developed countries. In one of the most interesting passages of *Nations in Alliance*, Professor Liska outlines two contrasting—in his terms, mutually exclusive—strategies that the West can follow *vis-à-vis* the unaligned nations. One is the strategy of conciliation. It identifies the United States with the anti-colonial position. "The conciliation strategy's key objective is for the individual non-aligned countries and regimes to uphold their commitment to independence" (p. 238). The other is the strategy of discrimination. It demands that Western policy should not only conciliate but also contain the apparently irreconcilable. "The key, or minimum, objective is, therefore, not to foster commitment to independence *per se*; it is to contain both Communism and its neutralist 'allies,' so as to insure an elementary pluralistic order in the non-Communist World. Within such an incipient order, the developing countries must be able to progress *and* regress in their decolonization, politico-economic development, and foreign policy attitudes at such uneven rates and in such a staggered phasing that at no time will all or most of them be ripe for simultaneous Communist takeovers" (pp. 238-39).

Liska prefers the strategy of discrimination. His reasoning is threefold. The discriminatory strategy, he claims, favors alliance cohesion, because it reduces the divisive danger that a number of Western nations will individually nurse their relations with non-aligned countries without adequate regard for their allies' interests. The chief risk of the strategy of conciliation, he says, is speculative and is probably commonly underrated; it is that "a policy of indiscriminate conciliation

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would counteract the competitive interplay among neutralists themselves, an interplay which tends to confine extremism to a minority position" (p. 247). On the other hand, he argues, the main risk of the discriminatory policy is manifest and probably overrated; it is that one or more countries may immediately become hostile to the West and align with the Sino-Soviet bloc. "The belief that such enforced intimacy does not produce and ultimately precludes permanent unions squares the policy of pressure with the basic rule of a tripartite system of policy: do nothing *vis-à-vis* a third party that might benefit the chief adversary" (p. 248).

While this summary incidentally illustrates Professor Liska's irritating manner of advancing his argument dialectically by constructing dichotomies so that, however strained, they can be played off against each other, it also contains a fundamentally valid recommendation for American policy. A decrease in the immediacy of the threat of suicidal East-West war does not imply that the enduring rivalry between the two power systems will be less intense. On the contrary, as the rivalry continues without a major war and without any immediate prospect of decisive victory for either side, its scope will continually expand, and its effects will more and more profoundly affect every state within the international order. While it seems to me unrealistic to oppose policies of conciliation and discrimination in the manner of Professor Liska, as though they were mutually exclusive, it does appear insistently true that the nations of the West in their dealings with the less-developed countries can afford neither divisive competition among themselves, nor the sentimental pretense that such dealings can be somehow exempt from the overriding terms of the East-West rivalry. American diplomacy therefore must aim to create not only a common Western policy, but one designed to discriminate against developing states that veer into opportunistic alignment with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Professor Liska does examine the possibility that an extension across the globe of industrial development might effect a shift away from the primacy of the East-West struggle in international affairs. He does so in terms of the likelihood that a South-North polarization would supersede the more acute contemporary conflict. His chief candidates for the status of "Southern" future great powers are India, Brazil, and Nigeria. While it is easy to agree that each of these states may in time dominate a surrounding region, it is most difficult to visualize their common alignment into a geopolitical "Southern" entity. Liska himself offers no real clue as to what the issues at stake would be between "North" and "South." To do him justice, he himself argues that the

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East-West conflict should continue to be given priority in policy determination (p. 254). However, it is useful to have the issue raised. The very number of new states, prominently visible particularly in the United Nations, and the easy currency of talk referring to an Afro-Asian or neutralist bloc, have tended to create the image of an ascendant "South." There are some who think that substance will be given to this phantom by the racial issue, which would pit the colored peoples of the world against the whites. But the facts make it likely that a coherent, racist, powerfully united South will remain an illusion. Developing countries must now draw their strength from alliance with West or East. Anti-white prejudice alone is not an adequate substitute for a "Southern" ideology. And to illustrate the essential delusion of the "South," one may ask whether China and Australia, for example, are Northern or Southern states. The term "neutralism" is itself verbal coinage of the East-West struggle. Without an apocalyptic war, that struggle will impress itself more and more deeply on the international system. Its subordination to a world order oriented along an entirely different axis is not foreseeable. In their relations with the developing countries, America and Europe cannot afford to be distracted by phantoms from the present reality of the Soviet challenge.

One other section of *Nations in Alliance* claims special attention. It is entitled "Nuclear Diffusion and Multilateral Deterrence" (pp. 269-84), and here Professor Liska argues against the thesis that there is a direct and inevitable correlation between an increase in the number of nuclear actors and the likelihood of catastrophe. I find his argument persuasive and therefore believe it should be given a wide and careful hearing. The heart of Liska's case is the hypothesis that the kind of nuclear diffusion most likely to occur will do more to stabilize than to destabilize the system of alliances. In brief, he suggests that the nuclear capabilities of additional states are likely to lag considerably behind those of the two superpowers. As a result, the two-power nuclear situation would be succeeded by a two-tier situation, in which there would be two highly unequal classes of nuclear powers. This would of course be dangerous, but it might be less so than continued confrontation between only two nuclear superpowers, because such a confrontation is stable only as long as both these powers are rational and conservative.

In Professor Liska's opinion, a second-tier nuclear power is not likely to strike deliberately against a great one; and nuclear blackmail by the lesser state against a great power would be suicidal unless supported by another great power. "There remains," Liska goes on, "nuclear blackmail or strike by one small state against another, precipitating a com-

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petitive great-power intervention. In this respect, too, the two-tier system would have stabilizing resources which are unavailable in a two-power system. The diffusion of nuclear capability among several smaller states in a region would create among them conditions of multilateral deterrence of the kind that would prevail among great nuclear powers in the global arena. An additional source of stability would be the more powerful nuclear states themselves" (p. 278). It is his view that when nuclear power is diffused, stability will rest less on the sense of justice and political detachment of governments. Self-interest will dictate moderation. State A, a hypothetical third nuclear power, will have a restraining effect on nuclear antagonists B and C, because it is potentially a non-belligerent victor over both ally B and non-ally C in terms of relative residual capability after a nuclear duel between B and C. Yet A too will fear such a duel, because in its wake A would face the successful belligerent, present ally or not, without the advantage of restraint being exercised by a third party—not to mention the fact that A is bound to be the potential secondary target during the exchange between B and C.

Professor Liska also contends that, in a world of diffused nuclear power, self-limitation to the use of conventional weapons would be at a premium. Nuclear capability would be kept in reserve, as a means of further limiting the conflict by frightening off other participants. Only a nation with nuclear power of its own is likely to appreciate fully the dilemmas of reliance on nuclear force and thus to desire, as the United States now desires, to strengthen conventional alternatives to the ultimate weapons. Moreover, the very complex uncertainty that accompanies nuclear diffusion would itself deter risk-taking. An expansionist power such as the Soviet Union can take considerable chances —as in Cuba—when it needs to reckon only with a single and pragmatic defensive opponent who can be counted on to provide opportunity for the expansionist to backtrack in time. Such an expansionist would dare less in the intricate two-tier situation of multilateral deterrence, and this gives a new advantage to a defensive power such as the United States. Liska concludes his argument by suggesting that the possession of nuclear powers by several states associated together may directly add a positive potential to their alliance: "Alliances become an instrument for peace when they add something substantial to the checks which mutual or multi-lateral deterrence impose on antagonists. This is most likely to happen when inter-allied restraints are reciprocal and dampen acts of self-assertion or provocation on the part of members of both adversary combinations" (p. 283).

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These are ideas for a world slowly recovering from the state of shock produced by the advent of nuclear weapons. The weapons, and their delivery systems, remain terrible. Their instant power to destroy exceeds reason. Human affairs have been forever changed by weapons that can "overkill"; the violation of reason in this word dramatizes as almost nothing else can that the power of these weapons exceeds their rational use. But mankind has absorbed change before. And even great change does not negate all uses of the past. Nuclear weapons have not yet brought, nor need they bring, catastrophe. Neither have they brought world government, the death of nation-states, or an end to competition and antagonism among nations.

Human reason must now cope with the task of rationalizing a world in which nuclear arms exist and will probably multiply. The exercise of reason in international affairs is diplomacy, as the two books under review remind us. Suffering from the first shock of the nuclear era, most people have lately viewed diplomacy in a bad light, chiefly because it failed in the past to prevent wars, which in their newest form are unthinkable. But diplomacy is only a means of deploying man's reason. Unskilled, it may betray human schemes and hopes; even skilled and at its best, it is never better than the reason of men. We need it today more than ever. And its resort to war in the past must be judged in light of the fact that wars have never seemed literally as irrational as nuclear war does today. The greatest challenge of renewed diplomacy is to control the arms that man now wields. Both of these books are non-utopian and traditional. Both address themselves excellently to the utility and limitations of diplomacy. In conclusion I should like to suggest that both authors are particularly relevant reading for the consideration of arms control, although neither explicitly deals at length with the topic. This is so because arms control is not and cannot be a new subject field or a separate discipline. Arms control in the nuclear age is principally a new dimension of diplomacy, and its gravest obligation.

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"RETREAT FROM WORLD POWER"

Processes and Consequences of Readjustment

By HAROLD and MARGARET SPROUT

Lord Strang, *Britain in World Affairs: The Fluctuation in Power and Influence from Henry VIII to Elizabeth II*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1961, 426 pp. $2.25.

C. M. Woodhouse, *British Foreign Policy Since the Second World War*, London, Hutchinson, 1961, 255 pp. 30 shillings.

F. S. Northedge, *British Foreign Policy: The Process of Readjustment, 1945-1961*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, 341 pp. $6.50.

Anthony Hartley, *A State of England*, London, Hutchinson, 1963, 255 pp. 25 shillings.

Michael Shanks, *The Stagnant Society: A Warning*, Baltimore, Md., Penguin Books, 1961, 236 pp. 95 cents.

Anthony Sampson, *Anatomy of Britain*, New York and Evanston, Harper & Row, 1962, 662 pp. $6.95.

THE books on which this article is mainly focused divide into two groups. The first three are concerned specifically with Britain's changed and still changing role in international politics. The second three deal directly or tangentially with British responses, broadly social as well as narrowly political, to declining power and influence. These writings can be viewed simply as discrete accounts of a single nation's unique experience. But one can also view such literature from a broader perspective. Particular cases are always unique in their totality. But they may also be exhibits of more widely encountered types of phenomena. It is always possible, and it may be interesting and fruitful, to formulate general comparative questions about particular cases, and to derive hypotheses which could be tried out for credibility in other cases.

Anthony Hartley, author of *A State of England*,[1] notes that there is "no comparative study of the fall of empires." With a pessimism characteristic of the attitude of many Britons toward systematic political analysis, he doubts whether such a comparative study would be possible.[2] This is not an occasion to engage in a dispute over the uses and

[1] Anthony Hartley, deputy editor of *The Spectator*, is a literary intellectual, generally right of center, whose viewpoint is strongly pro-European.

[2] Doubts of this sort do not prevent Hartley and others from advancing numerous general hypotheses about Britain's declining international position; nor are they prevented from asserting or implying that declining empires present numerous similarities. (See Hartley, 226; Shanks, 16; Sampson, 620-21.)

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limitations of systematic comparative studies. Our discussion will stick closely to the books cited at the head of this article, with briefer notice of some other writings similarly focused. But we shall try to keep certain more general issues in sight. To this end it may be helpful to identify at the outset certain types of problems which may confront any national political community beset by major changes in its external and domestic environment, where the cumulative effect of such changes is to diminish that community's relative capabilities and thereby to narrow the role it has previously played in the international system of which it is a member.

I

It is standard usage to discuss international political relations in a vocabulary of power. States are called "powers." International politics is often characterized as a "struggle for power." It is often asserted that the supreme task of foreign policy is to "maximize power." All politics, one is reminded *ad nauseam,* are "power politics." The tenability of such rhetoric depends on how the term *power* is defined and understood.

This term has acquired a nearly impermeable overlay of military connotations. Many political relationships are undoubtedly affected by the relative capacities of the interacting parties to employ destructive violence. But capacity to destroy and to kill does not always determine who gets his way. Who gets what, against what adversaries, depends (in the international as in the domestic arena) on many factors. Violence and threats of violence may or may not be decisive. The tendency of the conventional vocabulary, with its strong connotations of violence, is to foster a biased and (in our view) untenable image of international politics.[3]

The bias implicit in the prevailing concept of power shows up strikingly in any discussion of Britain's historic or present role in international politics. There was a time, following the Napoleonic Wars, when the Royal Navy was the symbol of a presumptively invincible *military* command of the seas. It has seemed to many that this was THE source of Victorian Britain's predominant world position and influence. Lord

[3] We are aware that Hans Morgenthau and others have tried to meet this issue by redefining power in such a way as to include much besides coercion and threats thereof. This is commendable, but we see no indication that the effort is succeeding. On the contrary, evidence accumulates that the word *power* continues to evoke images predominantly of destruction, coercion, and threats thereof, often to the virtual obliteration of non-violent connotations.

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Strang[4] (*Britain in World Affairs*) ranks Britain's naval prowess very high, but he rejects the notion that the world-wide ability of Britain to affect events was merely a function of capacity to kill, or even (by threat of blockade) to deprive other peoples of their means of livelihood (pp. 151ff.).

Some part of Britain's still considerable political influence today may be plausibly attributed to memories of former naval prowess. A nation's prestige, built in part upon earlier military exploits, may sustain its statecraft in some degree long after events have insidiously sapped its former military capabilities. Britain in the 1960's probably still draws residual dividends from this characteristic time-lag in thinking. But is this all that sustains Britain's diplomatic voice today?

Again, Lord Strang, along with many others, answers emphatically "no." He says, "It is one of the characteristics of the present age that the part played by material strength in determining the degree of influence exercised by a government in international affairs has tended to decrease rather than to increase" (p. 373). For this reason, Strang distinguishes at the outset between *power* and *influence*. He defines power as "capacity to coerce," and influence as "capacity to persuade, based in some measure, sometimes in great measure, but certainly not necessarily, upon the possession of power." Power and influence together determine the "capacity of a government to get its own way in international affairs" (p. 13).

This distinction is essential if one is to comprehend either the historic or the present-day role of Britain (or indeed of any other state). Since power has become so heavily laden with military connotations, and since there is a strong tendency to construe influence largely as a function of power, there is manifest need for some term other than power to denote the aggregate of attractions, pulls, and pressures which one political community exerts on others. The term we prefer for this general concept is *political potential*.[5] One can then reserve the term

[4] Lord Strang is a retired Foreign Service official whose career culminated as Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. His book is addressed primarily to British readers; his theme, "our country's place in the world." This book is not, and does not pretend to be, a product of exhaustive research. It is rather a long interpretative essay. Strang depends heavily upon the works of leading historians, especially Sir Llewellyn Woodward. But Lord Strang himself "comes through" clearly, especially in the later chapters, which deal with events in which he was for many years a participant.

[5] Here it is necessary to distinguish two meanings of the noun *potential*. One is the concept of latent capacity, a concept more sharply denoted by the noun *potentiality*, or the ADJECTIVE *potential*: for example, the military potentiality of Britain is so-and-so; or the potential resources of the country are such-and-such. In physical science the

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power for political relationships in which some element of coercion, violence, or threat thereof is deemed to be of the essence; and the term *influence* for relationships in which the effect is deemed to be unrelated, or only remotely or slightly related, to violence or threats thereof.

In international situations involving conflict of purpose or interest, the relative potentials of the interacting states can be inferred both from their responses to specific demands, and from their behavior (in the absence of specific demands) toward other members of the international system. These responses are commonly denoted by such terms as defiance, rejection, resistance, compromise, appeasement, adjustment, compliance, acquiescence, or simply as degrees of deference.

The degree of deference accorded to a particular government's demands, or to the political community which that government represents, depends upon various configurations of factors. These may be expressed as a relationship between *commitments* and *potential*.

The concept of commitment is simple to state, though often difficult to delineate in detail. By commitments one means simply undertakings (conceptions of national interest, operational strategies, etc.). Some commitments are embodied in treaties of alliance or other international agreements; others, in domestic legislation or other unilateral expressions of policy. A state's commitments always include amorphous and inchoate elements. Any description of commitments is likely to be somewhat controversial. But the overall configuration and general order of magnitude are usually more or less discernible.

Still more perplexing ambiguities beset the concept of political potential, and its corollary *capabilities*. There may be disagreement as to how much the actions or mere presence of one state affect the behaviors of others. There is certain to be disagreement as to the sources from which a government derives its political potential. Judgments as to what the relevant sources are, and as to their relative importance, comprise the end-product of what has generally come to be called capabilities analysis. All such judgments are taken with reference to some set of undertakings (commitments), some combination of interacting units (allies, adversaries, non-aligned states, etc.), and some set of operating conditions (geographical layout, deployable military forces, diplomatic personalities, institutions, public opinion, and many other categories

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NOUN *potential* carries another meaning: the actual or observed (not latent) pressure, or pull, or attraction, or simply effect which one physical system exerts on another. By analogy one can derive a concept of political potential to express the total or aggregative effect of one political community's behavior, or even presence, on the behaviors of other communities.

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of factors). Judgments regarding capabilities are always relative and comparative. Such judgments relate implicitly, if not explicitly, to some observed or postulated operational contingency.

Estimates of capabilities rest upon hypotheses regarding opportunities and limitations deducible from the characters of the interacting units and from the milieu which encompasses them. The end-product of any capabilities analysis is someone's judgment, and judgments nearly always differ somewhat from one estimator to another, depending on factors taken into account, and on relative values assigned to different factors.

Nevertheless, statesmen do choose among alternative goals and strategies, and their choices do appear to reflect judgments (more or less deliberately reasoned) as to what they can expect to achieve, and the price that they may have to pay for achievement. It is likewise a fact that sideline observers (academic scholars, journalists, and others) also formulate hypotheses regarding historical events and the probable outcome of developing situations and postulated contingencies. What is deemed possible and probable, either by practitioners in foreign offices and elsewhere, or by observers from various points on the sidelines, will depend upon their respective judgments as to the *relation* between the commitments and potentials of each of the interacting states.

If available means, non-military as well as military, are judged to be seriously deficient to cover commitments, one speaks of a condition of overcommitment. The problem of coping with overcommitment may confront any nation, at least some of the time, including nations which are approaching or at the summit of their international potential. Behavior under the latter condition may differ significantly from behavior of a government whose sense of overcommitment is coupled with awareness of declining potential and shrinking capabilities. In the present discussion of British experience, we are concerned mainly with the latter condition, but it may help to keep comparative implications in sight if one examines accounts and explanations of British experience with certain more general concepts, questions, and tentative hypotheses in mind.[6]

A Government may react to a sense of overcommitment in various

[6] British experience may have pragmatic as well as purely intellectual interest for Americans. Every political community in the past has exhibited a phase of rising political potential, followed by a short and catastrophic, or an insidious, long-drawn-out decline. It is probably next to impossible for most Americans to imagine the United States in a predicament even remotely resembling Britain's today. But it would be naïve optimism to suppose that the United States or any other member of the contemporary international system has been singled out for a uniquely favored destiny.

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ways. It may, and often does, muddle along, unable to do much to rectify the felt imbalance, trusting to luck that events will "take a turn for the better." (Some commentators have called this the "Micawber approach.") A Government may deliberately reduce or redirect its commitments, by withdrawing from alliances, redefining obligations to allies, depending more heavily upon allies, redeploying military forces, withdrawing from military outposts or other territories, or otherwise redefining its "vital" interests and strategies. This is essentially what Lord Strang means when he speaks of the "retreat from world-power" (pp. 273-74, 374). Alternatively, sometimes simultaneously a Government may undertake to increase its political potential, by concentrating its efforts, strengthening its military forces, intensifying its diplomatic activities, allocating more resources to the support of allies, stepping up its propaganda operations, promoting scientific or cultural activities for prestigious effect, and so forth.

With respect to efforts to restore damaged political potential, one queries whether there may be significant differences depending upon the nature of the preceding decline. Is it possible that abrupt and catastrophic decline (resulting from military defeat, for example, as in the cases of Germany and Japan) may be more easily reversed than an insidious long-continued decline? In examining British experience over the past century, one speculates whether a long-drawn-out decline may not reflect fundamental and intractable changes taking place in the international and domestic environments of the nation, changes in the world configuration of national potentials, changes in the technological basis of statecraft, changes in the distribution of economic activities, changes in the moods and behavior of Britons themselves. If the change in a nation's political potential derives mainly from events beyond its capacity to manipulate substantially, the central problem may become, in the long run, *not* whether to reduce commitments and redefine the state's role in the international system, *but rather* where and how much to cut, and how to do it with least possible injury to the state's already precarious political position and influence.

It will be interesting to investigate what effects "retreat from world power" may have both on the national community's internal public order and on its external political relations. On the first issue, one can note manifestations of public response—whether there is resigned apathy and civic withdrawal, or furious debate, bitter recrimination, Governmental instability, even civic disorder. In particular, it will be interesting to note what appear to be the *internal* effects of *external* crises which bring into stark relief the Government's declining ability

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to play a role long taken for granted. Specifically, this involves observing what happens when unexpected events suddenly jerk people into delayed awareness of discrepancies between cherished totems and myths, and their Government's deteriorating international potential.[7]

Political behavior in such moments of shock may vary considerably from one nation to another. How far are such differences attributable to forms of government, to differences in political culture, national myths, and so-called "national character"? Is it likely, for example, that the more responsive a government is to the demands and moods of its public, and the more aggressively nationalistic that public's behavior is, the more difficult it will be to withdraw in good order from exposed positions and unbearable obligations to allies, or otherwise to reduce the nation's commitments? There has been much speculation as to what kinds of political systems—authoritarian, democratic, parliamentary, presidential, etc.—generally exhibit greater flexibility and maneuverability, but more thorough comparative studies are manifestly needed.[8]

The international effects of reducing or redefining commitments may be likewise unsettling. It will be interesting to ask whether a government can relinquish territories, liquidate colonial responsibilities, withdraw from alliances, reduce obligations to allies, or otherwise retrench without starting chain reactions that accelerate the decline of its international potential. We have previously noted the time-lag that may sustain a government's voice for a considerable period, even in the face of a manifest relative decline of military and economic capabilities. Does explicit "facing up" to overcommitment—to inability to "cover bets," so to speak—and the taking of steps to rectify the felt imbalance by reducing commitments tend almost inescapably to undermine prestige built upon past exploits, and thereby to accelerate the overall decline?

The writings reviewed in this article do not venture very many explicit answers to these and similar questions. There is no evidence that they were written with any such general questions in view. But one

[7] With reference to the unexpected Russian "first" in launching a satellite into outer space, C. M. Woodhouse, then Director-General of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, said: "The jolt which a chemical solution sometimes needs to precipitate crystallization is matched in human affairs by the kind of shock which the Russians gave us last October. It is what Marxists call a 'dialectical lead.' It may not be a great change in itself, only a signal drawing attention to changes that have already happened unnoticed. . . . At the very least, it jerks people into thinking afresh and furiously. . . ." ("Facing the Issues," *The Observer*, January 12, 1958.)

[8] On this issue, see our *Foundations of International Politics* (Princeton 1962), chap. 6.

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who reads these books with more general considerations in mind may find a good deal in them that will contribute to a broader understanding and to more fruitful theories regarding the phenomena of overcommitment, decommitment, and readjustment.

II

Only one of the books (Lord Strang's) deals with Britain's nineteenth-century position and role in international politics, but that background is implicit in all the others. More accurately, these books (along with all other writings about Britain's place in today's world) are written against a background of retrospective reconstructions with regard to Britain's nineteenth-century world position.

One may doubt whether contemporary observers in the middle decades of that century would have described Britain's position quite as Lord Strang and other present-day interpreters do. A great deal of folklore and mythology has come to enshroud the state of affairs which in retrospect is called Britain's "world dominion," the *Pax Britannica*, and the like. However, there is plenty of evidence that nineteenth-century statesmen perceived well enough that the "voice" of Britain carried strongly to the Continent and to the lands beyond the oceans. Strang quotes, for example, Palmerston's charge to his successor, in 1852: "You have no idea till you know more of your office what a power of prestige England possesses abroad . . ." (p. 129). Some appreciation of the economic sources of British influence abroad is clearly implicit in at least a few contemporary writings. One mid-Victorian, the economist Stanley Jevons, noted in 1865 that "unfettered commerce . . . founded on the material basis of our coal resources, has made the several quarters of the globe our willing tributaries."[9]

In the main, however, generalizations about the world power and influence of Victorian Britain seem to be products of a later age. Indeed, it is likely that the overall design of the mid-nineteenth-century international system is much more clearly discernible in retrospect than it could have been to those who built and lived with it.

Lord Strang devotes two chapters to this period. He warns against exaggerating the influence which Britain could exert in Europe, in North America, and elsewhere overseas. Britain's impact on international history was undeniably great, but her "predominance was not absolute. She was a leading rather than a dominating power. . . ." Britain's mission was "to maintain an equipoise and to keep the peace."

[9] *The Coal Question* (London 1865), 305.

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That this was the generally accepted British image, there seems to be no doubt.[10] But it was an image not widely shared by Frenchmen, Germans, Americans, and other foreigners, as Strang himself admits (chap. 12).[11]

In Lord Strang's view, Britain owed her great influence to several factors: (1) "the high capacity of those who framed and conducted her foreign policy"; (2) the nearly absolute security of the British homeland; (3) the Royal Navy's strength and "military renown"; (4) Britain's "outstanding commercial, financial and industrial strength"; (5) "the relative weakness of the other great powers of Europe, and of France in particular . . ." (p. 158).

Lord Strang is at his best when analyzing the characters and techniques of British statesmen. He clearly regards superior diplomacy as the prime source of British influence in the nineteenth century. With most of what he says on this issue, one can have no quarrel. But when he comes to the economic and military foundations of Britain's world primacy, he takes a good deal for granted.

Let us examine his economic theses first. How did Britain's "commercial, financial and industrial strength" actually contribute to her international political potential? This question poses two issues: (1) relations between private enterprise and government inside Britain; and (2) relations between transnational economic events and degrees of deference accorded to British diplomats and their demands on other governments.

On the first issue, Strang speaks vaguely of "personal relationships existing between the City and Whitehall." But he also emphasizes the prevailing doctrine that the Government should not interfere with private commerce and finance; and he cites, as not too untypical, the Government's tolerance of a British private loan to Russia during the Crimean War. The loan, explained the Foreign Secretary, was in "the ordinary way of business" (p. 160 n).

Nowhere does Lord Strang speak as specifically and candidly on this issue as does Herbert Feis, an American economist and historian, who has written as follows: "The habits and structure of British society . . . contributed to foster a natural harmony of action [between gov-

[10] One of the more explicit statements of the official British image was that by Eyre Crowe, a Foreign Office official, in his well-known "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany," January 1, 1907; reprinted in *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, edited by G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley (London 1928), III, 397ff.

[11] See also, for a retrospective French view, André Siegfried, *England's Crisis* (London 1931), 11-26.

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ernment and private enterprise]. In the small circles of power, financial power was united with political power, and held mainly the same ideas. Partners of the important issue houses sat in the House of Commons or among the Lords, where they were in easy touch with the Ministry. In clubs, country week-ends, shooting parties . . . [leading bankers] could learn the official mind and reveal their own; there was ample opportunity to discuss the wisdom or needs of the moment. The smallness of England, the concentration in the same circle of those possessing influence or prestige . . . the personal honesty and discretion of English officialdom, the acceptance by the financial world of a high standard of honor—all these combined to make it easier to understand the freedom left to private judgment," and the high degree of "harmony of action" between the City and Whitehall.[12]

This is plausible and consistent with well-known characteristics of the British political system. Indeed, it may be about as close as one can come to describing the relationship between government and private enterprise in Victorian Britain. But "harmony of action" in London is only half of the picture. How did such harmony contribute to *effective* influence on *other* governments and their constituencies? On this Lord Strang is even more vague. Though the last word certainly has not yet been said on this subject, we would put the relationship as follows:

For various reasons, the British national community achieved a long head start in applying mechanical power to manufacturing and transportation, and in consequence a generally favorable competitive position that lasted for several decades. By virtually eliminating customs duties on primary products, the British community made it increasingly possible and profitable for less industrialized countries to buy British manufactures in exchange for foodstuffs and industrial raw materials. Industrial leadership and a bulk cargo, coal, to fill the ships on outbound voyages fostered the growth of the British merchant marine, which provided cheap and reliable ocean transportation. British capitalists found it profitable to invest heavily overseas. The City of London became the world center of banking, insurance, and other financial services. Sterling became in effect an international currency. All these facilities and services were generally more readily available and more expertly handled in London than anywhere else. Little by little, without much evident planning, economic behavior in many parts of the world became attuned to Britain's. Commercial and financial dependence upon British goods and services affected the structure of society in every continent (though less in Europe than elsewhere), created vested interests

[12] *Europe: The World's Banker, 1870-1914* (New Haven 1930), 87.

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in uninterrupted continuance of access to British goods, markets, and services, subtly fostered moods of deference, and otherwise contributed to a social milieu in which the demands and policies of the British Government were received in a manner considerably more compliant in the main than might have been expected under other conditions and circumstances.[18]

How much did Victorian Britain's undeniably great *political* potential rest also upon military foundations? What Lord Strang says to this question makes sense. But again he takes much for granted. He emphasizes, as noted previously, the advantage derived from a secure homeland, and from other peoples' memories of British naval exploits in the Napoleonic Wars. But what, more precisely, were those exploits? What conditions made them possible? And what sustained a continuing widespread belief abroad that the Royal Navy could repeat them in future wars?

To answer these questions would have taken Lord Strang much deeper than he goes into technological and other conditions prevailing in the nineteenth century. But these matters are germane to fuller understanding of the military foundations of Britain's international potential in the Victorian era, and of the irreparable erosion of those foundations in the twentieth century.

The British Navy's command of the seas was never absolute in the Napoleonic Wars, but it came close enough to carry out substantially the following missions: (1) to prevent military invasion of the British homeland; (2) to protect the inflow of essential supplies into Britain from overseas; (3) to cover the movements of British troops and matériel to theaters of war overseas; and (4) to drive enemy fleets and merchant shipping from the main sea routes, and cut off enemy countries from essential seaborne supplies and assistance. After 1815, the Royal Navy's presence (even token presence) served to keep memories of British naval prowess alive, and to foster an expectation in other peoples' minds that the Royal Navy could again close the main sea routes to its enemies in case of war.

This system of naval power was perfected in an era when all the Great Powers were European states. In the main, those European powers could gain access to the oceans only through narrow seas—the Channel, the North Sea, the Strait of Gibraltar, and later the Suez Canal and Red Sea. By occupying one or both of the shores of these narrow sea-

[18] For various versions of this hypothesis, see, for example, *ibid.*, 87-117; A. H. Imlah, "The Pax Britannica," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, L (January 1951), 12-24; Imlah, *Economic Aspects in the Pax Britannica* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), chap. 1; Siegfried, 11-20; Stephen King-Hall, *Our Own Times* (London 1935), 15-29.

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ways, and by maintaining sufficient naval forces and bases close by, the British Navy commanded the ocean portals of Europe. The same pattern was duplicated on a lesser scale in the Indian Ocean and in other distant seas.[14] At the summit of her naval power, Britain held strategically located shore positions close to all the passages into and from the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans, excepting only the potential (but not yet built) seaway across the American isthmus. With negligible exceptions, each of these naval outposts was located upon an island, at the foot of a peninsula or promontory, or upon a coast backed up by a formidable desert, jungle, or mountain range. Before the advent of submarines and aircraft, and the spreading grid of railways, these supporting positions could be attacked only from the sea. As long as the British Navy retained control of the water's surface, both the insular homeland and the outlying bases could be defended with relatively small garrisons.

Geopolitical distribution added significantly to this global naval design. As long as Britain's only formidable naval rivals were located upon the European Continent, British command of the North Sea, the Channel, and the exits from the Mediterranean gave Britain *ipso facto* a virtually global command.

All this was accomplished without the expense of a huge military establishment on land. The small British Army, manned by volunteers, garrisoned the oversea colonies and naval bases, and provided the nucleus for greater forces if needed. The Navy provided the shield behind which Britain could mobilize the greater land forces that would be required in case of major war in Europe or beyond the seas.

The foregoing paragraphs can convey no more than a general impression of the extraordinary military advantages which Victorian Britain derived from the geographic layout of lands and seas, in combination with prevailing geopolitical distribution and the state of technology. But there still remains the elusive question: How much did *other peoples' notions about British seapower* affect their behavior in time of peace? How much diplomatic leverage did British statesmen derive from dominant seapower? No one has answered this question satis-

[14] Admiral Lord Fisher once said: "Five keys lock up the world"—Dover, Gibraltar, Suez, Cape of Good Hope, and Singapore—and Britain held all five. (Quoted in A. J. Marder, *The Anatomy of British Sea Power* [New York 1940], 473.) In this grand design, the master position was the island of Britain itself, which "stood like a gigantic breakwater across the [sea approaches] to Germany [and the rest of northern Europe], narrowing down the channels of access to and egress from [most north European] ports to the Strait of Dover in the south and the area between Scotland and Iceland in the north." (Comdr. Russell Grenfell, *Sea Power in the Next War* [London 1938], 4.)

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factorily. Perhaps the materials for a really satisfactory answer vanished with the diplomats who dealt with Britain during the nineteenth century. Lord Strang's answer is as plausible as any. He says: "We could safeguard the peace of the seas [against pirates, etc.]. We could keep the lesser states in order. We could usually, though not always, intervene effectively where the scene of action was within range of the Navy. In relation to other great powers, our influence was strongest where our adversaries in diplomacy were states, like France, which were the most vulnerable to naval action" (p. 373).[15]

We have dwelt on the economic and naval aspects of the *Pax Britannica*, because these, as much as the memories of diplomatic successes, comprise essential background for understanding British moods, attitudes, and policies today. Sources of power and influence may or may not have appeared to Victorian Britons exactly as they are remembered and reconstructed by later generations. There may be, as previously suggested, a considerable element of myth about the vanished *Pax Britannica*. But what actually happened, and what contemporaries thought about it, may be today less important than how epic events appear in retrospect.

With respect to the long-drawn-out dissolution of the *Pax Britannica*, Lord Strang is consistently interesting. He has not provided a systematic analysis of the efforts of several generations of British statesmen to keep their foreign commitments and capabilities in some sort of balance, in the face of multiple changes. He has not explained, for example, how new machines insidiously eroded the foundations of Britain's global seapower. He says nothing of consequence about the automotive torpedo, the internal combustion engine, submarine torpedo craft, the oil-fired boiler, railroads, hard-surfaced highways and motor vehicles, aircraft and aerial bombs, and countless other fruits of the accelerating technology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He says something about the rise of new power centers outside Europe. But here, as elsewhere, his main concern is with diplomatic maneuvers and adjustments, rather than with the multiple changes—technological, military, economic, geopolitical, etc.—which gradually cut the ground, so to speak, from under the feet of the diplomats.

Historians disagree just when this process came to dominate British diplomatic psychology, when a sense of security and adequacy (with only occasional lapses into anxiety) gave way to a rather chronic anxiety (relieved by only occasional intervals of relaxation). Strang suggests that the turning point came between 1887 and 1897, the dates of

[15] See also Strang, 158, 386-87.

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the Golden and Diamond Jubilees of Victoria's reign (pp. 188ff. and 233ff.). He identifies a long succession of crises during the half-century that culminated in World War II, crises which periodically evoked re-examination and readjustment of British commitments and capabilities. He says: "We began to retreat from world-power when we lightened our naval forces in the Far East, the Caribbean and the Mediterranean on the strength of agreements with Japan, the United States and France in the early [1900's] . . ." (p. 374).

Unhappily there is no room here to comment in detail on Lord Strang's account of the process of readjustment before the First World War: successive retreats and redefinitions of foreign commitments, accompanied by unprecedented efforts to buttress Britain's security at home and influence abroad, by skillful diplomacy, by strengthening and redeploying the Navy, by progressively abandoning isolation and the role of uncommitted balancer and mediator among the European powers, by entering into unprecedented alliances and understandings which left British interests beyond the oceans increasingly dependent on the policies and good will of Japan and the United States. Nor is there space to examine critically Strang's handling of the interwar years, 1919-1939. Rather surprisingly he dismisses with a single sentence the Great Depression, and ignores completely the sterling crisis of 1931, which shook foreign confidence and undermined foreign deference to Britain as much as—possibly more than—a major military defeat might have done. Here, again, we can only reiterate our impression that Lord Strang is at his best when describing diplomacy, but less sure in his treatment of the technological, military, and economic forces that continued to sap the foundations of Britain's international position.

III

For the period since 1945 we have the books by Mr. C. M. Woodhouse and Dr. F. S. Northedge to compare with Lord Strang's. The underlying theme of all three is much the same: too heavy commitments, depleted capabilities, extreme reluctance to relinquish the role of a Great Power.

It was necessary, says Lord Strang, "to disengage . . . from commitments which we could no longer sustain. Spain and Holland and France had all, in the past, suffered from trying to play a part in the world which had outrun the resources at their disposal." Britain's historic "naval predominance" was irretrievably lost. The "homeland" was no longer "safe" and could not be made so. The "old security"

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was gone forever. "Isolation was out of the question, and separate alliances could serve no purpose. In her relatively weakened position, Great Britain could not stand alone." But Lord Strang derives some comfort from his belief, repeatedly stressed, that Britain's loss is not America's or any other nation's gain. For every nation, the H-bomb poses a threat of extermination. No state, not even the strongest, he contends, could successfully pursue a fully independent policy in disregard of the interests of its allies (pp. 342, 343, 369, 374, 376).

Woodhouse[16] offers a similar diagnosis. "Britain was no longer big enough to act alone in the world." But neither was the United States. British foreign policy was necessarily "dictated by Britain's circumstances at home": specifically, "that Britain is a small overcrowded island, which cannot feed more than half of its population from its own resources; which has practically no major raw materials except coal; and which is practically indefensible against nuclear attacks" (pp. 7-8). Northedge[17] is just as explicit. His first chapter opens with these words: "The dominant feature of Britain's position . . . in 1945 was her reduced status in the world scale of power" (p. 13).

Some of this frank talk is the wisdom of hindsight. The limitations of Britain's postwar position were not perceived all at once. This lag was most evident in the military sphere. A report on Britain's defense problem, prepared in 1946, reads almost as if the advances in military technology since 1939 had not really changed much after all.[18] For several years, the Government's annual Statements on Defense (summarized by Woodhouse, chap. 4) were generally optimistic.

In 1948, three years after a single low-yield atomic bomb wrecked Hiroshima, the Defense Statement argued that "new scientific developments do not modify the basic principles of defense policy." The Labor Government then in office appeared to assume that conventional land, sea, and air forces, supplemented by well-tried methods of civil defense, could repel any assault on the British Isles, maintain the inflow of food and raw materials, and provide the margin of time required to mobilize for total war.

[16] The Hon. C. M. Woodhouse, author of *British Foreign Policy Since the Second World War*, was formerly Director-General of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and more recently Conservative M.P. for Oxford, and a junior minister in the Macmillan Government.

[17] F. S. Northedge, author of *British Foreign Policy: The Process of Readjustment, 1945-1961*, is Reader in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

[18] *British Security: A Chatham House Study Group Report*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946.

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The Conservative Government that was formed in 1951 carried on with much the same set of doctrines. The Defense Statement of 1954 introduced the idea of "broken-backed" warfare. This was an attempt to reconcile with conventional doctrine the accumulating evidence of the destructiveness of nuclear explosives. It was now accepted that a future war would probably open with a "period of intense atomic attacks." These would inflict "great destruction," but might fail to produce "decisive results." The fighting would then "decline in intensity," as the "opposing sides would seek to recover their strength." Assuming some such sequence of events, it was essential to have a conventional military establishment, "capable of rapid mobilization," to carry on after the atomic bombardment subsided.

The concept of "broken-backed" warfare was omitted from the 1955 Defense Statement. Instead, great emphasis was put on the enormous destructiveness revealed by recent thermonuclear bomb tests. Much was made of the effects of blast, heat, and fallout. The deterrent effect of a threat of massive retaliation was stressed more heavily; and Britain's decision to build an independent nuclear weapons system (first taken in 1949) was reiterated. Nevertheless, it was stated, Britain's "long-term policy remains unchanged." In a major war, the Royal Navy would still be "required to contain and destroy enemy forces at sea so as to allow movement of supplies and troops and to give both our land and our air forces support." Britain would "still need troops on the ground to hold the enemy well to the east in Europe in the vital initial stage of a war." Home defense, both military and civilian, would be "no less vital than before."

This hybrid system—nuclear weapons and a strategy of massive retaliation, grafted onto the conventional military establishment—was reaffirmed in 1956. Britain "must make a contribution to the Allied deterrent commensurate with our standing as a world power." Britain must also possess conventional forces sufficient to deal with "outbreaks of limited war." And these latter must be "capable of playing their part effectively" in case of "global war."

The unresolved issue was how to accomplish all this without bankrupting the economy. The 1956 Statement noted that "maintenance of British forces overseas involves heavy charges on the balance of payments." Military demands were encroaching on "exports" and the "re-equipment of British industry." Especially worrisome was the military demand on "our limited resources of scientific manpower."

The Suez crisis emphasized the severe economic limits within which any British Government had to operate. The 1957 Defense Statement

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was even more explicit on the need to retrench. This was to be achieved by letting the conventional forces run down, and by putting chief reliance on a strategy of nuclear deterrence. This strategy clearly reflected resentment against dependence on the United States, a resentment intensified at least momentarily by the Suez crisis. Thereafter, possession of an independent nuclear striking force became the cornerstone of British military policy.

Both Strang and Woodhouse defend this policy, though not very strongly. Neither approaches, in bleak intransigence, the case for Britain retaining her own independent nuclear weapons as stated by the British political scientist, K. B. Smellie, who says: ". . . the United States might not be willing to use atomic weapons unless she were directly subject to nuclear attack; there might be interests vital to Britain for which she would be prepared to strike though her allies were not. More generally, if Britain were to renounce atomic weapons and the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. did not, Britain would have weakened her standing. If the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. did renounce them, British security would be reduced, for with 200 Soviet divisions facing the West, and with 30,000 Soviet aircraft and . . . 500 submarines, only so long as there was a nuclear deterrent would peace be preserved. . . . But, although the balance of terror between the two great superpowers . . . might prevent a direct conflict, the cold war may continue indefinitely, and in the cold war the intricacies of power and influence are too bewildering and dangerous for Britain to forgo her own strategic nuclear deterrent. . . ."[19]

Northedge attacks this thesis on two grounds: unbearable economic cost and lack of credibility. The second is, at least in part, a consequence of the first. Thus far no Government (for reasons to be discussed in a moment) has come anywhere close to allocating the resources that would be required to give Britain a credible independent nuclear weapons system. The GNP of the United States is about eight times as large as Britain's; and the U.S. government spends well over 10 per cent of it for military-related purposes. In 1962, the British Government, partly for internal political reasons, partly for complex economic reasons, imposed a ceiling of about 7 per cent of GNP on military-related expenditures. It has been estimated that American outlays for military-related research and development alone exceed British expenditures for *all* military purposes. Furthermore, the costs of military research, development, and production are still rising. Given these limiting factors, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Britain is simply being priced

[19] *Great Britain Since 1688: A Modern History* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1962), 370.

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out of any possibility of achieving a credible independent nuclear weapons system in the foreseeable future.[20]

If one of the purposes of the decision in 1957 to develop a purely British nuclear deterrent was to regain independence from the United States, this purpose has not been achieved. Cost has driven the British Government to depend increasingly on the United States for automatic delivery systems. This dependence has been brought into sharp relief (since these books were published) by President Kennedy's decision late in 1962 to scrap the controversial "Skybolt" rocket previously scheduled for production and delivery to Britain. In the view of Northedge: "After the abandonment of the British missile 'Blue Streak' in April 1960 [to be superseded by the American-supplied "Skybolt," now also scrapped] it was impossible to foresee British nuclear weapons ever being delivered, other than by [manned] bombers, except in American rockets. This made the assumption . . . that Britain might one day fight with nuclear arms while America remained neutral, so unreal that for practical purposes it could be ignored" (p. 310).

Barring radical change in the international environment, it is difficult to imagine *any* British Government allocating the huge funds required to achieve a credible independent nuclear deterrent. We see no escape from the conclusion that one probable consequence of trying to do so, without radically increasing the military budget, is likely to be a continuing shrinkage or deterioration of British conventional forces. There is, moreover, no reason for doubting that responsible Ministers are fully aware of what they are doing.

If this is so, one asks why does the British Government cling tenaciously to this "wasting nuclear asset," as it has been dubbed. To this Northedge offers an explanation which other Britons have also put in various ways. He suggests that nuclear weapons have become a status symbol, calculated to sustain the image of Britain as a world power, and somehow to strengthen British bargaining capacity in dealings with the Soviet Union, the United States, and Western Europe (p. 310). How much prestige Britain does, in cold reality, actually derive from possession of a relatively small stock of nuclear warheads, deliverable only in obsolescent and highly vulnerable manned aircraft, or in American-supplied missiles, is a subject of continuing disputation among

[20] This conclusion may hold just as rigorously for France as for Britain. Despite President de Gaulle's reiterated views to the contrary, it is said that "French military and industrial figures . . . seriously doubt France's ability to build a meaningful nuclear force," or even to maintain "economic expansion . . . as long as the nuclear program siphons off men, money and material." (*New York Times*, April 9, 1963.)

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British politicians, military journalists, and others who concern themselves seriously with British defense problems.[21]

IV

We have alluded more than once above to the close connection between Britain's postwar military capabilities and the harsh realities of her economic situation. Long before 1939, current exports of goods and services had failed to pay for essential imports. Britain's ability to import had come to depend heavily on earnings from investments overseas. The Second World War drastically reduced those investments, while simultaneously increasing British indebtedness to foreigners.[22]

Post-1945 conditions magnified the consequences of this transformation to net-debtor on international account. Northedge gives the essential details. The war had "cost about a quarter of the country's national wealth," vast "physical destruction" inside Britain, and heavy losses of shipping and cargoes. "Internal disinvestment, through failure to replace [obsolete and worn-out] plant and machinery" approached a billion pounds. "The task of making good this loss in earning capacity was increased by pent-up demand within the country" and by other conditions "which attracted resources away from the re-establishment of the country's external position . . . the domestic cupboard was bare, the population down-at-heel and much industrial property superannuated." These conditions were to influence "almost every act of British diplomacy in every part of the world" (p. 33).

These and other facets of Britain's postwar economic crisis have been described in many different contexts.[23] But evidence still accumulates that the *political* and *military* implications of Britain's continuing economic problems are not sufficiently appreciated, at least not in America. Perhaps it will help to clarify these implications if one visualizes Britain's postwar national product as a sort of metaphorical "pie," on

[21] For a similar view, see Andrew Schonfield, *British Economic Policy Since the War* (London, Penguin Books, 1958), 94ff.

[22] On November 22, 1947, the *New York Times* quoted a political party document as follows: "Before 1914 the people of [Britain] were owed by the rest of the world a debt equal to £100. Today [1947] each one of us . . . owes the rest of the world £100."

[23] For example, Schonfield, *op.cit.*; C. A. R. Crosland, *Britain's Economic Problem* (London 1953); Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development, *Britain's Economic Problem and Its Meaning for America* (New York 1953); various reports of the ECA Mission to the United Kingdom, 1948; G. D. H. Cole, *The Postwar Condition of Britain* (London 1956). Many other items dealing with this issue could be cited.

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which various sets of consumers made demands. The largest volume of demands came from the tens of millions of private consumers who were "fed up" with wartime austerity and hungry for goods of all sorts. A second set of demands arose from the need to repair war damage and provide new capital equipment. A third set arose from the civil operations of government, the scale and cost of which were rising after the war, partly in consequence of the welfare program to which the postwar Labor Government was strongly committed. A fourth set of demands came from the military services, confronted with steeply rising prices resulting mainly from rapid technological obsolescence of nearly every military item.

To these one must add the necessity of allocating a substantial part of the national product to the export market, in order to pay for essential imports. About 50 per cent of all food was imported. Coal was the only domestic raw material in abundant supply. Total imports exceeded 25 per cent of GNP. Almost every piece of equipment manufactured in Britain—lathes, presses, dies, generators, locomotives, tractors, office equipment, and almost everything else—contained a substantial amount of imported materials.

After the U.S. government abruptly terminated Lend-Lease in 1946, only partly compensated by a loan and subsequent grants under the Marshall Plan, British ability to pay for imports depended mainly on exports of goods and services. Ability to export depended both on having something to sell, and on being able to sell in competition with offerings of foreign producers. Thus ability to compete in foreign markets was linked from the outset with recapitalization of British industry.

Repair, modernization, and expansion of productive facilities after 1945 not only required major allocation from current output to domestic investment; new capital also consumed large quantities of imports. Furthermore, most of the goods exported to pay for imports of essential raw materials also contained imported materials themselves. That is to say, exports had to pay not only for goods consumed or retained inside Britain, but also for the imported raw materials incorporated into the exports themselves. Thus a sort of spiraling effect resulted which presented refractory problems at a time when other sets of demands—private consumption, welfare programs, military projects, etc. —were all pressing hard on the GNP.

Under these conditions, the initial postwar political strategy was to disengage and reduce commitments abroad, cut military spending to a minimum, and concentrate on economic recovery. British forces were

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rapidly demobilized. Forces were withdrawn or reduced in many locations overseas. Divestment of colonial responsibilities proceeded at a rate more rapid than anyone had anticipated even a year or two earlier. Military equipment depreciated. Despite a decision (in 1949) to build an independent nuclear weapons system, research and development lagged for want of funds.[24]

The Korean War arrested briefly the process of military retrenchment. The outbreak in Korea brought heavy pressure from the United States on Britain, to undertake a massive rearmament effort. The Atlee Government complied with a program which proved politically disastrous for the Labor Party as well as economically disastrous for the economy.[25] The economic disaster was magnified by a steep rise in the prices of primary materials, attributable largely to increased production and stockpiling in the United States and elsewhere. British importers had to pay more for raw materials at the very moment when British capacity to export was declining. Between 1950 and 1951, the visible adverse excess of imports over exports rose from £347.6 millions, to £1,093.3 millions.[26]

In any economy there are two obvious ways to increase the flow of goods and services to a preferred set of consumers. One is to reduce the shares of the GNP available to other categories, which is what the Atlee Government deliberately did in 1951, by means of fiscal regulations designed to divert resources from private consumption, social welfare, and investment to military production. The consequence of that policy was to make it more difficult, if not quite impossible, to increase significantly the size of the national product to be shared. The Conservative Government which displaced Atlee's in 1951 cut back the military program, and for several years the Government and the elite press hammered on the theme that military spending must not exceed the capabilities of the economy.

Woodhouse gives a generally satisfactory account of the effort, through the 1950's, to bring commitments and capabilities into balance. This was achieved, to the extent that it was achieved, "by increasing the [economy's] capacity and decreasing commitments." It would be a mistake, he concludes, to imagine that "either part of the process could be abandoned . . ." (chap. 6).

[24] How this retreat on many fronts was carried forward with a minimum of confusion, disorder, and recrimination is described in all three books under review. But none of them considers in any detail how much Britain's form of government and political mores may have contributed to this generally orderly process. Yet that issue would be central to any comparative study of the phenomena of decommitment and disengagement.

[25] See Schonfield, 93-94. [26] See Cole, 177.

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Many students of Britain's economic problems do not fully share Woodhouse's cautious optimism that a viable balance has been achieved; and Woodhouse himself is somewhat reticent on the domestic political premises implicit in both economic and military policy in recent years. It appears to have become a major premise of public policy that spending for military purposes shall not encroach substantially on either private consumption or government-supported social services (such as education, public health, pensions, etc.).

A few statistics will cast light on this implicit assumption. In 1955, military spending accounted for nearly 10 per cent of GNP. By 1960, the *proportion* had dropped to about 7 per cent, though *actual* military expenditures remained nearly the same. That is to say, the military budget was substantially constant while the national product was slowly rising. In the same period, the proportion of total *government* expenditures allocated to military purposes declined from 29.6 to 22.2 per cent, whereas government support of the social services increased from about 41.3 to 47.3 per cent of total *government* expenditures. In the same period, gross domestic capital formation appears to have increased slightly, from about 16 to 18 per cent of GNP.

The military budget in recent years has been grossly insufficient to advance significantly toward the government's goal of achieving an independent nuclear weapons system. Yet some critics contend that even the reduced level reached by 1960 (7 per cent of GNP) constitutes a crippling burden. According to one of these critics, the military establishment and its supporting industries "have locked up" a "sizable proportion of the materials and manpower needed to keep British goods competitive in world markets." Moreover, he continues, "a large armaments industry not only saps the growth of productive investment, which is the source of success in world markets, but is a burden on the balance of payments through the import component of its output."[27]

These are complex and controversial issues. Some critics assess the inhibiting effect less severely.[28] There are, moreover, numerous nonmilitary factors to be considered in any analysis of British economic growth. But in considering the relation of military spending to domestic investment and exports, one should not lose sight of the rarely articulated political premise, operative ever since the Korean War, that it would be politically inexpedient, if not suicidal, for any Government

[27] Erich Strauss, *European Reckoning* (London 1962), 112, 113.

[28] See, for example, *Growth in the British Economy* (London, Political and Economic Planning, 1960), 147, 149.

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to make deep cuts either in personal consumption or in public spending for non-military purposes.

V

British diplomacy since 1945 exhibits an interplay of conflicting sets of principles. On the one hand, there has been the persistent image of a past in which Britain was the directing genius of a world-wide political system, with territories and vital interests in every continent, a supporting military deployment, immense prestige and influence, and considerable freedom for diplomatic maneuver most of the time. On the other hand, there have been constant reminders of an uncomfortable present, characterized by a dissolving empire, overshadowing superpowers, reduced military stature, intractable economic shackles, and severely limited maneuverability. In the words of Sir Oliver Franks (Oxford don, diplomat, and banker), Britain is "no longer free to intervene and choose our partners as and when we wish."[29] Far more than in most earlier periods, Britain's environment has included more "givens" which Governments could alter and manipulate only slightly, and often not at all.

Strang, Woodhouse, and Northedge all tell the same story, with minor variations: repeated efforts, only partially successful, to reconcile past images with present realities, by establishing Britain as the influential common nucleus of three overlapping associations. Again, from Sir Oliver Franks (now Lord Franks): "Our enduring associations are within the Commonwealth, with the United States, and with the nations of Western Europe. . . . We shall continue as a Great Power as, within these associations, we take the initiative, persuade our friends, and lead. Our resources, spiritual and material, must be so strong that our friends will accept this from us and consult us in advance whenever they have an idea or want to act. . . ."[30]

This image of Britain's new role, quite "fashionable" in the middle 1950's,[31] was momentarily shattered by the Suez crisis (1956), in which British statecraft reverted to the older pattern. For Lord Strang, the Suez venture marked the climax of the long process of "retreat from world-power": "It was unwise for Great Britain and France to think that they could safely in 1956, relying on their own strength, embark

[29] *Britain and the Tide of World Affairs* (Oxford 1955), 11.
[30] *Ibid.*, 12.
[31] See Susan Strange, "British Foreign Policy," in *Year Book of World Affairs, 1955* (New York 1955), 49.

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upon independent military action even against a weak adversary, given that once military operations are started no one can say where they will end. They were engaged in an adventure . . . which they no longer had the political, military or economic strength to bear" (pp. 374, 372).

Northedge deals with Suez in greater detail and in broader perspective. He too concludes that the venture reflected a "serious miscalculation, apart from the deficiencies in British military preparations which it showed and the issue of its moral character" (p. 240). But Northedge also views British behavior in the Suez crisis as evidence of difficult psychological adjustments going on within British society. "On balance, British public opinion accepted the decline of British power in the postwar world with tired resignation rather than truculence. The remarkable transformation of the British Empire effected by the grant of independence to India and Pakistan in 1947 was not only without precedent in its extent but also in the relative lack of dissension in Britain on the abandonment of the chief jewel in the imperial crown. One reason for this was that 'little Englandism' had always occupied a respected place in British Radical thought and when, after the war, Britain felt no longer in the mood to continue to bear the cares and cost of empire this tradition revived. Nevertheless, residues of resentment remained, often at an unconscious level. The feeling of being pushed out of one place abroad after another was bound to produce an outburst, especially if the pushing was dramatic and seemingly without excuse. Along with this went latent resentment about American carping at British imperialism, mingled with some jealousy at the transfer of leadership of the democratic world to the United States. When American politicians seemed to be positively egging on foreign nationalists against British rule . . . the impulse to hit back was understandable" (pp. 225-26).

The significance of the Suez debacle has been warmly disputed. To some Britons, it is remembered as one of their "finest hours." In others it evoked frustrating and humiliating images to be blotted from conscious memory. It certainly revealed to a wider public, who rarely read economic statistics and "defense statements," Britain's loss of power, influence, and freedom for maneuver. In words used by Woodhouse in a slightly different context, Suez jerked government and public "into thinking afresh and furiously. . . ."[32]

Skillful diplomacy repaired the damage to British prestige abroad, and healed the breach with the United States. But by the end of the 1950's it was becoming evident to some that the image of Britain as the

[32] "Facing the Issues," *The Observer*, January 12, 1958.

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nucleus of three overlapping associations was coming to have less significance than had previously been hoped. The impact of changing world conditions on Britain's relations with the Commonwealth, the United States, and Europe is the focus of Northedge's concluding chapter. He poses the issue as follows: "The three circles . . . no longer overlapped with Britain as the common element uniting them. Two of these circles, the Commonwealth and the Atlantic Community (by which British Ministers really meant the United States), had ceased to hinge so largely on Britain, while Europe was moving in paths which threatened to leave her far behind. The task of British policy in the sixties was therefore that of redefining these three relationships" (p. 303).

How much the changing Commonwealth has sustained Britain's international potential in recent years has been endlessly debated. Northedge regards it a wasting asset; Woodhouse and Strang, manifestly less so. The Australian scholar, Hedley Bull, views the Commonwealth as a "symbol" which "has enabled British Governments to preserve, at home and abroad, the image of their country as a Great Power." He also suggests that this symbol "enables the British nation to avoid, or at least to dull, the sense of historical defeat."[33]

Similarly, Northedge stresses the prestige which Britain has previously derived from its so-called special association with the United States. Everyone is familiar with the frequent private meetings of Prime Ministers and Presidents, and recurrent consultations at lower levels. British statesmen, according to Northedge, have thought of their role as one of "helping to check the more intransigent trends in American policy," and to broker negotiations between Washington and Moscow.

When this association was momentarily disrupted by the Suez crisis, many Britons exhibited furious frustration and anger. Though that breach was promptly and skillfully closed, more recent events continue to raise doubt as to the benefits Britain derives from this association. As Northedge observes, "With the arrival of the nuclear stalemate . . . it was no longer clear that the United States required advice of this kind" (p. 309). (And here Americans should remember that when Britons say "require," they often mean "desire.")

The Cuban crisis (October 1962) seemed to confirm this conclusion. In the words of Drew Middleton (than whom there is no American journalist more consistently empathetic to Britain): "Britain was informed but not consulted by her closest ally. . . . The Prime Minister's only intervention—a message to Premier Khrushchev—had no effect

[33] "What Is the Commonwealth?" *World Politics*, XI (July 1959), 583, 586.

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on the outcome. . . . Britain's role in world history, her tradition of diplomatic skill and many years of careful cultivation of American goodwill counted for almost nothing."[34]

Britain's association with Europe has become the most confused and uncertain of all. British desire for closer ties with Europe, according to Woodhouse, has coincided with "disappointments, alarms, and setbacks in other parts of the world." For example, a wave of pro-Europeanism swept Britain briefly following Suez. But shortly the old ambivalence returned. By the end of the 1950's, Woodhouse could write that "It looked as if Europe could not provide the vehicle on which Britain might rise to the new order of magnitude and the new level of sovereignty which the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. had established" (pp. 224-25).

All three books were finished while the issue of British entry into the European Economic Community (Common Market) was still in the stage of preliminary debate. All three see that issue as a challenge to Britain's broader policies. Apart from economic considerations, many Britons ask: Would entry confirm the image of Britain as merely another *European* state, no longer capable of playing a major role upon the larger stage of *world* politics? To this question Northedge answers: "If Britain enters [the E.E.C.] . . . this period may be the last in which she could be described as having an independent foreign policy" (p. 7).

Similar conclusions have been drawn from Britain's role in the Cuban crisis of October 1962. The British journalist, Anthony Howard, commented: "The British Government could hardly have had its dependent status more brutally spelled out than it has been this week."[35] From Drew Middleton came the similar comment that "Outside Europe, Britain is just another ally, more powerful perhaps than Belgium or Italy in the European scale, but not to be admitted as an equal in the contest between the two nuclear Powers."[36]

One can only speculate how credible such judgments may appear a few years hence. But two observations seemed to be justified in 1963. First, efforts to rebuild Britain's international potential through cultivation of the three overlapping associations, described above, had come at least temporarily to a dead end. Second, as long as the scientific and technological race for superiority in nuclear weapons systems continued between the Soviet Union and the United States, Britain's relatively

[34] *New York Times*, October 30, 1962.
[35] *New Statesman*, October 26, 1962.
[36] *New York Times*, October 30, 1962.

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very small nuclear capability seemed likely to have much less impact on international politics than British Governments might hope to achieve by other means. It appeared unlikely that Britain could develop a credible independent nuclear deterrent without radical and seemingly improbable reallocation of goods and services within the British political community. And to some observers it seemed equally doubtful whether Britain would continue to draw significant prestige dividends from nuclear weapons tied to American-supplied delivery systems.

One could not be long in Britain in the early 1960's, or read elite British magazines and newspapers, without sensing how distasteful and frustrating the existing state of affairs was to most of that tiny British minority who gave any serious and sustained attention to foreign affairs. Such observations led one straight into the many-sided debates then going on inside the British national community. In all seriousness, and with none of the pejorative overtones of Mr. Dean Acheson's rhetoric, one could indeed characterize Britain in the early 1960's as a nation still groping for an acceptable new role.[37]

VI

As intimated just above, any such generalization about British political thinking applies mainly to a very small fraction of the population. One should distinguish between the moods of the many and the articulate opinions of the informed and attentive few. Something could be said about the former, but there is no room to say it here. Among the latter, the jolts which events have administered in recent years—the frustrations attending colonial divestment, the intractable sluggishness of the British economy, the Suez debacle, the Common Market negotiations, the recurrent balance-of-payments crises, South Africa's resignation from the Commonwealth, the persistent failure to achieve an acceptable military posture, etc.—have all evoked searching questions and much disputation, not only with regard to Britain's role upon the world stage, but also with regard to the implications of alternative possible roles for British traditions, institutions, domestic policies, and ways of life in general.

In the articulate sector, one finds a wide spread of opinions: ranging from the die-hards who refuse to come to terms with Britain's shrunken international potential, at one extreme, to various brands of "little Eng-

[37] The reference to Mr. Acheson is, of course, to his controversial speech at West Point, in December 1962, in which he characterized Britain as having "lost an empire and . . . not yet found a role."

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landism," at the other. These extremes correspond roughly, but not precisely, to the political Right and Left, respectively.

The die-hards include most of the militant nationalists whose feet are firmly rooted in the past. Their most vocal spokesman has been Lord Beaverbrook, whose *Daily Express* (circulation about 4 millions) asserts truculently that "Britain must never surrender her independence to any foreign power."[38] These militant nationalists speak in the idiom of the *Pax Britannica*: world power, defense of empire, strategic lifelines, etc. They fervently believe, or at least assert, that Britain's own military forces should (and can be made adequate to) defend the homeland, the "empire," and the sea and air links which radiate from Britain. In varying degrees, they tend to be anti-American, anti-European, and pro-Commonwealth. They claim superiority for British diplomacy, and even speak as if London should, and could, take over from Washington the management of the Cold War. Ministers occasionally make a bow to the die-hards, but there is little evidence that any such past-minded image of Britain's future affects government policy significantly.

Little Englandism, in its extreme forms, merges into such movements as the campaign for unilateral nuclear disarmament. Demands from this extreme wing include also the withdrawal of American installations and forces from British soil, British resignation from NATO and other alliances, and abdication of any pretence to the status of a Great Power. For rather different reasons than those of their opposite numbers on the Right, extreme little Englanders tend to be anti-American, anti-European, and pro-Commonwealth. It may be doubted whether extremes of little Englandism exert even as much influence on policy today as does the militant Right. *But* little Englandism does conform rather more closely than its opposite to certain features of Britain's postwar environment; and for this reason, one can imagine a configuration of world events which might bring the unilateral disarmers and neutralists into a position of greater influence in British politics.[39]

Between these extremes, and much more significant in the context of the present situation, one finds a broad spectrum of moderate opinion. Most of the moderates start from the premise that Britain still holds numerous political assets, and can develop others to sustain a con-

[38] *Daily Express*, March 29, 1962.

[39] Thus far there has been a great deal of press reporting and superficial commentary and disputation about British neutralism and unilateralism, but remarkably little painstaking analysis. By far the most sophisticated commentary that has come to our attention is Hedley Bull's short article, "The Many Sides of British Unilateralism," in *The Reporter*, March 16, 1961.

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structive and satisfying role in international politics. Moderate opinion seeks to identify the conditions, domestic as well as external, which set limits to fruitful choice and performance, to distinguish between those conditions which are beyond British capacity to alter substantially and to which British statesmen must adjust, and those conditions which can be modified and manipulated to enhance Britain's international potential.

It is into this category that one puts such books as Anthony Hartley's *A State of England*, Michael Shanks's *The Stagnant Society*, Anthony Sampson's *Anatomy of Britain*,[40] and, along with these, a varied assortment of other writings. An ever-recurring theme in them is the British people's loss of a sense of historic purpose and mission. Shanks compares the complacency in his own country with the driving purposefulness which he sensed in the Communist countries: "Against this [Communist] Sparta stands our Athens—rich, exciting, full of life and vigour, but seemingly incapable of concentrating its energies on a positive social pattern" (p. 16). A similar theme runs through Sampson's book: "the decay of the sense of overriding purpose"; Victorian Britain had it; mid-twentieth-century Britain has lost it. "At the back of many politicians' minds there remains the dread that Britain will become trapped in her past and that, in Sir Geoffrey Crowther's words, 'Britain will be to the twenty-first century what Spain was to the eighteenth'" (pp. 633, 620-21).

These are by no means eccentric attitudes. We could cite many examples, but one or two will suffice. Hugh Gaitskell, speaking to the Labor Party Conference in 1961, declared that if Britain "continues to stagnate economically," visitors would come to regard the British as "an easy-going, tolerant people with a great and glorious past whose only trouble is that they are stuck in it."[41] Julian Critchley, M.P., has said: "The weakness of Britain is that she has become rootless, motiveless and complacent. . . . We may well have avoided . . . the political neuroses of, say, France, but we have been forced, as if to compensate for past splendors, to turn increasingly inwards upon ourselves."[42]

Such sentiments are fair specimens of opinions frequently encountered in Britain these days. They pose baffling questions. What do the critics mean by loss of a sense of national purpose? What was it the Victorians had which modern Britons have lost? What is the quality of the Communist societies which a Conservative like Shanks wants

[40] Hartley is identified in note 1 above; Shanks is industrial editor of *The Financial Times*; Sampson is a feature writer on *The Observer*.

[41] Quoted in Sampson, 99.

[42] "The Common Enemy," in *The Spectator*, November 16, 1962.

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his own to emulate? To what extent is this yearning for renewed sense of historic mission simply thinly disguised, common garden variety, nostalgia for the good old days of the *Pax Britannica*? If there is loss of social momentum and a sense of direction, is it a quality identifiable in the behavior of millions, or only of the few thousands who set the style of government, politics, business, and society in general? Why has the British "retreat from world power" run its own peculiar course, a retreat in remarkably good order, with a minimum of truculence and recrimination, but culminating in a state of affairs so widely characterized as economic, cultural, and political stagnation?

Hartley attributes "loss of purpose" to "loss of power." In part, he conceives this as a psychological consequence of diminished *national* participation in exciting world decisions and movements. But he also stresses the "practical" impact on individuals: ". . . fewer jobs for educated people (though this has hardly begun to be felt as yet), less opportunity for profitable adventure open to lovers of change and excitement, less occasion for residence abroad, practically none for pro-consular administration, and, above all, the fearful economic strain implied by a lingering desire to keep up with the Joneses across the Elbe or the Atlantic . . ." (pp. 85-86).

Shanks accepts Britain's diminished world position as an unavoidable consequence of World War II. In a more recent book, he says: "As with France after 1918, military victory had exhausted her strength, and she remained one of the supreme arbiters of the world by courtesy only."[43] But economic stagnation prevents British Governments from playing as effectively as they might otherwise even the diminished role which the British nation is still potentially capable of playing.

Shanks takes as evidence of this stagnation the relatively slow rate of British economic growth. To break out of this rut, the economic system must produce and sell more and better goods and services. To do this, more raw materials must be imported. To pay for these, Britain must sell abroad more goods and services, in stiff competition with foreign producers. To compete successfully, Britain must utilize more efficiently her most abundant resource—people, manpower.

Shanks cites numerous obstacles to doing so. He has much to say about the restrictive policies and practices of the trade unions; rather less about the restrictive practices of British management. He emphasizes the under-utilization of technical skills: too few trained engineers and technicians, too little imagination and receptiveness in ab-

[43] Michael Shanks and John Lambert, *Britain and the New Europe* (London 1962), 13.

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sorbing such specialists into most British industries. He attributes this state of affairs in part to the classics-humanities bias of British higher education, in part to the cult of the amateur's superiority over the expert. He also cites nepotism in too many businesses, the anti-business bias of too many university graduates, and widely prevailing fear of "academic prowess." He concludes: "As with so much else, however, one suspects that at bottom it is our inherited class system which is at fault. . . . Not since Marie Antoinette milked cows in the Trianon has there been a ruling class in Europe with such an urge to play the peasant" (pp. 214-15).

Shanks implicitly, Sampson explicitly, attribute great importance to leadership. Indeed, Sampson's whole book can be characterized as an attempt (largely by means of interviews) to identify and describe the various elites—politicians, civil servants, businessmen, clergymen, lawyers, university dons, and others—who set the style. At the end he sums up as follows: ". . . the old privileged values of aristocracy, public [read "private"] schools and Oxbridge which still dominate government today have failed to provide the stimulus, the purposive policies and the keen eye on the future which Britain is looking for, and must have. The old ethos was moulded by the success of an invincible imperial machine. Its style was to make big things seem small, exciting things boring, new things familiar; but in the unconfident context of today this bland depreciation—and the assumed superiority that goes with it—merely succeeds in dispelling enthusiasms, blunting curiosity and dulling experiment. . . . Britain's malaise, I suspect, is not primarily a malaise of the ordinary people, but a malaise among the few thousand managers of our society who have failed to absorb and communicate new challenges and new ideas . . ." (pp. 637-38).[44]

How one interprets the contemporary British scene depends, to some degree, on one's perspective and initial premises. What appears to Hartley, Shanks, and Sampson as alarming stagnation appears to Lord Strang more as "stability" and "steadiness"—qualities which (in his view) have long helped to sustain British influence around the world. Nevertheless, Strang too recognizes dangers. At the very end of his book, he says: "The question which cannot as yet be answered is whether, in an environment of placid and cosy uniformity, where high taxation blunts the edge of enterprise and social security muffles the

[44] Twenty years ago, the British historian, Sir Llewellyn Woodward, observed that British adjustment to the changes of the twentieth century "might have been easier and more rapid if our educational system had concentrated less upon an uncritical view of the ancient world." (*Short Journey* [Oxford 1942], 40.)

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call to effort, there can be developed the driving force in politics, science, commerce and industry which are necessary for national advancement, or the leadership which can give a new turn to events" (p. 398).

Diagnoses such as those summarized above have stimulated continuing disputation as to the functions which Britain should still be able to perform upon the larger world stage. One recurrent idea is the value of accumulated British experience both in the art of diplomacy and in the important task of helping the ex-colonial peoples along the road to modernization. The latter, in Lord Strang's view, could be one of Britain's main contributions in the years ahead (p. 379).

Success in this role, as well as in other spheres of diplomacy, it is quite widely acknowledged, will depend somewhat on Britain's reputation as an upholder of international law and order. It was this image which the Suez adventure at least temporarily damaged. In the words of Sir William Hayter (Warden of New College, Oxford, and formerly British ambassador in Moscow), Britain in 1956 had been "gradually replacing" lost military power "by the reputation . . . for moderation, wisdom, respect for international law and a liberal attitude to nationalism. . . . Suez blew it all away and revealed, or seemed to reveal, us as the same old grasping imperialists as ever, but toothless and rather incompetent."[45]

Both Woodhouse and Strang insist that this damage has been largely repaired. Indeed, they along with a good many other British commentators seem quite optimistic that Britain's voice will continue to be respected in the councils of the greater Powers. Woodhouse expresses "cautious optimism" that Britain's indubitably diminished diplomatic assets still count for a good deal in today's international politics. Some Americans are clearly skeptical about this. But their skepticism may reflect merely their own biased images, such as the notion that international politics is a sort of grandiose game in which the only chips that really count are megaton bombs and ballistic rockets. If such be the essence of international politics, then indeed Britain has only a very minor role to play. Without depreciating the political importance of violence and threats to use violence on a massive scale, we would tend to agree with Lord Strang and others that the configuration of military forces in the international system these days enhances rather than diminishes the *diplomatic* capabilities which Britain still commands.

Another recurring theme is that Britain can and must remain a great commercial power.[46] One variant of this theme is that the City is still

[45] "The Cost of Force," in *The Observer*, February 28, 1960.
[46] Woodhouse, 245.

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equipped to provide the array of services which historically contributed so greatly to making London the financial center of an international economic system. One has only to wander through the City, and read the names over the doors of massive banks, insurance and trading companies, to appreciate the attractiveness of this idea. In a physical sense at least, the City still looks like the financial capital of a world community—much more so than Wall Street or any other financial center. But, in the words of the financial editor of *The Guardian*, physical facilities are "not enough." Numerous tax and other fiscal reforms are also required. This, the editor concludes, "is probably too much to expect from a tired administration."[47]

But overdue fiscal reforms are not the only obstacles. The strength of the City cannot rise much above the strength of the economy as a whole. We have noted the extreme dependence of Britain upon exports to pay for essential imports which, in turn, set limits to the level of production. A rise in domestic consumption, domestic investment, or military expenditure, has repeatedly sucked in imports at such a rate as to produce a balance-of-payments crisis. This in turn has evoked steps to damp down production and consumption, in order to protect the international value of sterling. It is generally acknowledged that Britain can escape from this vicious circle only by increasing the efficiency of productive and distributive processes. We have summarized Shanks's diagnosis of what is involved. His diagnosis (and some of his assertions are controversial) still leaves the issue of the social consequences of the radical reforms which he and others propose. Major changes, especially changes in the education and utilization of people, Britain's most abundant resource, could start chain reactions in British society that could upset long-established and still widely cherished patterns of working and living. Hence, for this and other reasons, one encounters a good deal of ambivalence toward the ramifications of radical reforms.

Occasionally one hears it asserted that the only long-term solution for Britain's recurring economic predicament is a drastic cut either in the standard of living or in military expenditures. Nearly every observer seems to believe that the former would probably bring down any Government that tried to impose it. At the same time, a military policy that could be construed as abdication of any pretension to the status of "Great Power" appears to be unacceptable to most of the Britons who have spoken on this issue.

In Hartley's view (which seems to us quite representative of moderate

[47] *The Guardian*, May 21, 1962.

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British opinion), the idea of Britain becoming simply "another Scandinavian Welfare State," without any significant influence on *world* politics, "is a good deal less of a nightmare to the ordinary man than it is to the politicians." To most of the latter, as to many outside politics, such a prospect is intolerable. Moreover, Hartley contends, it is totally impracticable, "given our geographical situation, lack of natural resources and world commitments" (p. 65). "Our population is too big, our economic structure too unbalanced, for such a change [in political status] to be possible without great hardship" (p. 99).

It is one thing for American observers to delineate the unresolved dilemmas of British statecraft. It is perhaps more difficult for us to appreciate the degree to which feasible solutions are unacceptable and acceptable solutions are unfeasible under the political and economic conditions prevailing in Britain and in the larger world arena today.

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ON THE USES AND LIMITS OF DEFENSE PLANNING

By CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL

Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1962, 532 pp. $10.00.

ONE of the main strategic lessons inferred from World War I concerned the paramountcy of defense over offensive power on the battlefield—a consequence of a number of technical developments in weaponry. Though commanders and their staffs were incomprehensibly slow to catch on to the circumstance, it had become impracticable to determine the military issue by flinging one's forces against a modernly equipped establishment. The price in lives for achieving victory by offensive action was more than either side was willing to pay in an ultimate test, though both sides persisted in trying. Among technically advanced peoples, conditions of modern industry, moreover, had greatly increased material potential for sustained combat. Thus the war settled down to a protracted contest in production and in civil will—both factors greatly affected in turn by sea power. In the sequel, looking back on its first experience as a participant in a general war in a foreign theater, the United States had no obvious cause to feel insecure about the future. It anticipated no occasion for taking belligerent initiative. It was shielded by the oceans, on which it disposed considerable power. Its industrial capabilities were great and growing. A balance of power had presumptively been restored abroad. In event of another breakdown such as to require the nation's interposition, there would be time enough to prepare. While not the same as before the war, the situation was not entirely different either. Normality seemed restored in some portion. Military expenditure leveled off at a moderate level—three times as high as before the war, but small indeed in the measure of later times.

In drastic contrast, World War II was marked by a huge shift of advantage to the offensive—not an absolute preponderance, to be sure, but one generally manifested in most stages of the fighting. Near the war's end, the prevailing trend skyrocketed with the emergence of techniques for bringing nuclear energy to bear. An enormous and continuing multiplication of offensive power has been pre-eminent among the factors keeping the international situation on tenterhooks for a

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

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period now approaching two decades. A renewal of the stability experienced from time to time in other epochs seems out of the question until and unless techniques for redressing the offensive power of nuclear weapons are achieved—a point beyond the scope of this review.

The period immediately following the hostilities of World War II brought a renewal of the quest for normality. The United States also faced a problem of fitting an inherently and prodigiously offensive weapon to a defensive strategy. For the time being, it counted heavily on a monopoly of the relevant techniques. Its initial approach was to divest itself of the monopoly by placing it under international control—in unrealistic hope of establishing and gearing up an authority to restrain aggression all around everybody's horizon. Frustrated in that venture by noncooperation from the Soviet Union, the United States set about to renew as much normality and stability as it could. James E. Forrestal, first Secretary of Defense, outlined the approach in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1947. Essential to renewal of world stability, in his view, was a restoration of a balance of power in Europe by filling in "the vacuum created by the destruction of German power and the weakening of the power of Western Europe." This course entailed skimping on some aspects of military strength in favor of economic measures. As offsetting factors, Forrestal counted on the nation's capacity to "outproduce the world," to "control the sea," and in exigency to "strike inland with the atomic bomb." He summed up: "These years before any possible power can achieve the capability to attack us with weapons of mass destruction are our years of opportunity" (p. 31).

In *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets*, Warner R. Schilling notes four fundamental flaws in the approach—an overestimate with respect to time and technical difficulty of the obstacles to Soviet development of intercontinental nuclear capability, an underestimate of difficulties and time factors in rearming Western Europe, a disregard of possibilities of encountering formidable military problems not directly involving Europe or Soviet nuclear power, and a failure to appreciate that "once the Soviet Union *had* achieved the capability to attack the United States with nuclear weapons, American security would cease to pivot on . . . a European balance of power" (p. 33).

The fact of these strategic misassumptions was to become revealed stage by stage in the span anticipated as "our years of opportunity." Two secular alterations in the environment, separate in origin but interlaced in effect, were to unfold—namely, the lapse of a European balance of power and Soviet acquisition of intercontinental nuclear striking

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power, placing the United States within immediate range of attack. With respect to the first, the past provided some guidelines; "analysis could be taken against a background of both historical and personal experience" (p. 34). The other aspect "had no precedent." In responding to both, and especially to the second, policy required imagination in novel degree—and indeed still requires it, for the course is not finished. Strategy-makers faced the emerging necessities with varying degrees of adaptability and reluctance—and do so yet.

Adapting a government's collective cognition to such changes in circumstances and recasting strategy to match them are political undertakings. The modifier stands for many aspects of public life—for partisan competition for preferment, for methods of seeking places of importance and advantage in the running of general affairs, for processes of argument and decision in settling conflicts among values, for methods of determining relative moment and urgency among public needs and purposes in allocation of resources, and for accommodation among rival interests. In particular, the word applies to the endless business of getting the people who count within a governing apparatus to share premises enough to concert on policy—an aspect in which political and administrative functions merge. All the meanings are relevant as Schilling, of Columbia University, and his two collaborators—Paul Hammond, now of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, and Glenn H. Snyder, now of the University of California—delve into the politicalness of the process in *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets*. They are concerned not merely with strategy as a final product of deliberation—though they expound it knowingly—but mainly with ways of pulling an administration enough into unison to settle on a strategy.

"The myth that questions of national security are above or at least somehow apart from politics has died hard," says Professor William T. R. Fox in a foreword to the book. I had never really been aware of the existence of such a myth until the moment of learning of it from so authoritative an observer. Thus alerted, however, I note indications of its active survival on the current scene—in assertions that authorities within the Executive establishment have managed to rise to a cold and impersonal level of pure intellect in their calculations, whereas their critics are enthralled by political considerations and therefore affected by subjectivity and fallibility. Such present disputations lie beyond the range of the book at hand. If the myth of apolitical character survives, however, it is through no want of effort by the authors. I can concur in Professor Fox's report of a hard death. The expiry is well accom-

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plished through a painstaking and protracted cudgeling administered by the three.

Their 275,000-word book focuses on three episodes in United States policy since World War II. The first, done by Schilling, involves the contriving of the improvident defense budget for fiscal year 1950, wherein Louis Johnson, then the relevant Secretary, purported to be trimming away fat without touching muscle. The second, by Hammond, concerns complex efforts, mainly at the instance of persons in the Department of State, to reverse the thriftless economies and to restore the nation's armed capabilities to a level and a kind commensurate with its obligations, closely following disclosure of unexpectedly early nuclear success by the Soviet Union and culminating in the rearmament undertaken after the outbreak of the Korean War. The third, Snyder's part, deals with the Eisenhower Administration's early attempt again to shorten the tether.

Each author took up his assigned phase as an independent research operation, devoting considerable care to ordering of details. At a late stage, following three years of inquiry and writing, the authors compared and modified drafts to reflect each other's wisdom. The resulting work has consistency of line and method, which is primarily narrative, with analysis occurring in interstices. Meticulousness in chronicling sometimes matches that of current books recapitulating a day when some personage was assassinated or a night when a liner sank. Applied to deliberations of committees and gestation of bureaucratic papers, such procedure does not necessarily produce exciting reading. The minutiae are sometimes overwhelming. The need-to-know precept has a bearing for the making of books as well as for the sharing of classified information.

In going through the book I puzzled occasionally over terms—"ideology," for example, where "idea" would have better served, or "evolutionary" misapplied to an obviously intended course of change. What of the overworked comparison of policy-making to radar operations, citing the remote to elucidate the familiar? Wariness, hesitancy, the wish to get one's bearing before plunging ahead are well enough known as human characteristics to make so recondite a metaphor unnecessary. I wonder whether the concept of a leaderless process is inherently applicable, anyway. Mechanistic pussyfooting surely is no appreciable part of current making of military policy. I underlined such phrases as "the political process," "the foreign policy process," and "the decision-making process" repeatedly in Schilling's portion and occasionally in Snyder's. Hammond gives us a preferable plural—"processes"—at least

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intimating awareness of a variety of phenomena rather than just one procedure. The variousness of the ways of resolving national will on courses of action is one of the matters most clearly delineated in the study.

There are as many ways of making foreign policy and military policy as there are, say, of annoying your wife, going broke, or making a reputation. Invariably the plot depends, in large part, on the actors—notwithstanding an ancient cliché about preference for a government of laws and not of men.

The roles and effectiveness of departments and agencies shift with the attitudes, calibers, and quotients of willfulness of their chiefs. In one period the State Department may carry the distinction and weight of really being a foreign office under a purposeful Secretary who leads it. In another, under a Secretary who personalizes authority, that institution's significance may recede. Yet again the State Department may be reduced to being only a magnificent message center headed by a Secretary in eclipse. At Defense, one Secretary may interpret the principle of civil supremacy to entail a ratificatory role. Another may interpret the principle as requiring leadership. A third may take it as a warrant to subsume all discretion unto himself. With someone of the type of Louis Johnson in authority, Defense's relations with State may figuratively come under a Trading-with-the-Enemy Act. With counterparts of George Marshall and Dean Acheson in charge, the two departments may enjoy constant confident collaboration.

Presidents, who are as variable in quality as Secretaries, inherently affect the conditions of policy-making. The title of the office itself is derived from a Latin gerundive meaning *sitting foremost.* Some presidents emphasize one element of the image; others, another. Some mostly just sit. Some make themselves foremost. Of these latter, some do it knowingly both as to style and substance. Others have flair for style without much grasp of content. Some while away their time making soundings and hoping for fair weather. Others will to sail ahead. Some know the art of making collaborators out of subordinates. Some know only how to make subordinates out of collaborators. Others are merely ambiguous about the matter.

From one angle, the process labored over by these authors is seen as a great pecking-order undergoing continuous alteration, phase by phase and issue by issue. From another angle, it is a way of producing papers intermittently to focus attention within a government and to provide frames of discourse so that one functionary and another may at least for a time be forced to talk about the same things and to find out what

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is on someone else's mind. Inevitably it produces decisions, which are often tagged final but are in the best of circumstances likely to prove only temporary in result, for in this field of endeavor decisions produce responses which require new decisions in endless succession.

Schilling, Hammond, and Snyder give us early episodes of a story as yet unresolved. The configurations of the problems are surely as involved and difficult as they were in the immediate sequel to World War II, when their account commences—perhaps even more so. Schilling refers to the strategy initially outlined by Forrestal as having "confused the fact that the two revolutions in the American security position were occurring sequentially in time with the idea that they were aggregative in their significance" (p. 33). Yet that assumption was perhaps premature rather than erroneous. The two aspects seem now to have become fused—the circumstance basic to the current crisis of confidence and purpose within NATO. Would the United States really uphold its obligations to defend Europe at a risk of destruction of its major cities? A shadow of doubt is surely a central consideration in bringing on conflict of purpose between this government and the France of President de Gaulle—with a consequence of putting at issue the whole future of the alliance.

The three authors have brought great thoroughness to bear on the phases they examine. Their analysis makes up in depth what it lacks in surprises for us. The main fault I find with the product is expressible in a question that an Irishman once put at the finish line to a horse which, carrying his wager, came in last—"What took you so long?"

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND SURPRISE ATTACK

The "Lessons" of Pearl Harbor

By MICHAEL HOWARD

Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1962, 426 pp. $7.50.

FEW professional historians stray into the field of strategic studies, and those who do are not likely to find it congenial. They will be surrounded by men of great ability and quicksilver minds who link events into patterns, reduce the chaos of experience to predictable order, deduce principles, extrapolate trends, and in general toss around the stuff of history with an insouciance which the historian, knowing from his own laborious researches how delicate, complex, and intangible is every one of the historical "events" so cheerfully used as the basis for these theories and predictions, finds it hard to regard as academically reputable or even logically sound. Like the lawyer or the philosopher, he winces at the labels casually slapped onto historical phenomena or human behavior of which the essence thereafter remains unexamined. Faced by *terribles simplificateurs* whose confident analyses and predictions may easily become the bases for national attitudes and policies, he can only continue, quietly and insistently, to repeat his creed. Every event is for the historian unique, unforeseeable, and indescribable in its full complexity. In some respects it will resemble other events, and out of these resemblances useful patterns may be deduced as intellectual tools. But all these patterns are subjective and hypothetical. Like the psychiatrists' ink-blobs, they teach us more about our own minds than they do about the ingredients which compose them. To suspend judgment, to refuse to make patterns at all, is not only sterile but destructive of all historical writing. But any patterns made or deductions drawn from events before the record is established as completely as human effort can do it will be worthless as foundations for any form of political, economic, or strategic thought.

In appearance, events from the recent past may seem less misleading as a basis for theory and action than those of a remoter era which we can understand only partially, which come to us refracted through the minds of several historians, and of which many relevant details will

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certainly be lost. Yet in fact recent events may be the most deceptive of all, for they are the most easily misunderstood. They come to us, in the first place, in the massively oversimplified imagery of the daily press. They are set in contexts which give them a distinct and perhaps distorting significance; contexts of whose existence we may remain wholly unconscious. A mass of detail relevant to them will pass unnoticed because it has not been anyone's job to report it; and it may remain unnoticed for decades or even centuries until laboriously excavated in specialist monographs. Finally we are likely to assume an expert familiarity with them which we do not possess and never have possessed; and come to their re-examination unwillingly, if we come to it at all.

For these reasons in particular, historians should therefore welcome a study such as Mrs. Wohlstetter's which, based on meticulous research, shows how infinitely various were the factors that went to the making of a single historical event within most adult memories: the total surprise achieved by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The surprise was the more amazing in that it occurred at a time when all informed and responsible American authorities realized that war with Japan was possible, if not probable, within a matter of days. The nature of the government machine, general human fallibility, official information policy, the relations between official Departments and the military services, individual personalities and sheer chance all contributed to an outcome whose unpredictability was as total as today it seems incredible. Mrs. Wohlstetter forces us to perform that most difficult of intellectual feats: to forget what actually happened. We are made to think ourselves into the skins of men for whom the various indications of what was to happen, which in retrospect seem so unequivocal, were swamped in a context of irrelevant or misleading information wherein all sorts of alternatives appeared equally probable. We are shown the functioning of each intelligence office, in Honolulu and in Washington: their structure, their sources, their interrelationships, the personalities of the responsible officers; above all, the preconceptions which molded the criteria they used in selecting, out of the mass of data at their disposal, the information they regarded as significant. In a very few cases there was grotesque carelessness; in some, a rigid unimaginativeness compounded by interservice rivalry. But in most of them capable and dedicated officials were working to the top of their bent, with unrivaled opportunities for discovering Japanese intentions: and they still got the answer wrong. And they might, as Mrs. Wohlstetter grimly points out, get the answer wrong again.

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The book does not make easy reading, and this is not entirely due to the complexity of the subject and the author's very proper refusal to simplify it. Mrs. Wohlstetter scorns a chronological approach. Instead she studies each intelligence agency in turn, and, a little perversely, opens with those which one might expect to come last: the radar stations and naval and air patrols at Pearl Harbor itself, and the messages they received heralding the actual attack. From these she works back to the naval and air commands in Honolulu and from them to the central agencies in Washington. The result is more confused and repetitive than the nature of the subject makes absolutely necessary. Little is done, for instance, to set the international scene, which could have been done very simply and in small compass. The fact that many of the American intelligence officers with whose activities Mrs. Wohlstetter deals knew little about the course of Japanese-American relations since 1931 is of course important; but many readers of this book may be equally ill-informed. As a result they may find the raw material with which they are here so abundantly presented a little indigestible; and the book is more likely to be consulted for the material which the author has quarried out of the thirty-nine volumes of the *Congressional Hearings* and elsewhere than to be read, like the studies of Robert J. C. Butow, W. L. Langer, and Herbert Feis, as a coherent historical study in its own right.

As these and other writers have made clear, the Pearl Harbor attack was not launched out of the blue at a pacific and unsuspecting nation. It was part of a desperate attempt by Japan to escape from the choice imposed on her by the American embargo of July 24, 1941, between economic strangulation and capitulation to the American demand that she should renounce her entire policy in East Asia. As Mr. Stimson so frankly expressed it: "The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves."[1] Japan, like a cornered wild boar, could break out only by turning on her pursuers; and the war on which she embarked was, in the purest Clausewitzian sense, a continuation of her policy with an admixture of other means. Least of all military operations can the opening moves in a war be divorced from their political context. As a result, Mrs. Wohlstetter's book is almost unintelligible without some reference to these major diplomatic studies; while, conversely, these works will now need to be revised to take account of her very remarkable researches.

For, from the material that Mrs. Wohlstetter provides, the reasons

[1] Herbert Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor* (Princeton 1950), 314.

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for the surprise at Pearl Harbor emerge with an entirely new clarity. Chief among them—although this has of course long been general knowledge—was the universal expectation, among Americans and others, that when the Japanese attacked they would move directly southward on their ultimate objectives in the Netherlands East Indies and Malaysia, and perhaps on the Philippines, as indeed they did; though this expectation did not save the Philippines from being surprised as completely as was Pearl Harbor. All that was expected at Pearl Harbor was sabotage, against which precautions had been taken. "A warning signal," as Mrs. Wohlstetter observes, "is not likely to be heard if its occurrence is regarded as so improbable that no one is listening" (p. 304). And these signals, embedded in a vast mass of miscellaneous information about Japan (much of it indicating an imminent attack on Russia), came in to a Washington that was in any case predominantly occupied with the situation in Europe and the Atlantic. Even if the American governmental intelligence machine had been perfectly designed and staffed by geniuses, the vital signals might still have been missed. And it was not perfectly designed. Understanding between various Departments—State, War, and Navy—was very incomplete, as was that between Washington and Honolulu. Army and Navy officers did not always feel under an obligation to pool their information. Key officials were uncertain how much each other knew, and often assumed in their colleagues and subordinates an acquaintance with vital information that did not in fact exist. Certain intelligence, such as the famous MAGIC intercepts, received so limited a circulation that its value could not be fully exploited. There was no office like the Joint Intelligence Committee in London, into which all information, naval, military, and civil, ultimately flowed. The importance of the intelligence services themselves was anyhow widely underrated or misconceived. The Chief of Staff of the Military Intelligence Division modestly considered that his functions were limited to counterespionage. In general, comments Mrs. Wohlstetter, "the prestige attached to intelligence work was low and reflected exactly the menial character of the job. Any intelligence officer who stayed on the job long enough to become sensitive to signals was an exception, for he would automatically be regarded within the service as being of not very high caliber" (p. 70). Almost all peacetime armies have displayed the same snobbery and almost all have suffered in consequence.

In peacetime, moreover, a state of effective war-readiness demands an unceasing exercise of imagination among senior officers and the maintenance of unrelenting discipline, even in the least likely circum-

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stances, among all ranks. Such a standard cannot be maintained indefinitely, especially in the forces of a nation which had, until that December morning, felt itself geographically immune from the surprise attacks to which Germany's nearer neighbors had better cause to be accustomed. The pathetic messages monitored from forward Russian units on June 22, 1941—"We are being fired on, what should we do?"—had very much less justification than had the attitude of the American officer who placidly watched the Japanese bombers dive over Pearl Harbor in the belief that they were American machines on an exercise. Nor is any army in a position to mock the Americans for the incompetence and slovenliness which the Japanese attacks revealed in the arrangements for manning the listening posts and communications at Pearl Harbor. When one has been at peace for twenty years these things are likely to happen.

The principal conclusion which Mrs. Wohlstetter appears to draw from her study is that surprise attack is still possible, and that "in spite of the vast increase in expenditures for collecting and analyzing intelligence data, the balance of advantage seems clearly to have shifted since Pearl Harbor in favor of a surprise attacker" (p. 399). But this is a highly arguable proposition. As Mrs. Wohlstetter rightly emphasizes, one of the lessons to be learned from the Pearl Harbor affair is that men tend to interpret data to accord with their own conscious or unconscious preconceptions. It is a failing against which historians, and indeed scientists, have to be constantly on their guard. The RAND Corporation, which sponsored Mrs. Wohlstetter's investigation, is a catholic organization in which all strategic and political viewpoints find free expression, but it would be surprising if there were not in that community an exceptionally high degree of sensitivity to the continuing possibility of surprise attack. This sensitivity arises not only from the necessary preoccupations of analysts on defense contracts with a question which lies at the very heart of their studies, but from their close association with the U.S. Air Force, with its inescapable responsibility of ensuring that no such surprise attack ever occurs again. But Mrs. Wohlstetter's conclusion does not follow necessarily from the evidence in her book. That evidence could indeed be used to establish entirely contrary conclusions. If one lesson of Pearl Harbor is that our intelligence systems can never provide an adequate guarantee against surprise attack, another might be that the intelligence system of an aggressor can never provide a sufficiently complete picture of our state of readiness and retaliatory capacity to make a surprise attack a rational course of action for him. Uncertainty is a factor that must be introduced into

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both sides of the equation. As Mrs. Wohlstetter makes quite clear, the problem of intelligence is rather one of selection and evaluation than of penetrating "security" barriers; and that problem has increased a thousandfold since 1941. When one considers the astronomically huge quantity of information about the United States and her Allies that must be flowing into Russian intelligence centers, their difficulty in producing a firm enough evaluation to serve as a basis for action must appear almost insoluble.

There are of course lessons to be learned from Pearl Harbor, as indeed from every historical event. But they will be valid only if they are teased out and examined with the same painstaking and scholarly care that Mrs. Wohlstetter has devoted to establishing the record. And this has not yet been done.

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